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The Still/Moving Field: An Introduction
Eivind Røssaak
This collection of essays seeks to introduce an affirmative critique of and fasci-
nation for the different uses of stillness and motion in a wide variety of expres-
sions – pre-cinematic, cinematic, post-cinematic and new media. The debate on
stillness and motion is as old as art history, but within cinema studies, it became
the subject of widespread debate during the s. At its root, it was informed
by apparatus theory and the idea of negating movement through enlighten-
ment. Its axiom was that cinematic movement is an illusion, that movement is
an “ideological effect of the cinematic apparatus.” Any artistic deconstruction
of motion through ruptures or the revelation of a series of stills was rapidly
integrated into this critical program. The still image was the hidden or even
repressed basis behind the industrial illusion of cinematic motion.
Today, we are experiencing a broad range of cinematic turns within the art
scene as well as a technological revolution through the use of computer-gener-
ated imagery, which means that the entire critical program, based as it was on
the materiality of celluloid, has lost some of its initial urgency. The use of the
interplay between stillness and motion must be recontextualized. Fresh con-
cepts are needed to see these works in a broader, more complex media aesthetic
environment. We want to investigate the possibility of a thicker description,
which allows contributors to discover and open up the field through close ana-
lysis of specific works and media practices. Contemporary media rely on a com-
plex connection between the forces and intensities of time and speed relations,
which affect the body of the spectator or user. The body is not just the carrier of
a personal history, but a storage site and an intensified receptive surface in a
media-saturated society. Thus, the body belongs to a history of media and med-
iations. A crucial part of this embodied media history involves the encounters
with audiovisual material such as in Tobias Rehberger’s work On Otto, dis-
cussed in Ina Blom’s article. Mediations and bodies participate in a larger collec-
tive and technical environment, which instantiates and re-imagines the history
of media and affects.
From Optical Toys to Computer Imaging
In a strange way, the history of images between the still and the moving returns
to the very origins of cinema; in fact, even earlier. The viewing pleasure of pre-
cinematic optical toys such as the thaumatrope, the stroboscopic disc and the
phenakistiscope stems from the paradoxical difference between what they look
like before and after the toy is activated. It is a mind-blowing ride from stasis to
kinesis and back. Early film exhibitors also addressed this experience. They
were concerned with demonstrating the abilities of the new medium of the ciné-
matographe, as the Lumière Brothers called their multipurpose machine. Time
and again, they would astonish their audiences with their special presentation
technique. Initially, the brothers Lumière presented the moving image as a pro-
jected still, before the projectionist brought the image to life by cranking up the
machine.
One hundred years later, one of the most striking features in contemporary
cinematic practices in movie theaters, art galleries, and new media platforms is
the frequent use of slow motion and other techniques of delay. It is as if the
moving image has become increasingly refashioned in the direction of demon-
strating its abilities to remain motionless, or to move in ways that are barely
visible. Several moving image artworks, particularly the ones in galleries and
museums, seem to excel in featuring indiscernible differences between motion
and stillness, in stops, still frames, freeze effects, slow-motion effects, and even
stuttering. According to art historian Boris Groys, the contemporary cinema of
delay and slow motion – from The Matrix to  Hour Psycho – negotiates
with its other – immobility – as a way of understanding its relationship to both
earlier forms of representation and to the mediascape of the contemporary con-
sumer. As Groys writes,
In the course of its long history of antagonism between the media, film has earned the
right to act as the icon of secularizing modernism. Inversely, by being transferred into
the traditional realms of art, film itself has, in turn, increasingly become the subject of
iconoclastic gestures: by means of new technology such as video, computer, and
DVD, the motion of film has been halted midstream and dissected.
In this way, cinema comes to reflect upon its destiny in a new media environ-
ment. The contemporary examples are many: from Bill Viola to Douglas Gor-
don, Sam Taylor-Wood, Sharon Lockhart and others. While some artists prefer
the latest media techniques like digital artist Jim Campbell, others hark back to
earlier techniques or combine new and old techniques like in the avant-garde
filmmaker Ken Jacobs’most recent works.
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We have also seen a growing awareness and conscious reflexivity regarding
mediation and new technology in pop videos as well as in commercial cinema.
Directors like Michel Gondry operate in both fields. The fame of a blockbuster
movie like The Matrix (Andy and Larry Wachowski, ) rests to a large ex-
tent on its striking use of special effects such as the so-called bullet-time effect.
This was a new, never-before-seen combination of slow motion and frozen
movement effects that was immediately copied in countless other cinematic
practices around the turn of the st century. These experiments are now often
mimicked in vernacular video and disseminated on platforms like YouTube.
The Spanish artist Sergio Prego devoted a series of low-budget videos to strange
versions of the bullet-time effect involving jumps and splashes of large chunks
of thick paint. It has become clear that the effect actually stems from the artist
Tim McMillan’s frozen-time experiments from , and even further, back to
Eadweard Muybridge’s photographic experiments from the s. Like a mi-
cro-genre in cinema, certain still/moving effects such as the bullet-time effect
seem to have travelled through all of the different registers of cinematic practice
from the big screen to YouTube, and from art galleries to computer games de-
veloped by a new generation of software artists producing a variety of genera-
tive or interactive images, like in Mario Klingemann’s work.
The aftermath of the th anniversary of cinema and the challenges from
new media have led to a reconsideration of what the moving image is and can
be, revealing the contingency of a certain order of the moving image we have
called cinema. This order is now passé. The moving image is no longer simply
something to be observed during a -minute screening in a darkened movie
theatre. Perhaps classical or institutional cinema will end up being the parenth-
esis and not the norm when it comes to studying the life and history of the
moving image. The ubiquity of the moving image in contemporary art and
communications has reopened the key question – what is a moving image? – in
new ways.
Assembling the Field: The Three Phases
The questioning of the moving image is no longer just the activity of film scho-
lars alone. It spans several disciplines from media, film, theatre, dance and art
history to anthropology and into architecture, information science, technology
and biology. This collection of essays tries to assemble the investigation of the
moving image around the emergence of the cross-disciplinary field we tenta-
tively call the still/moving field. This is a vital arena for inquiry regarding the
moving image after the end of cinema as we used to know it. Titles from the
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past decade such as: Stillness and Time: Photography and the Moving Image; Be-
tween Film and Screen: Modernism's Photo Synthesis; Death x a Second: Stillness
and the Moving Image; Still Moving: Between Cinema and Photography; Le cinéma de
l’immobilité, L’Entre-Image; Le temps exposé: Le Cinéma de la salle au musée; Freeze
Frames: Zum Verhältnis von Fotografie und Film; The Still/Moving Image: Cinema
and the Arts; Viva Fotofilm: Bewegt/Unbewegt, Cinema before Film; The Cinematic
and Stillness in a Mobile World, bear witness to the emergence of a still/moving
field.
For the sake of a tentative overview, I would argue that we can organize the
still/moving field in three partially chronological phases of mutually dependent
questioning: a turn to the in-between, a turn to history, and a turn to algorithms.
The turn to the in-between was, not surprisingly, first taken up in France. It
stems from Raymond Bellour’s long engagement with what he calls “l’entre-
images”, an ambiguous French neologism with multiple meanings: the be-
tween-the-images, the in-between-images, or the images in between, and it
deals, in many ways, with the aesthetic and ontological tensions and passages
between photography and film, stillness and motion. A key reference point in
the debate is Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida: Note sur la photographie (),
where he radically distinguishes between photography and cinema. In one es-
say, Barthes even comes close to asserting that the essence of cinema is found in
the still. A few years later, Gilles Deleuze wrote his seminal philosophical
study Cinéma I-II ( and ), in which he opposes the semiological gaze
(Christian Metz’ theory in particular) and anything that tends to immobilize
film, like calling film a language or asserting that cinematic movement is the
result of an illusion, etc. To him, movement and time become the all-determin-
ing factors for understanding cinema. Raymond Bellour’s position is important
for understanding the genesis of this field. In one of his most important articles
on the still/moving image, he places himself between Barthes and Deleuze, and
between Freud and Bergson; ultimately, between the still and the moving, to
explore the blind spots of these two positions. Bellour writes that
There is one category of time not considered by Gilles Deleuze in his dynamic taxon-
omy of images: the interruption of movement, the often unique, fugitive, yet perhaps
decisive instant when cinema seems to be fighting against its very principle, if this is
the movement-image. […] what kinds of instants does the interruption of movement
imply?
To Bellour, the interruption of movement emphasizes the fact that a film “can-
not be reduced to the overly natural time of illusion, indexing a time-space at
the juncture of the visible and the invisible”. Ultimately, immobility may pro-
duce a movement of emotion or the intellect not available in the movement-im-
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age. These movements of immobility are explored further by George Baker,
Christa Blümlinger and Liv Hausken in the present collection.
I would also place important contributions by Serge Daney and Laura Mul-
vey in this turn to the in-between. Their contributions are of a more political
character. They investigated how the still or uses of stillness in cinema also ad-
dress issues of psycho-social management and control. Laura Mulvey, in her
germinal article on “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (), asks why
the representation of women in cinema very often involves moments of stillness
and pause in the narrative. Women become an indispensable element of specta-
cle; “her visual presence tends to work against the development of a story line,
to freeze the flow of action in moments of erotic contemplation.” The woman as
an “alien presence” has no other value than “to-be-looked-at-ness,” Mulvey ar-
gues. Daney was also concerned with how cinema organizes the visual
through the freeze. As the language of modernist films was appropriated by
television, he observed that techniques of delay and the freeze-framing of an
object would rapidly become the visual language of commercials and consumer
industries. Now, a new generation of Hollywood directors like the Wachow-
ski Brothers (The Matrix, ), McG (Charlie’s Angels, ) and Baz Luhr-
mann would soon reappropriate the language of advertising back into cinema
to create a new kind of cinematic reflexivity on visual culture through rapid
changes and cuts between fixity and movement.
The turn toward the in-between opened up an important aesthetic and politi-
cal line of questioning with regard to the moving image, but it didn’t produce
much new knowledge as far as early film history is concerned. Philosophers
such as Gilles Deleuze viewed early cinema simply as a primitive cinema, un-
able to create the complexities of modern time-images. This would change with
the emergence of what has been called the New Film Historians. During the
s and s, New Film Historians such as Noël Burch, Tom Gunning, An-
dré Gaudreault, Thomas Elsaesser, Charles Musser and filmmakers like Ken Ja-
cobs would discover the riches of early film in multiple ways, and Kemp Niver’s
work to make available the large paper print collection at the Library of Con-
gress would instigate much new research. Burch and Gunning have concluded
that early film must be regarded as a system that functions according to a dif-
ferent logic of presentation than the modes and rules arriving later with the so-
called classical narrative cinema. The turn toward history also led to impor-
tant new research into the complexities of pre-cinema. Today, the work of Ead-
weard Muybridge and Etienne-Jules Marey is no longer simply viewed as pri-
mitive photography leading up to cinema, but as two complex and distinct
approaches to the analysis of motion. While Marey produced most of his se-
quential images on a single plate using a photographic gun, Muybridge used a
battery of cameras, each of which was separated from its neighbor by a variable
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distance, depending on the subject. One could perhaps say that Marey develops
the fixed-plate chronophotography into a registration of movements in time,
each image separated by equidistant intervals, while using a single fixed lens.
Muybridge develops the style into a registration of movements from different
places in space. In striking ways, Muybridge’s style is taken up again in later
digital capturing techniques such as the bullet-time effect in The Matrix ().
This research into pre-cinema and early cinema has instigated new ways of
looking into the relationship between stillness and motion. Tom Gunning’s,
Mark B.N. Hansen’s and Trond Lundemo’s articles in the present collection re-
late to this research. If Mulvey could be placed within the turn toward the in-
between, I would place Mary Ann Doane’s study of cinematic time and Linda
Williams’ study of stilled and moving bodies in the turn toward history. Even if
Williams addresses many of the concerns that Mulvey raises, the difference be-
tween them lies most obviously in Williams’ keen awareness of how both film
theory (such as psychoanalysis) and cinematic techniques from Muybridge’s pe-
riod to those employed today are “historically determined – and determining –
mechanisms of power and pleasure.”
The turn toward the algorithm is the last paradigm that I will consider in this
reconfiguration of the still/moving field. New technologies and new artistic stra-
tegies produce a new interrogation of the image. The turn toward the algorithm
could, as Laura Marks and others would argue, as easily be called a turn toward
information, code, the digital, the interface or the software. Researchers are
not yet in agreement with regard to exactly where the key change is to be found,
but what all these terms have in common is a critique of the image, in the sense
that much of critical attention has been directed toward the instability and mal-
leability of the image. The image is no longer a given, but an instantiation of
code to be algorithmically manipulated, processed and disseminated in endless
new ways. D.N. Rodowick argues in his work The Virtual Life of Film, that the
reason for this, is that while the relationship between input and output is con-
tinuous with regard to the analogue image, the relationship is discontinuous
with regard to the digital image. While Eivind Røssaak starts his discussion in
this volume at this juxtaposition, Mark B.N. Hansen focuses on the role of the
interface in contradistinction to a strong contemporary tradition. Jay David Bol-
ter and Richard Grusin stated in their now classic work Remediation that new
media tend to remediate older media like the page, the book, film or photogra-
phy, and Lev Manovich argued in his The Language of New Media that with the
computer “cinema is now becoming the cultural interface, a toolbox for all cul-
tural communication, overtaking the printed word.” This line of argument
tends to lose what is singular, different, and, indeed, “new” with new media,
according to Hansen; new media develop a visual interface onto new ways of
engaging with the world, with what he calls “movement variations.” Hansen
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addresses in particular how new media interfaces can foster a transduction be-
tween the human and the inhuman in ways not conceivable with cinema.
While both Manovich and Hansen address the interface as a new and flexible
gateway to old or new experiences either in terms of visuality or of embodi-
ment, Thomas Elsaesser thinks of interfaces “not primarily as visual, and not so
much as subject/object, inside/out, becomings or involving movement, but in-
stead instantiating invisible passages, bridges or zones, transit points or security
areas continuously upsetting the dichotomies of inside/outside, center/edge, im-
age/frame etc.” He quotes Alexander Galloway who writes: “Let me point out
that the word ‘interface’ has been unfortunately infected by a colloquial usage
designating screens, keyboards, controllers, and so on; I use the term instead in
the specific computer-scientific sense of an algorithmically and linguistically de-
termined bridge of inputs and outputs between two different code libraries.”
Galloway criticizes fundamentally the what-you-see-is-what-you-get logic (WYSI-
WYG-logic) of the interface. “The difficulty of the WYSIWYG logic is that it is
undeniably a lie […]. The interface lies about what it is doing in order to deliver
a more perfect experiential truth. Software knows it is true that it is false […], it
is necessary to demonstrate that the transparency of the new and the opacity of
the old are not natural qualities of media, but are the results of socially and
historically specific processes,” Galloway writes. The interface is the result of
syntactic techniques of encoding that exist behind the interface to create specific
effects. The interface is seen as a “control allegory”; it “asks a question and, in so
doing suggests an answer.” Systems theory and algorithms become key fac-
tors in understanding this new regime of control and manipulation. In other
words, the algorithmic turn implies both a critique of the visual layer of our
culture and a new way of understanding communication and aesthetics alto-
gether. Mark B.N. Hansen, Thomas Elsaesser, Arild Fetveit, Trond Lundemo,
Ina Blom and Eivind Røssaak demonstrate different ways of navigating
through this landscape in the present collection.
The Topics
Aesthetic astonishment and reflexivity have always nurtured the still/moving
field. The increased attention toward ambiguity and playfulness at stake in the
construction of the contemporary moving image, in the commercial cinema
theatres, in art galleries and on the Web, often demonstrate a self-conscious re-
search into the histories, uses and lives of images in an expanded media field.
Part of this reflexivity appears in a renewed interest in older, even pre-cinematic
techniques, and their media archaeological relationship to new media and im-
The Still/Moving Field: An Introduction 17
age technologies. This collection of articles traces these foldings and implosions
of the moving image theoretically and through examples. If Barthes began his
research into film from the still, this collection of articles commences with mo-
tion. Motion, here, is not considered an illusion based on a series of still images.
Indeed, the collection starts out with motion as a fact within the arts even before
cinema, in the form of philosophical toys. Another common feature among the
contributions is the keen interest in figuring out how forms of motion and
movement variation relate to certain affects and bodily emotions, and, as in
Blümlinger’s, Blom’s and Lundemo’s contributions, in particular, to certain
forms of power.
The book is divided into five sections, each dealing with the topic of stillness
and motion from a specific angle. The first section, “Philosophies of Motion”,
reinvestigates the question of whether images are actually in motion at all. Tom
Gunning’s article, “The Play Between Still and Moving Images: Nineteenth-Cen-
tury ‘Philosophical Toys’ and their Discourse” explores how the persistence of
vision thesis promoted the idea that perception deals primordially with still
images and represses the phenomenon of moving vision, which persists in the
description of the moving image as an “illusion”. By revisiting the scientific dis-
course on the processes of vision and the historical documents that first set out
to present and promote the new philosophical toys in the nineteenth century
such as the thaumatrope, the stroboscopic disc, the phenakistiscope, the an-
orthoscope and the zoetrope, Gunning proposes a new understanding of mo-
tion informed by phenomenology.
Mark B.N. Hansen continues his investigation into how new media engages
the body in new ways in his essay, “Digital Technics Beyond the ‘Last Machine’:
Thinking Digital Media with Hollis Frampton”. In his essay, “For a Metahistory
of Film”, filmmaker Hollis Frampton proposes moving beyond the divide be-
tween photography and cinema. Frampton embraced the wisdom of sculptor
August Rodin who, in reference to Muybridge, argued that “It is photograph
[sic] which is truthful, and the artist who lies, for in reality time does stop”.
What lies behind Frampton’s embrace of Rodin’s position here is, however, not
what we might first think, for in Frampton’s case, what is patently not at issue is
some claim for the superiority of one medium over another, in our case, of
photography over cinema. Rather, what is at stake is a distinction between two
types of time: what Frampton calls historical and ecstatic time, respectively. He
also links temporal ecstasies, and, hence, temporal caesura, to subjectivity.
Frampton is busy thinking of cinema as the “Last Machine”, as an “infinite cin-
ema”, a virtual or conceptual cinema that registers all appearances of the world,
taken from all possible vantage points, regardless of its artifactual embodiment.
According to Hansen, Frampton’s aesthetic is appropriate for a media age that
is constituted on top of digital technics, and more specifically, for a situation in
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which media forms are outputs that, in a crucial sense, are technically discontin-
uous from technical materiality. Hansen proposes exploring the aesthetic poten-
tialities of digital technics in the wake of Frampton’s conception of infinite cin-
ema.
While the previous section addresses the inherent ability of images to take on
various types of motion, the next section, “The Use of Freeze and Slide Motion”,
highlights film’s affinity with arrest and the still image. Christa Blümlinger in-
vestigates the use of freeze-frame, or the visual standstill, in R.W. Fassbinder’s
films. When Garrett Stewart defined the figure of the freeze-frame as a repro-
duced, projected individual image that entails the suspension of the sequence
and the negation of the filmic image, he considers this form of interruption –
with an eye on the narrative cinema – as having the potential of a critical in-
quiry and the possibility of ‘filmic reflexivity’within a narration. To Blümlinger,
this cannot always be taken for granted. Each case has to be analyzed concre-
tely. While the freeze-frame in the classical cinema is quite rare, it’s only because
the classical cinema developed other modes of stasis and fascination. Serge Da-
ney argues that advertising, video clips, and the films based on these forms to-
day mobilize an excess of visual standstills that become a form of exchange
between visual regimes. Blümlinger shows how various stylistic figures found
in Fassbinder’s films have, despite the seriality of some productions, led some
critics to place his work in modern auteurist cinema. But the figure of the stand-
still in Fassbinder’s work has seldom been noted until now, probably because it
often appears marginally – in a literal sense. For Fassbinder, the freeze-frame
was a specific form of visual standstill that can be found as a figure of brief
cessation or sudden interruption usually at the beginning or end of his films. To
Blümlinger, Fassbinder’s standstill by no means just represents a kind of bana-
lized repetition of a modern stylistic figure in the wake of the New Wave, but
rather is tied to a certain idea of film and a kind of media theory.
Liv Hausken’s “The Temporality of the Narrative Slide-Motion Film” elabo-
rates some of the challenges posed when one explores a slide-motion film. Vi-
sually, a slide-motion film like Año Uña consists of photographic stills, mainly
sequences of freeze-frames. Auditively, it is like any live action film, with music,
diegetic sound, sound effects, and, unlike Chris Marker’s well-known La jetée,
Año Uña even contains dialogue. The tension between the past and the pre-
sent, the absent and the arriving, is, nevertheless, quite different from the film
expression of La jetée, not least because of the architecture of the diegetic
space. Through an analysis of the spatiotemporal complexity of the narrative
slide-motion film, Hausken tries to show how these films seem to demonstrate
the materiality of the moving image as well as question nearly all of the basic
film analytic terms.
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“The Cinematic Turn in the Arts” section is devoted to three investigations of
artistic strategies connected to the cinematic turn within the art scene. In “Stop/
Motion”, Thomas Elsaesser initially gives a broad overview of some of the most
discussed artists and works in this trend, before moving on to discuss the more
complex issues facing both cinema and the museum when they marry. “One of
the most powerful forces at work in bringing museum and moving image into a
new relation with each other is the programmatic reflexivity of the museum and
the self-reference of the modern art-work”, Elsaesser writes. Entering a museum
is like crossing a special kind of threshold, of seeing objects not only in their
material specificity and physical presence, but also in understanding this ‘there-
ness’ as a special kind of statement, as both a question and a provocation. This
‘produced presence’ of modernist art is both echoed and subverted by moving
image installations, often in the form of new modes of performativity and self-
display that tend to involve the body of the artist.
In After “Photography’s Expanded Field”, George Baker revisits his very in-
fluential essay, “Photography‘s Expanded Field”, to extrapolate on the forms
and possibilities opened up by the expansion of the medium of photography
and its relationship to motions and emotions as forms of subjectivity. He speci-
fically investigates the motivations for why so many contemporary artists posi-
tion their practice between mediums, or engage in the cinematic opening of the
still photograph. Another way of stating this radicalization would be to say that
Baker’s concern today is less with the ‘objective’ or structural mapping per-
formed in his earlier essay; the interpenetration of forms, the expansion of med-
iums like the photograph also has a “subjective” logic, and thus Baker turns to
the desiring politics of the expansion of photography.
In “On On Otto: Moving Images and the New Collectivity”, Ina Blom inves-
tigates the German visual artist Tobias Rehberger’s ambitious ‘film’ project On
Otto, which is not really a motion picture, but a project that involves all of the
production steps and competences of a normal ‘Hollywood’ movie, including
roles for, among others, Kim Basinger, Danny DeVito, Willem Dafoe, Justin
Henry and music composed by Ennio Morricone. Blom considers this project as
part of a series of works in the field of contemporary art that explore media
apparatuses as complex systems intimately intertwined with the practices of
life and labor. Blom rethinks or recontextualizes the questions of stillness, cin-
ematic motion and collective emotion through the multiple cinematic materials
in the project On Otto, which are displayed, not primarily on screens, but in an
architectural/sculptural environment that addresses social structures in a new
way.
The fourth section, “The Algorithmic Turn”, revisits some of the topics from
the first section and explores how the logic of the computer generates a new
audiovisual culture. While the first section discusses the issues in a more phe-
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nomenological and philosophical sense, this section explores a series of contem-
porary pop videos and “software cinema”. In “Mutable Temporality In and Be-
yond the Music Video: An Aesthetic Post-Production”, Arild Fetveit delineates
a new post-production aesthetic. He sees the aesthetic strategy of the sampling
of pre-existing material across different media as prevalent in a range of articu-
lations across the worlds of both art and media. New forms of temporality have
also evolved with extended uses of slow motion and curious forms of mutable
temporalities, where the movements of bodies are controlled not only during
the recording, but also in the later re-working of the footage. What emerges
from these developments, according to Fetveit, is a new post-production aes-
thetic, where post-human embodiment can sometimes be observed.
Eivind Røssaak, in his “Algorithmic Culture: Beyond the Photo/film Divide”,
investigates how the still/moving issue has been transformed from a matter con-
cerning media specificities to one that has become part of a larger culture of
interactivity and exchange. He opposes the nostalgia for authenticity and in-
dexicality that is so prevalent in traditional film studies and contends that digi-
tal images are no longer one image, but a multiplicity, beyond the photo/film
divide and always open to new forms. This alters some of the typical uses of
stillness and motion within new media experiments. Rather than relying on the
notion of remediation, Røssaak develops a notion of the moving image as a
processual and sensitive system governed by algorithms and machines attuned
to the nervous system of a collective memory. Røssaak presents a series of ex-
amples to explore the new dimension of the multiple image. His examples come
from the history of photography, the software cinema of Ken Jacobs and Gregg
Biermann and from newer interactive Web media such as Mario Klingemann’s
work.
The final section, “Archives in Between” includes Trond Lundemo’s discus-
sion of Albert Kahn’s archive, Les Archives de la planète, which has significant
ramifications for comprehending the relationship between film and photogra-
phy and contemporary digitalization. Albert Kahn created Les Archives de la pla-
nète between  and  using color photography, film and (to a lesser ex-
tent) stereoscopy. This means that the archive, both conceptually and physically,
depends on connections and divisions between still and moving images. These
intersections between the still and the moving depict a constituting heterogene-
ity of the archive subsequent to the introduction of time-based media. “Move-
ment is also at the core of the entrance of the anonymous and the mass into
visibility”, Lundemo asserts. Kahn wanted to make an “inventory of the surface
of the globe inhabited and developed by man as it presents itself at the start of
the th century in order to fix once and for all the practices, the aspects and the
modes of human activity, whose fatal disappearance is only a question of time.”
With few exceptions, the film shots in Les Archives de la planète were not edited
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for exploitation and remained as raw “rushes” to be revived at a later time. The
archive, according to Lundemo, was based on Kahn’s anticipation that various
modes of human activity were about to undergo a “fatal disappearance”. These
images describe places one cannot visit in the future, and are as such emble-
matic of modern mankind’s experience. The survival of these images now de-
pends on the convergence of various media as a result of their digitization. Lun-
demo discusses in great detail both the problems and the possibilities of this
digital encoding of our photographic and filmic past.
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Cinema is an art of the moving image, yet materially it could be said simply to
be made up from a series of still images. This apparent paradox between still
and moving images has been noted by nearly all accounts of cinema, but resol-
ving this exchange between stillness and motion, or rather the transformation of
one into the other, still eludes both empirical scientific explanation and, I feel,
reflects deeply rooted ideological prejudices. The moving image, I claim, consti-
tutes a sort of a scandal, which has been consistently resolved by being de-
scribed as an illusion, something in other words that does not “really” exist. I
want to explore the complexities of the introduction of the moving image in the
nineteenth century and the limitations that come from seeing simply as an illu-
sion.
Persistence of Vision: Vision and Its Fallacies
Jonathan Crary has claimed that nineteenth-century visual devices focused on
the question of the body and the senses, emphasizing defining and measuring
the processes of the body and the senses and thereby disciplining them. Thus
the nineteenth century approached vision in a new mode: “Vision, rather than a
privileged form of knowing, becomes itself an object of knowledge, of observa-
tion. From the beginning of the nineteenth century a science of vision will tend
to mean increasingly an interrogation of the physiological make-up of the hu-
man subject, rather than the mechanics of light and optical transmission.” Op-
tical illusions do not simply obscure the truth about the world, but rather offer
new information about the process of perceiving and the perceiver’s body.
Focusing on human perception redefined the complex problem of seeing
things that are “not there.” Discovering the nature of visual illusion revealed
the essential processes of vision, just as knowledge of disease reveals the pro-
cesses of the health. The most common form of seeing something which was
“not there” may be the afterimage, which at the turn of the nineteenth century
became the subject of intense investigation. Close attention to this subjective
phenomenon exemplified the new attitude towards perception that Crary de-
scribes. The way afterimages were described and the role they played within
the optical devices known as philosophical toys, which produced moving
images, vividly reveals the assumptions generated and the tensions raised by
the moving image in this new intellectual and technological context.
Contemporary perceptual psychologist R.L. Gregory defines afterimages (of
which there are both positive and negative types) as “the continuing firing of
the optic nerve after the stimulation”. In other words, after an object has been
removed from the field of vision an image of it lingers, due, in Gregory’s expla-
nation, to a physical process within the retina, especially if the object were
bright or the gaze fixated. By means of an afterimage we paradoxically see an
object even in its absence. This phenomenon had been observed for centuries,
including discussions by Aristotle, Ptolemy, Ibn al Haytham and Leonardo da
Vinci. The afterimage forms the most dramatic example of what are often
called “subjective visual phenomenon”, i.e. seeing images that result from a
bodily response rather than from a “sampling” of the world. Studying and de-
monstrating this phenomenon led to the first proliferation of optical philosophi-
cal toys. As Crary puts it, “beginning in the mid-s, the experimental study
of afterimages led to the invention of a number of related optical devices and
techniques.” These devices announced the invention of modern motion pic-
tures and popularized the concept of the persistence of vision as the means of
creating an illusion of apparent motion.
“The persistence of vision” exemplifies the nineteenth century’s understand-
ing of visual illusions as primarily a physiological phenomenon, which can be
demonstrated, triggered and even measured through mechanical and optical
devices. Few concepts have been evoked so often in relation to visual devices
and especially moving images, and yet so disputed as this one. As an explana-
tion of the phenomenon of apparent motion it has now basically been dis-
carded, but still must be dealt with as a revealing historical and cultural legacy
(and one that displays its own phantom persistence, as perceptual psychologists
like Joseph and Barbra Anderson have lamented). As Mary Ann Doane has put
it “The theory of persistence of vision may be “wrong”, but the question re-
mains – why was it so firmly ensconced and what function did it serve in the
th century?” The attitude toward vision maintained by the persistence of
vision thesis, reveals the interface nineteenth century scientists thought they
had discovered (and in many senses had manufactured) between human percep-
tion and the machine. The attraction of the theory for the nineteenth century, I
believe lies largely in its essentially mechanical view of the human sensorium
(and its persistence in some accounts of cinema to this date indicates how much
a mechanical view of perception and cognition still underlies the assumptions
most people maintain about vision). Persistence of vision and the optical de-
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vices I discuss here form a circular logic in which the devices are the cause of
visual illusions as well as demonstrating their explanation. Besides spawning
images of motion, these devices forged a new dependent relation between the
still and the moving image, as each enacted the trick of a transition from a static
image to a moving image. However, we might claim the real trick lies in making
the moving images appear as nothing more than a peculiarly tricky modifica-
tion of the still image, an epiphenomenon founded in the inert and reliable still
image. That the theory of persistence of vision has been debunked therefore
takes on more significance than simply a passing moment in the explanatory
fashions of science. Persistent afterimages offered a theory of perception which
parsed movement into static phases and still images, an attempt thereby not
only to discipline the moving image, but to dissolve its movement into its oppo-
site.
So what is this theory in which movement is paradoxically explained through
persistence? The theory is founded on the fact that motion picture devices
(whether the first nineteenth-century devices such as the phenakistiscope or zoe-
trope or the later motion picture films) all employ a continuous series of still
drawings or photographs depicting separate phases of an action on some sort of
material support. A device moves these still images through some sort of viewer
at a sufficient speed to create what is often called “apparent motion”. A dancer
dances, a horse gallops, a man walks. How does this happen? In  one of the
earliest books published on the nature of cinema, Frederic Talbot’s Moving Pic-
tures: How They Are Made and Worked provides an especially vivid description:
Suppose, for instance, that a series of pictures depicting a man walking along the
street, are being shown on the screen. In the first picture the man is shown with his
left foot in the air. This remains in sight for / of a second, and then disappears
suddenly. Though the picture has vanished from the eye, the brain still persists in
seeing the left foot slightly raised. One thirty second part of a second later the next
picture shows the man with his left foot on the ground. The shops, houses, and other
stationary objects in the second image occupy the positions shown in the first picture,
and consequently the dying impression of these objects is revived, while the brain
receives the impression that the man has changed the position of his foot in relation
to the stationary objects, and the left foot which was raised melts into the left foot
upon the ground. The eye imagines that it sees the left foot descend.
The first book written about film by an experimental psychologist, The Photoplay
a Psychological Study, was published in  by Hugo Munsterberg and offered a
summary – as well as an early rejection – of the persistence of vision theory in
psychological terms:
Every picture of a particular position left in the eye an afterimage until the next pic-
ture with the slightly changed position of the jumping animal or the marching men
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was in sight, and the afterimage of this again lasted until the third came. The after-
images were responsible for the fact that no interruption was noticeable, while the
movement itself resulted simply from the passing of one position into another. What
else is the perception of movement but the seeing of a long series of different posi-
tions? If instead of looking through the Zoetrope we watch a real trotting horse on a
real street, we see its whole body in ever-new progressing positions and its legs in all
phases of motion; and this continuous series is our perception of the movement it-
self.
Munsterberg wryly comments on the theory: “This seems very simple. Yet it
was slowly discovered that the explanation is far too simple…”
Munsterberg put the crux of the critique (which has basically stood to today,
although many film scholars seem unaware of it) succinctly as, “The perception
of movement is an independent experience which cannot be reduced to a simple
seeing of a series of different positions.” Munsterberg claims that a “higher
mental act” is superadded to the physiological process, which he admits does
not fully explain the phenomenon. While contemporary theories of perception
do not deny the phenomenon of an afterimage and the apparent motion that the
older theory sought to explain, they agree that simply retaining a series of after-
images in different positions cannot automatically yield a moving image (the
effect would more likely be that of multiple superimpositions). Contemporary
theories have broken the motion into multiple interrelating factors, whose com-
plexities still allow some degree of controversy and uncertainty, even if the in-
adequacy of the old theory cannot be disputed. As the Andersons show, the
phenomenon of persistence of vision as the explanation of the continuous mov-
ing image can be broken into two issues:
Why is the image continuous, and why does it move? In other words, why do the
separate frames appear continuous rather than as the intermittent flashes of light
which we know them to be? And why do the figures on the screen appear to move
about in smooth motion when we know they are in fact still pictures?
Not long after the emergence of cinema, perceptual psychology already sup-
plied alternative explanations to the persistence of vision thesis, as Munsterberg
was aware. In  Max Wertheimer took up the issue of apparent motion and
his critique of the persistence of vision theory inaugurated the beginning of Ge-
stalt psychology by questioning the mechanistic assumptions of previous per-
ceptual psychology. Wertheimer attributed apparent motion to three factors,
summarized by the Andersons as: () beta movement (the object at A seen as
moving across the intervening space to position B), () partial movement (each
object seen moving a short distance), and () phi movement (objectless or pure
motion). Writing more recently R.L. Gregory’s classic account of visual per-
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ception Eye and Brain simplifies the situation and states that the continuous ac-
tion as seen in a motion picture film “relies upon two rather distinct visual facts.
The first is persistence of vision, and the second the so-called phi phenomenon.”
Most perceptual psychologists today agree that multiple factors contribute to
apparent motion.
Playing with Vision: The Thaumatrope
Picking up and playing with a nineteenth-century optical device allows anyone
to re-experience the transformation of a still image into…something else. Be-
yond demonstrating the phenomenon of the afterimage or apparent movement
the fascination these images draw from us endures. A true phenomenology of
that experience may be sharpened through attention to successive theories of
vision, but it also exceeds the context of the history of science. The moving im-
age breaks out of its intended context when its playfulness triumphs over its
philosophy.
The Thaumatrope, one of the earliest optical philosophical toys, has a some-
what indirect relation to apparent motion, but demonstrates the flicker fusion
aspect of persistence of vision quite dramatically, through its ability to fuse a
continuous image from two rapidly alternated separate images. As Crary says
of the Thaumatrope, “Similar phenomenon had been observed in earlier centu-
ries merely by spinning a coin and seeing both sides at the same time, but this
was the first time the phenomenon was given a scientific explanation and a de-
vice was produced to be sold as a popular entertainment. The simplicity of this
‘philosophical toy’made unequivocally clear both the fabricated and the hallu-
cinatory nature of its image and the rupture between perception and its ob-
ject.”
The purveyor and promoter of the Thaumatrope, John Ayrton Paris was a
distinguished medical doctor and scientific author who had used his philoso-
phical toy to demonstrate the principle of persistence of vision to the Royal So-
ciety in . But he aggressively promoted the device’s role as an educational
toy and wrote a rather long novelistic account of how toys and games could
teach young people the nature of the universe and their own perceptions. This
 book (so popular it went through several editions and revisions) embeds
these devices into a very revealing discourse of popular nineteenth century
science. Its title says it all: Philosophy in Sport Made Science in Earnest: An attempt
to illustrate the first principles of natural philosophy by the aid of popular toys and
sports. The chapter he devotes to the Thaumatrope opens with a clear argument
for the educational use of illusions: questioning human senses and demonstrat-
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ing their unreliability. According to Paris, the trick of the Thaumatrope lies not
just in the hand, but lurks concealed in the eye itself, whose nature is revealed
by the device. Paris’ narrator, Mr. Seymour, declares to his young charge, “I will
now show you that the eye also has its source of fallacy.” His adult interlocutor,
the local vicar, exclaims “If you proceed in this manner, you will make us into
Cartesians.” Paris provides a useful footnote to explain the term:
The Cartesians maintained that the senses were the great sources of deception; that
everything with which they present us ought to be suspected as false, or at least du-
bious, until our reason has confirmed the report.
Mr. Seymour translates the toy’s name to mean “Wonderturner, or a toy which
performs wonders by turning round.” The Thaumatrope’s wonder is “founded
upon the well-known optical principle, that an impression made on the retina of
the eye lasts for a short interval after the object that produced it has been with-
drawn.” The twirling of the card causes the images on each side to appear
before the eye as if present at the same instant, which Seymour describes as, “a
very striking and magical effect.”
As with most philosophical toys, the lessons of the Thaumatrope depended
on the manipulator not only being in control of the device, but also being able to
examine its elements both in motion and stillness. Anyone could see that each
side of the disk presented only a part of the composite image which spinning
produced. Thus the illusion could both be produced and deconstructed by the
child who operated the device. The classic Thaumatrope composite images (e.g.
a bird + a cage; a vase + flowers; a horse + a rider; a bald man (or woman) and a
wig) did not present a moving image at all, but rather a sort of superimposition,
merging two separate pictures into a new unity.
The Thaumatrope displays the fascination produced by an optically pro-
duced image. Paris claims the composite image derives from a “fallacy” of the
eye. Most discussions of persistence of vision claim it results from a “defect” or
“weakness” of the eye. Herein presumably lies at least one basis for the produc-
tion of motion being described as a trick or deception (Talbot says “the camera
is a more perfect trickster than the most accomplished prestidigitator”). The
spinning disc is faster than the eye. The illusion presumably derives from the
lingering, persistent afterimage, by which we see something after it has, in fact,
vanished from our visual field, or, in the case of the Thaumatrope’s composite
image, we see an image which does not strictly correspond to anything in rea-
lity (there is no “bird in a cage”, only a bird on one side of a card and a cage on
the other). This image is the product, Paris seems to claim, of a collusion be-
tween the device and our eye, or, alternatively the tricky device has taken ad-
vantage of the weakness of our eye (C.W. Ceram in fact refers to the “laggard
sense of sight” in describing Plateau’s experiments with afterimages, and Tal-
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bot intones about motion pictures, “The illusion is wholly due to one glaring
deficiency of the human eye, of which the utmost advantage has been taken”)
in order to make us believe we see something that does not, in fact, exist.
I have always found such description of this ability to blend two images into
a single one as a imperfection of the eye curious and extremely Cartesian, in the
sense of driving a wedge between what we know and what we see – and decid-
edly valuing what we know over what we see. Following Paris’s cue, we might
view the Thaumatrope as a machine for producing young Cartesians, as much
as illusions. But to understand this new form of image, I think we must let the
movement speak rather than concentrate exclusively on the explanation. When
I twirl a Thaumatrope, although I do see a composite image, I do not mistake it
for the equivalent of the images imprinted on either side of the disk. The image
has an unfamiliar quality. It is less material than the printed images, and, as
Paris stresses, less opaque; I can in effect see through it. I am inclined to think
of it as visual rather than tactile, something I can see but not touch. And yet I
am very aware of its production (and my manual role in producing it). Mary
Ann Doane, one of the few film scholars who attempts to describe the image
produced by optical devices, captures its odd nature which she indicates
aligned it with the possibility of deception and trickery: “The image of move-
ment itself was nowhere but in the perception of the viewer – immaterial, ab-
stract, and thus open to practice of manipulation and deception. The toys could
not work without this fundamental dependence upon an evanescent, intangible
image.” Most likely this is best described as a “virtual image” an image whose
existence consists in its appearance and effects rather than its materiality, and
which, in relation to optics, the OED defines as an “image resulting from the
effect of reflection or refraction upon rays of light” (thus David Brewster used
the term in  to describe the effect of an image appearing behind the mirror
caused by a convex mirror). As a trick, this virtual image surprises me, not only
because I know it isn’t “really there,” but because I participate in its appearance.
As simple as the device is, the Thaumatrope cannot function without someone
serving as simultaneous viewer and manipulator. The image appears as the re-
sult of this interaction. As Doane states about early optical devices, “The tangi-
bility of the apparatus and the materiality of the images operated as a form of
resistance to this abstraction, assuring the viewer that the image of movement
could be produced at will, through the labor of the body, and could, indeed, be
owned as a commodity.” The viewer of the Thaumatrope was both the aston-
ished spectator and the producer of the image. Mannoni reproduces a Thauma-
trope with a painter before a blank canvas on the one side and a small portrait
of a lady on the other. Twirling the disc, the resulting composite image places
the lady on the canvas, as if stressing the device’s role in creating, not just a
composite, but a composite image.
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But if we are aware of the act of twirling the Thaumatrope as a form of pro-
duction, we are also aware that it produces only an ephemeral image that
vanishes as soon as the turning stops. While the implication of Paris’s Cartesian
discourse is that the Thaumatrope should make us aware of the feeble and de-
ceptive aspect of our senses, I wonder if the imagery of the discs, their often
irreverent sense of humor and fantasy encourages such sober disillusionment. I
want to stress the ludic and aesthetic dimension of the toy, the delight that
comes from playing with oneself and one’s perception. Why, in fact, shouldn’t
this ability to see the superimposed image be viewed as a faculty, an ability,
rather than a defect? I experience the production of this virtual image as extend-
ing my conception of vision rather than experiencing some sort of failure to
maintain the distinction between the two images. After all, this is a toy, a device
to give pleasure, not cause frustration. We certainly feel as we twist the thread
of the Thaumatrope and watch the image it produces that we are escaping the
ordinary, that we are seeing in a different manner; we glimpse a virtual world.
Although the superimposed image may not necessarily produce an image of
motion, it is an image in motion and therein lies its uniqueness. What it does not
resemble is the fixed and static image that constitutes the norm of pictorial ex-
pression (a norm, I believe, we could claim that the art of picture-making also
constantly challenges and re-conceives). To claim that the Thaumatrope-pro-
duced image does not exist or exists simply as an illusion, reveals a prejudice
towards perception as a static process, veracity as something viewable only
from a fixed and stable perspective, vision understood as a still picture. I am
claiming that the moving image fascinates partly because of its constant im-
pulse to exceed what is already known and already grasped, in favor of mobile
possibilities.
Wheels of Life: Flickering Moving Images
The optical devices that succeeded the Thaumatrope produced not just super-
imposed virtual images, but images that moved, using revolving wheels or
drums with slots or indentations through which the viewer peered. The aper-
ture provided by the viewing slot not only turns what would otherwise be a
continuous blur into a stable visible image, but also inscribes the viewer into
the apparatus, setting a place and means for observation and controlling it with
precision. The breakdown of a continuous movement into a series of flashes or
flickers – basically the creation of shutter effect – was essential for the produc-
tion of motion in nearly all cinematic devices to come. As Austrian scientist
Simon Stampfer explained its function in his stroboscopic disc in , “the
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light falling on the change of the images is interrupted, and the eye receives
only a momentary visual impression of each separate image when it is in the
proper position.” The production of motion was founded upon a breakdown
of vision into flashes, flickers of instantaneous vision produced by a rapidly
revolving shutter. The complexity of effects triggered by this simple device is
worth extensive contemplation. Stampfer indicates the role of the aperture and
shutter in aligning image and viewer and exposing the still images to a brief
view in such a way that the transition between images is occluded. Like a me-
chanical conjuror, the shutter hid the moment of change (when one image re-
placed another) from view.
Paris’s book for young scientists explains the apparent movement produced
by these devices in terms of a theory of motion which claims that perceiving
motion is less something seen than something deduced: “Now it is evident, that
before the eye can ascertain a body to be in motion, it must observe it in two
successive portions of time, in order to compare its change of place.” He sup-
ports this statement with a quote from Lord Brougham (Lord Chancellor and
member of the Royal Society), “Our knowledge of motion is a deduction of rea-
soning, not a perception of sense; it is derived from the comparison of two posi-
tion; the idea of a change of place is the result of that comparison attained by a
short process of reasoning.” This claim seems somewhat different from the
more physiologically based persistence of vision theory, but it reveals a central
prejudice about the actual perception of motion: that motion must be the pro-
duct of a mental (or physical) processing of still images. This persistence of the
still image as the true substance of the moving image is the specter that haunts
the nineteenth-century understanding of the moving image.
While the explanations of vision offered by Lord Brougham resolve motion
back into still images, the toys more commonly ran the other way, as is seen in
the Phenakistiscope, invented by Belgian scientist Joseph Plateau (and basically
identical in principle and manufacture to the Stroboscope invented and pre-
sented about the same time by Simon Stampfer). Curiously, Plateau first pro-
duced a device whose turning wheel and aperture and shutter mechanism pro-
duced a still image rather than a moving one. In the Anorthoscope (described
by Mannoni) a distorted anamorphic drawing rotated and viewed through a
revolving slotted disc produced a “perfectly steady and recognizable image.”
Although produced for sale in , the Anorthoscope was a commercial fail-
ure, while Plateau’s next revolving wheel toy, set off what Mannoni has called a
“Phenakistiscope craze.” It could be claimed that this device provided the first
unambiguous example of a optical moving image. The name of the device, de-
rived from the Greek phenax – cheater or deceiver – marked the view it offered
as deceptive. Here is Plateau’s physical description of the device:
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The apparatus …essentially consists of a cardboard disc pierced along its circumfer-
ence with a certain number of small openings and carrying painted figures on one of
its sides. When the disc is rotated about its center facing a mirror, and looking with
one eye opposite the opening… the figures are animated and execute movements.
The viewer holds the device by a handle in one hand while peering through the
slots and sets the wheel turning, usually spinning it with a single finger of her
other hand. The slots punctuate the vision of images on the moving disc as
Stampfer described, converting the passing figures into a flickering series of in-
dividual images (or rather producing a single moving image) rather than a con-
tinuous blur.
Apparently the idea of a moving figure came to Plateau only after his experi-
ments with the “illusion” of a still image produced by the Anorthoscope. He
had also demonstrated the apparent stillness of a rapidly revolving device with
a repeated identically drawn figure. As the wheel revolved with some sixteen
figures of a standing man drawn on its periphery, the figure appears within the
viewing slots as a single static image. Mannoni theorizes that the example of the
Thaumatrope may then have inspired Plateau to the next crucial move. Now
the figures drawn on the periphery portrayed a single figure engaged in the
successive stages of a simple repetitive motion: a dance, sawing wood, opening
one’s mouth in a grimace, juggling balls, or, perhaps most mesmerizingly, a se-
ries of abstract geometrical gyrations and transformations. As William B. Car-
penter, vice president of the Royal Society, pointed out in , the Phenakisti-
scope substituted “for the repetition of similar impressions…a series of
gradationally varied impressions, produced by drawings of the same figure in
different positions.” Although the succession of poses yields a single progres-
sive action, the revolving wheel makes it a potentially endless cycle, with no
clear conclusion, other than that caused by the operator/viewer’s boredom or
manual fatigue. The movement portrayed here is posed between brevity and
endlessness, an instant of action or an eternity of Sisyphean repetition, the first
appearance of the cinematic loop that evades the linearity of action through its
circular technology. The most famous of Plateau’s phenakistiscope disc shows a
male dancer performing a pirouette. The dancer performs a -degree turn.
Like most of his contemporaries, Plateau believed the device demonstrated
the natural outcome of optical afterimages, as for the first time explicitly sub-
sumed under persistence of vision:
If several objects that differ sequentially in terms of form are represented one after
another to the eye in very brief intervals and sufficiently close together, the impres-
sion they produce on the retina will blend together without confusion and one will
believe that a single object is gradually changing form and position.
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One could see this pirouetting dancer as the origin of the optical moving image
(in other words, as a continuous moving image produced by an optical device).
Like the Thaumatrope, the Phenakistiscope or Stampfer’s Stroboscope create a
virtual image, an optical phenomenon that is not identical to any of the images
that make it up. Rather than an image with a single material base it is a percep-
tual image produced by motion, and thus virtual. In this sense it could be called
a “trick” produced as it is by a device that must be operated. But the same
process of revolving disc and slotted shuttered viewing could produce an
equally “tricked” still image, as in Plateau’s Anorthoscope (or the more famous
Faraday Wheel). Motion is necessary for the trick, but the trick does not have to
yield a moving image.
But the effect of the motion produced remains powerful, and Paris describes
“the great astonishment they felt, at observing the figures in constant motion,
and exhibiting the most grotesque attitudes.” In spite of these uncanny and gro-
tesque effects, Paris, however, (or his narrator) uses the device to explain our
normal perception of motion:
Each figure is seen through the aperture and as it passes and is succeeded in rapid
succession by another and another, differing from the former in attitude, the eye is
cheated into the belief of its being the same object successively changing the position
of its body. Consider what takes place in an image on the retina when we actually
witness a man in motion; for instance, a man jumping over a gate, in the first moment
he appears on the ground, in the next his legs are a few winches above it, in the third
they are nearly on a level with the rail, in the fourth he is above it, and then in the
successive moments he is seen descending as he had previously risen. A precisely
similar effect is produced on the retina, by the successive substitution of figures in
corresponding attitudes as through the orifices of the revolving disc; each figure re-
maining on the retina long enough to allow its successor to take its place without an
interval that would destroy the illusion.
The true sleight of hand employed here is that the devices that produce motion
from a series of still images are now being used to explain – not the process of
the toy itself – but normal human perception. If the toy creates an illusion of
motion, one wonders if the precisely similar process of the toy and what hap-
pens “when we actually witness” motion indicates that all perception of motion
should also be considered an illusion, and if not why not? Like Lord Broug-
ham’s description of movement as a process of reasoning and comparing, Paris’s
explanation of actually witnessing movement starts from the assumption that in
perception the still image is primary, that movement consists of a mental deduc-
tion based on comparing static positions. What we see happening in Broug-
ham’s explanation and Paris’s lesson drawn from the Phenakistiscope – and this
is one reason the discourse about the invention of cinema involves more than
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simply a technical history – is human perception being modeled on a mechan-
ical explanation of a mechanical device (rather than exploring the new device in
terms of human perception).
The Phenakistiscope generated a number of offspring, all of which similarly
animated drawn successive figures in loops of repetitive motion when viewed
through revolving devices. The most popular was the Zoetrope, in which, as
Carpenter described it, “We look through slits in the side of a vertical revolving
drum at the interior of the opposite side of the drum…and when one of the long
strips covered with figures is placed in the lower part of the drum, and is
viewed through the slits in its near side, the effect is exactly the same as that
produced by looking through the slits near the margin of the disks of the Phe-
nakistiscope.”
The Moving Image: More than an Illusion
It is worth pausing at this threshold in the nature of imagery that the Phenakis-
tiscope and its successors crossed. Since the beginning of culture, movement has
played a role within art works through the physical movement of actors and
dancers, puppets and automatons, or shadows and pictorial figures. But with
these mechanical devices we actually see moving images produced optically. I
maintain this marks a revolutionary moment in the history of the image – one
we have not fully appreciated or explored. To describe the perception achieved
by these devices without recourse to the mechanical description of how they
operate remains a challenge, precisely because their effect overturns our domi-
nant concept of representation as a picture. We are more comfortable describing
how the devices work than how they affect us as viewers.
Let me be clear. These devices do not represent motion; they produce it. They
do not give us a picture of motion (such as a comic strip panel of Ignatz Mouse’s
brick sailing through the air with lines indicating its trajectory); they make pic-
tures move. For perceptual reasons, which we still understand only in part, we
actually see movement, provided the apparatus is properly made and operated.
Earlier devices represent, or allude to, movement through multiples pictures.
Magic lantern slides, protean or transforming pictures (pictures showing differ-
ent images depending on a change in light) and even Thaumatropes could re-
present different phases of an action, although in a limited number (usually
two). A trick lantern slide showing a dancer in two successive poses could be
manipulated rapidly and smoothly and give an impression of motion through
this alternation. But a viewer is always aware of the individual static phases and
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the gap between them. The Phenakistiscope generated a new sort of image, an
image that moved.
The reader might observe that my task in describing this threshold might be
easier if I simply described what the Phenakistiscope produces as an “illusion”
of motion. But this is a thorny term and I don’t want to descend into philosophi-
cal conundrums. From one viewpoint I would agree we are dealing with some-
thing like an illusion, in that the successive drawings of Plateau’s dancer never
move – except in a Phenakistiscope. But I am not willing to say that when the
wheel is spun and I look through the aperture I do not see a figure of a dancer
moving. My position is obviously phenomenological; that is, I maintain that
perceptions need not be dissolved into their physiological process (I am not
against doing this – if we are studying physiology rather than moving images).
But my task here is to describe our perception as we experience it. The riddle of
the perception of the moving image lies in the fact that no one can explain it
purely physiologically and the psychological explanations are still debated. In
other words, we have a true challenge to explanation here. Yet the phenomeno-
logical description, while still difficult, is, I think, possible. We see motion, and
yet it is somehow truly different from a physical dancer or puppet. We see a
moving image, two dimensional in appearance. As an image, it has something
of the virtuality of the composite picture in the Thaumatrope, provided, as I
believe we do, we sense the flicker fusion occurring.
A moving image delights us with its novelty, because most images do not
move; but also for its familiarity, since it recalls for us the way we perceive the
world, which is primarily moving. Recent investigators of perception claim the
greatest distortion in our understanding of visual perception comes from as-
suming it is founded on static images, pictures, to which somehow movement
is superadded. As the ecological and phenomenologically-minded perceptual
psychologists (such as J.J. Gibson and Alva Noe) have demonstrated, movement
provides the norm for visual perception, because our eyes are moving, our
bodies are moving and the world around us moves as well, in concert and in-
dependently of us. The static retina image is a myth created in the perceptual
laboratory. I believe our investigation of the discourse surrounding the early
moving image devices shows that the mechanistic worldview of the nineteenth
century was determined to see human perception in terms of machines. Thus
the education offered by philosophical toys included not only the disciplining
of the body that Crary finds embedded in these devices, but a worldview in
which the viewer identified his (and others!) perception with the operation of a
machine. This is an education with social and political consequences. Some-
times the greatest trick lies in claiming something is only a trick and that one
can unmask it easily.
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However, I would maintain that reexamining the experience of the moving
image, even in these devices, need not be limited to this lesson. While I resist
describing the moving image as an illusion, I think one might still see it as a
trick, a trope, a turn, a transformation that surprises, partly because we do in-
deed see it, not simply mistake it. The moving image is an illusion only if we
assume our eyes are defective. If we think of seeing as a multifaceted way of
exploring the world (and indeed of delighting in it), then a trick need no more
be an illusion than is a difficult gymnastic or acrobatic turn or a feat of juggling.
While the educational logic of “Philosophy in Sport made Science in Earnest”
labors to transform astonishment and delight into earnest discipline, it also ex-
ceeds its purpose. The dancer pirouettes endlessly and if its visual fascination
may serve the end of seduction into taking one’s place willingly within the ap-
paratus (or before the screen, or at the keyboard), this need not be the only
pleasure produced (nor need pleasure only lead to complicity).
This apparatus, while it subjects our vision and behavior to a specific regi-
men necessary for the transformation into a moving image to take place, also
remains very much in our hands and within our sight. The productive gestures
are highly visible rather than concealed; we operate the Phenakistiscope and
Zoetrope with the flick of our hands or fingers. We see the whole apparatus
and it parts and can observe the still images before we set them into action.
These philosophical toys display what Crary calls “the undisguised nature of
their operational structure,” their evident “mechanical production” based in
“the functional interaction of body and machine.” They lack the concealing of
the operational mechanism that Theodore Adorno would identify with the
Phantasmagoria, and which become part of the regimen of the classical cin-
ema. Mary Ann Doane states it explicitly: “The optical toy is anti-phantasma-
goric in this respect – it does not hide the work of its operation but instead
flaunts it.” 
The moving image entered the nineteenth century in peculiar circumstances.
First, it displayed a dialectical relation between still and moving images. But the
educational discourse surrounding philosophical toys remained fixed upon the
primacy of the still image, and describing the “illusion of motion” as the pro-
duct of the rapid presentation of still images before a “defective” eye. This re-
duction of motion to an illusion served philosophical ends. William Carpenter
in his  history of “the Zoetrope and its Antecedents” claimed that the study
of these devices allowed young people to cultivate a “scientific habit of
thought” founded on a comparison “between the apparent and the real.” Even
more radically, it was claimed such devices taught young people that the pro-
cess of seeing motion somehow depended on atomistic still images, and then
“cheating” the eye into seeing things that were not actually there. In this scenar-
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io, maintained by many to this day, the eye is deficient and weak, while the
machine is powerful.
As Mary Ann Doane emphasized (and Crary indicated) optical devices pre-
sent the machine as a toy, unthreatening and inviting. Part of its attraction lies in
the manipulation of the apparatus itself, which one holds in one’s hand, as
much as in the evanescent image it produces, which Doane characterizes as
their tactility, manipulability and materiality. These optical toys, as she elegantly
puts it, mark a moment when the viewer “seemed to hold movement in his or
her hands.” Yet, even acknowledging the nostalgia that such a simple control
of the device evokes, the production of the moving virtual image remains a
crucial threshold in the modern transformation of the image I am tracing. As
Doane describes it, “a hesitation in the transition from still to moving image
underscores the wondrous nature of its effect, its alliance with the toy that takes
on life.” While the trick of motion undoubtedly partakes of the uncanny effect
of the animating of the inanimate, the stuff of childhood fables and myth for
millennia, it takes on new meanings in the modern era. No longer restricted to
the myths of archaic culture or the fairytales of the nursery, we now dwell with-
in a environment enlivened by moving images, even though the new dimen-
sions implicit in this modern revolution in image has now been rendered banal
by its omnipresence. It is our duty as theorists to rediscover and pay attention to
it.
My survey of several nineteenth-century devices for the production of moving
images has tried to break away from simply drawing up a linear series of the
devices that “led” to the movies. While not denying that narrative, in this chap-
ter I tried to show the deeply dialectical relation between still and moving
images which these devices reveal, especially when approached phenomenolo-
gically, rather than simply technically. Most centrally, I am arguing that the ab-
solute novelty of the moving image – so delightfully evident in all these devices
– posed a sources of anxiety (or at least confusion) for its early explicators, who
used their explanation to reduce the moving image to an “illusion” founded in
the “reality” of still images and the fallacy of human perception. A strong pre-
judice against recognizing the mobile nature of visual perception is revealed by
this discourse, a prejudice that the cinema and media studies must still labor to
overturn.
The best introductory textbook on Cinema, David Bordwell and Kristin
Thompson’s Film Art: An Introduction still promotes this view, claiming in its
opening pages: “Moving-image media such as film and video couldn’t exist if
human vision were perfect.” One wonders how to imagine this “perfect” vi-
sion in which all motion would presumably cease and dissolve into a succession
of still images. Although Bordwell and Thompson simply invoke this perfect
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vision as a rhetorical heuristic it reflects the distrust, and indeed pedagogical
discredit of the senses that much of film studies has adopted from the nine-
teenth century. Although Bordwell particularly offered a trenchant criticism of
the description of film spectatorship known as apparatus theory, which saw cin-
ema and especially the “illusion of motion” as part of the ideological swindle of
the basic cinematic apparatus, that suspicion of the moving image seems to per-
sist.
My investigation of the moving image offers another take on the theory (and
history) of the apparatus. Although being vigilant about the nature and method
of ideological deception remains a duty of the theory of media, assuming an
Enlightenment critique of perception seems to me a distraction rather than a
foundation for a political praxis. I share Jonathan Crary’s attempt to provide
apparatus theory with historical, technological and phenomenological specifi-
city. However if the optical devices serve as a mode of disciplining subjects and
workers and citizens, I find the realm of the moving image provides equal op-
portunities of criticism and analysis. And I do not believe that delight necessa-
rily cancels those possibilities out. The proliferation of devices of the moving
image demands a critical history of their uses and experiences. But if a utopian
celebration of new media can blunt the edge of criticism (and produce an amne-
sia about what we have learned from previous practices of visual images), pur-
itan suspicions of the senses and their playfulness seems to be an equally deadly
route to take. There may yet be uses for philosophical toys.
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In his pioneering introjection of Hollis Frampton into debates about digital me-
dia, Peter Lunenfeld situates experimental film – for which Frampton serves as
an exemplar – as a ground condition for much of what, circa , comprised
new media art production. Suggesting that experimental cinema in its heyday,
from the s to the s, managed to achieve “the status of gesamtkunstme-
dium”, Lunenfeld argues that it “can serve as a model for computer-inflected
art. I believe,” he states, “that the most interesting new media works aspire to
the condition of the experimental cinema without quite realizing it”.
Lunenfeld’s claim can be understood as a specification of Lev Manovich’s
more general and wide-ranging argument concerning the cinema’s role as cul-
tural dominant. In The Language of New Media (), Manovich positioned cin-
ema as “the cultural interface, a toolbox for all cultural communication, overtak-
ing the printed word.” In this scenario, again circa , new media plays the
role of cinema’s rejuvenator: “Cinema, the major cultural form of the twentieth
century, has found new life as the toolbox of the computer user. Cinematic
means of perception, of connecting space and time, of representing human
memory, thinking, and emotion have become a way of work and a way of life
for millions in the computer age. Cinema’s aesthetic strategies have become ba-
sic organizational principles of computer software. ... In short, what was cinema
is now the human-computer interface.” Just as Lunenfeld’s argument for the
particular cinematic aspirations of new media art situates it squarely within the
cinematic genealogy traced out by Manovich, so too does his strategy run the
risk of compromising what is singular or different – indeed, what is “new” –
about new media.
For this reason, I suggest that we reverse the directionality of the correlation
between experimental film and new media, substituting for Lunenfeld’s claim
the notion that experimental film aspired, as it were in advance of its actuality, to
the condition of new media. To substantiate such a claim, one could invoke the
lifelong interest a filmmaker like Hollis Frampton displayed in different media
platforms and in the juxtaposition and interpenetration of different media; or
one could cite the various discussions Frampton devoted to the digital image
and the work he did as part of the Media Arts Lab at SUNY, Buffalo. I want
here to take a different, more circuitous, but I think ultimately more profound
and compelling path from Frampton to new media, but also from new media
back to (and beyond) Frampton. The crux of this exploration concerns the nexus
of technology, time, and movement, and Frampton’s role here is to anticipate
the contemporary repositioning of cinema within a larger media ecology – one
that extends both beyond film into the post-cinematic as well as before film into
the prehistory of the cinematic – but whose single and dominant principle is
movement. On this account, cinema becomes reconfigured as a particular fram-
ing of universal movement, or movement-variation, that is determined by its
specific temporal scale; as one of framing among others, it undergoes a relativi-
zation and becomes open to transformation by other media forms that, like di-
gital media, may be capable of broaching its formerly defining homologies with
the temporal syntheses of consciousness.
With his various meditations – both theoretical and artistic – on the contin-
gency of cinema’s technical specifications and the rich temporal virtuality that
these specifications foreclose, Frampton could be said to explode cinema both
from within and from without. In a sense, he operates equally as a filmmaker,
indeed a filmmaker of the most experimental sort, who seeks to question, chal-
lenge and extend the boundaries of the medium of film, and as a new media
practitioner avant la lettre, who embraces (if only, for the most part, in theory)
the technical possibilities of computational media that precisely exceed the scope of
cinematic representation. While I want to reserve my in-depth engagement of
Frampton’s work and thought for a later section, let me simply mention a cou-
ple of his more stimulating ideas that cross the divide between these two voca-
tions.
First, there is his intriguing claim, in that most intriguing of texts, “For a Me-
tahistory of Film”, that “cinema is the Last Machine” and that cinema is “prob-
ably the last art that will reach the mind through the senses”. This claim is
made somewhat less opaque, to my mind at least, by his specification of the
precise endpoint of the Age of Machines: while it is “customary”, Frampton
claims, to date this moment to the advent of video, this dating is “imprecise”,
and, indeed, not nearly early enough. In place of video’s advent, Frampton sug-
gests the appearance of “radar”, which, he notes, “replaced the mechanical re-
connaissance aircraft with a static anonymous black box”. What this specifica-
tion helps to clarify is the correlation between cinematic representation and
human sense perception that serves to qualify cinema as a “mechanical art”,
one that could teach and remind us “(after what then seemed a bearable delay)
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how things looked, how things worked, how to do things … and, of course (by
example), how to feel and think.” With radar – and subsequently, with a pro-
liferating host of media innovations (culminating in today’s computers) that in-
volve a similar end run around human sense perception – this correlation, and
this mimetic-pedagogic function of cinema, finds itself suspended. That, I sug-
gest, is what Frampton means when he claims that cinema is the last art that
will reach the mind through the senses.
Another closely related and equally intriguing claim involves Frampton’s
questioning of the temporal technicity of cinema. Noting that cinema is a
“Greek word that means ‘movie,’” Frampton divorces cinema from the artifac-
tuality of its institutional apparatus, which is to say, the fixed projection of mov-
ing images at a rate of  fps: “The illusion of movement is certainly an accus-
tomed adjunct of the film image, but that illusion rests upon the assumption
that the rate of change between successive frames may vary only within rather
narrow limits. There is nothing in the structural logic of the filmstrip that can
justify such an assumption.” Given its close association with Frampton’s meta-
historical concept of the “infinite film” (a film that would appear to comprise all
the images potentially generated by the world throughout its entire history), we
might perhaps best understand this claim as an attempt to liberate movement or
variation – the interval between any two states, which is precisely how I pro-
pose we understand cinematic movement – not simply from its historical sub-
ordination to still images (which informs our received notion of cinema as a
sensory illusion created by the animation of photograms) but from the overcod-
ing such movement-variation undergoes via its historical elective affinity with
the cinema, understood narrowly as a technically-specified, institutionally sta-
bilized regime of representation. In other words, what I believe to be at stake in
Frampton’s seemingly outrageous claim for the radical temporal flexibility of
cinema is nothing less than a shift in focus concerning the operation of move-
ment and its relation to time: a fundamental shift from movement as an artifact
of cinema narrowly considered to movement-variation as the basic component
of all worldly relationality. By calling his art “simply” “film” – film that would
encompass all potential passages between frames or “images” ranging from
those most alike to those most different – Frampton aims to expose the mini-
mal logic of connection and distance that informs variation as such. If we read
his account of the infinite film in relation to Bergson’s conception of a “universe
of images” – a conception according to which images comprise the materiality
of the world – we can appreciate the fundamental and multi-scalar imbrication
of movement and time it involves: what there is is continual “virtual” variation
between images that can and must be actualized in concrete movements operat-
ing across a host of timescales.
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We can now understand just how limiting and indeed how misguided were
the terms on which an earlier generation of critics (one to which both Lunenfeld
and Manovich belong) sought to couple Frampton and the digital. For it is not
just insufficient but it is downright mistaken to claim, as does Lunenfeld, that
Frampton’s Magellan project anticipated the cultural form of database and
loop that, following Manovich’s analysis, comprise the defining tropes for con-
temporary digital media. Lunenfeld writes:
In the early s, Frampton posited “the infinite film”: a forever unfinished cinemat-
ic system incorporating all modes of filmmaking, all examples of those modes, and
one that could grow and change as its medium matured. Frampton’s “infinite film” is
a Platonic database for our spectacular culture. It is the Alexandrine dream … dis-
tilled from the librarians who were promised by the Ptolemiac kings of Egypt that
they would have the opportunity to catalogue every book of their era.
What is wrong or misguided about this claim is not the general correlation it
posits between Frampton’s work and the defining aesthetic properties of new
media objects and networks; no, what is wrong here is Lunenfeld’s complete
neglect of the temporal dynamics of selection, his purely spatial treatment of
the infinite film. Magellan operates on the cusp of what can be considered to
be cinema: it challenges the temporal artifactuality of institutionalized cinema
(by, for example, forgoing the cinematic synchronization of consciousness, as it
does in spreading out the one minute films comprising the “Straits of Magellan”
section across the span of a year) at the same time as it instantiates alternate,
non-(pre- or post-) cinematic temporalities (by way, for example, of its sheer
magnitude and imposed conditions of viewing, which function [or would have
functioned] to make viewing Magellan as a film, that is in its entirety in a sin-
gle session, simply impossible). As such, it exemplifies how Frampton antici-
pates the condition of new media: how his cinematic aesthetic was in fact rooted
in a media temporal modulation of movement.
Movement and the Impression of Reality
In a talk at the  Society for Cinema and Media Studies conference in Los
Angeles, Tom Gunning made a plea for cinema scholars to question one of the
longest-standing – and least-interrogated – assumptions of our discipline: the
notion that cinema (understood in its institutionalized form as still images pro-
jected at a constant frame rate of  fps or close to it) is the product of a funda-
mental sensory illusion, that cinema results from technology tricking our
senses. To give a sense of just how widespread this assumption is, Gunning
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singled out how cinema is characterized by Bordwell and Thompson in their
Film Art, the most popular and, arguably, the best introductory textbook that is
responsible for reproducing the ideology of cinema for new generations of stu-
dents. On the book’s first pages, Bordwell and Thompson write: “Watching a
film differs from viewing a painting, a stage performance, or even a slide show.
A film presents us with images in illusory motion.” That the authors choose to
emphasize the term “illusory” along with the crucial term “images” suffices to
make the point at hand here.
This point – or rather, the positive claim that comes out of it, namely that the
perception of movement in cinema is not a mere sensory illusion, but has a basis in
phenomenological experience – animates much of Gunning’s recent work on cin-
ema both in relation to certain strands of film theory and in the context of the
transformations, both of cinematic practice and its theorization, brought about
by the introduction of new media technologies. If I understand Gunning’s deep
argument correctly, the ultimate payoff of this line of thinking – beyond a re-
storation of a certain tradition in film theory, running from Münsterberg to
Metz, that places movement at the core of cinema’s operation – is the securing
of a commonality linking cinema backwards to pre-cinematic devices as well as
forwards to new media. Accordingly, in place of the divisive debates around the
digital that have ranged from the highly theoretical – whether new media can
function indexically – to the concretely practical – whether digital film cam-
eras and projection systems can adequately “mediate” the materiality of the
filmic image, what Gunning’s argument seeks to install is a return of sorts to
the phenomenological immediacy of image media, which is to say, to the phe-
nomenological impact of movement (or, more precisely, of movement-images),
that is at issue in all moving image media, and not just in celluloid (or analog)
cinema.
In adapting Gunning’s argument for my purposes here, I want to suggest that
what Gunning claims about the phenomenological “reality” of movement in
relation to cinematic and post- (and pre-) cinematic movement-images can (and
must) be expanded and generalized to the movement of all worldly material
processes, or to what I propose to call movement-variation. Effectively, this ex-
pansion-generalization calls to the fore the process of temporalization asso-
ciated with selection and the production of concrete intervals; more specifically,
it implicates time rather than space as the crucial materialization through which
movement attains phenomenological reality, in any and every case. Accord-
ingly, if institutionalized cinema, in artifactualizing selection within a particular
temporal scope, comprises one instance of such temporal materialization, it by
no means comprises the only – or even, the most exemplary – such instance. For
this reason, our thinking concerning movement must go beyond the cinematic
movement-image and indeed, must seek to clarify how cinema, as one concrete
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regime of movement-images among others, itself instantiates, specifies, and ar-
tifactualizes a more general operation of movement-variation. For cinema’s spe-
cific power – the power to move us phenomenologically, to generate (sensory)
impressions of reality – derives from the more general power of movement-var-
iation, the power to induce temporalizations that operate at divergent time-
scales and that, as we shall see below, confound the actual with the virtual in
highly productive and interesting ways. Understood within such a context, new
media offers a way of expanding the range of movement in which we can parti-
cipate, and is thus – in an irreducible sense – in a relation of continuity and
compatibility with cinema.
In “Moving Away from the Index”, Gunning credits Christian Metz – specifi-
cally, the presemiotic Metz – with the realization that movement is the “corner-
stone of cinema’s impression of reality”. To substantiate this claim, Gunning
turns to an early, neglected essay of Metz’s, namely “On the Impression of Rea-
lity in the Cinema”, where Metz argues that it is movement – and not iconic or
indexical representation – that confers the “impression of reality” on cinematic
experiences. Not without significance for the theme of this volume, Metz’s claim
arises on the basis of a contrast between cinema and (still) photography and
deserves to the quoted at some length:
we may ask ourselves why the impression of reality is so much more vivid in a film
than it is in a photograph…. An answer immediately suggests itself: It is movement
(one of the greatest differences, doubtless the greatest, between still photography and
the movies) that produces the strong impression of reality.… Two things, then, are
entailed by motion: a higher degree of reality, and the corporality of objects. These
are not all, however. Indeed, it is reasonable to think that the importance of motion in
the cinema depends essentially on a third factor, which has never been sufficiently
analyzed as such…. Motion contributes indirectly to the impression of reality by giv-
ing objects dimension, but it also contributes directly to that impression in as much as
it appears to be real. It is, in fact, a general law of psychology that movement is always
perceived as real….
In seeking to pinpoint exactly why movement has this power to confer reality
on experience, Gunning stresses the role of participation; participation com-
prises nothing less than the hinge linking the movement-image to the immedi-
ate reality claimed for the perception of movement:
We experience motion on the screen in a different way than we look at still images,
and this difference explains our participation in the film image, a sense of perceptual
richness or immediate involvement in the image. … Motion always has a projective
aspect, a progressive movement in a direction, and therefore invokes possibility and a
future. Of course, we can project these states into a static image, but with an actually
moving image we are swept along with the motion itself. Rather than imaging pre-
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vious or anterior states, we could say that through a moving image, the process of
motion is projected onto us. Undergirded by the kinesthetic effects of cinematic mo-
tion, I believe “participation” properly describes the increased sense of involvement
with the cinematic image, a sense of presence that could be described as an impres-
sion of reality.
Through participation, the movement in the image (the moving-image) seam-
lessly and directly becomes the real perception of movement by its embodied
spectators.
By far the most opaque moment in Metz’s essay occurs when he invokes the
source that makes possible such seamless and direct becoming: namely, the “in-
substantiality” of movement. (By “insubstantiality”, Metz would seem to mean
something like “immateriality”.) Movement’s insubstantiality literally renders it
immune from the doubling that is constitutive of representation; unlike solid
objects, which can be captured in representational images that refer to their ex-
periential (most notably, tactile) properties, movement actually suspends the
very machinery of representation. Metz extracts the most radical consequences
from this situation:
Movement is insubstantial. We see it, but it cannot be touched, which is why it cannot
encompass two degrees of phenomenal reality, the “real” and the copy. Very often we
experience the representation of objects as reproductions by implicit reference to tacti-
lity, the supreme arbiter of “reality” – the “real” being ineluctably confused with the
tangible…. The strict distinction between object and copy, however, dissolves on the
threshold of motion. Because movement is never material but is always visual, to re-
produce its appearance is to duplicate its reality.… In the cinema the impression of reality is
also the reality of the impression, the real presence of motion.
Three points need to be made here.
First, what Metz is effectively claiming in this passage is that cinema, once
movement is restored to the role of its fundamental principle, cannot be consid-
ered a representational medium at all: due to the necessity and inescapability of
our participation in it, cinematic movement does not and cannot represent move-
ment; on the contrary, it does nothing but generatemovement. More bluntly still:
cinema is not about the objects it depicts but rather exclusively about our ex-
periencing of them. And that is why the impression of reality – cinematic move-
ment – is also the reality of the impression – the movement it induces in the
viewer.
Second, Metz’s transitivity claim (impression of reality = reality of impres-
sion) comes at a cost: namely, the cost of the materiality of cinema’s reality.
Metz is straightforward here when he states that movement “is never material
but is always visual”: this conclusion would seem to follow from the particular
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insubstantiality of the cinematic image (but couldn’t we question Metz’s as-
sumption that the visual need be non-material?), and it is a price that Metz cer-
tainly seems willing to pays without a second thought.
Third, when Gunning glosses Metz’s transitivity claim as marking a differ-
ence between “reality” and “realism”, he would appear to be engaging in an
effort aimed at reconciling these two points, or rather, more precisely, at affirm-
ing the first while nonetheless preserving the materiality that movement ac-
crues by way of its belonging to the broader depresencing of the world. Thus,
on Gunning’s interpretation, cinematic movement would still be immaterial or
insubstantial in relation to theatrical representation, without ceasing to belong
to the movement of the world or what I will go on to call “movement-varia-
tion”. Such a move on Gunning’s part, I would suggest, anticipates his more
recent position whose ultimate gambit, as his paper included in this volume
attests, is to situate moving images within the ontologically broader movement
of the world.
From Movement to Movement-Variation
With his notion of duration and the method of intuition necessary to experience
it, Bergson makes it possible to extend the operation of movement-impression
beyond the rarified domain of cinema and the other arts. According to Bergson,
we can only experience movement, without artificially dividing it up, by insert-
ing ourselves into it, by fusing our own duration with its duration. In his own
invocation of Bergson, Gunning likens this process to the activity of participa-
tion described by Metz:
Although Metz does not refer directly to Henri Bergson’s famous discussion of mo-
tion, I believe Bergson developed the most detailed description of the need to partici-
pate in motion in order to grasp it. Bergson claims, “In order to advance with the mov-
ing reality, you must replace yourself within it” (Creative Evolution, ). For Bergson,
discontinuous signs, such as language or ideas, cannot grasp the continuous flow of
movement, but must conceive of it as a series of successive static instants, or posi-
tions. Only motion, one can assume, is able to convey motion. Therefore, to perceive
motion, rather than represent it statically in a manner that destroys its essence, one
must participate in the motion itself.
What is crucial here is the generality of Bergson’s claims for movement and par-
ticipation, and what holds these two together – what insures that movement is
necessarily correlated with participation through movement – is duration. From
the Bergsonist perspective, cinematic movement (like any concrete movement)
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is part of a larger domain of movement, what I propose to call movement-varia-
tion. Movement-variation can be understood as the correlate of duration in the
precise sense that duration’s materiality is comprised of incessant, asynchro-
nous and heterogeneous temporal change across divergent scales of being. The
world ismovement-variation.
Accordingly and irregardless of how we understand Bergson’s criticism of the
“cinematographic illusion”, we must situate cinema, the art of the movement-
image, within a much vaster domain of movement-variation. In this sense, too,
the restoration of the phenomenological basis of the impression of reality – the
restoration at issue in Metz and in Gunning – must be understood not as some
“reality effect” specific to the cinema, but as an instance of a broader phenom-
enological claim about movement and sensation. Put another way, if part of
Gunning’s point is that post-classical film theory goes awry in dismissing the
sensory experience of moving images as (psychological) illusion, the resulting
affirmation of a certain “genuineness” of the senses must be extended to the
sensory experience of movement as such (not just cinematic movement). In-
deed, the “reality” of sensory experience in the cinema itself stems directly from
the broader “genuineness” that characterizes sensory experience as such.
With his concept of “thinking-feeling”, Brian Massumi expands Metz’s reality
of impression well beyond the domain of cinema. Specifically, Massumi seeks to
reposition the divide separating representation and participation in relation to
the “direct and immediate self-referentiality of perception.” In addition to being
the perception of an object, Massumi suggests, perception is always doubled
back on itself – it is always also the perception of its own passing. As the correlate of
and source for the doubleness of perception, the object’s constitutive “out-of-
sync-ness” with itself is implicated within a phenomenology of appearance
that, like Gunning’s insistence on the “genuineness” of sensation, focuses on the
“reality” of perception’s immediate participation in the movement-time of ob-
jects rather than their representational status. Like Gunning, Massumi is struck
by the insistence of movement’s reality, which he defines as “what we can’t not
experience when we’re faced with it. Instead of calling it an illusion – this move-
ment we can’t actually see but can’t not see either – why not just call it abstract?
Real and abstract.” The “genuineness” that Massumi accords “abstract” ex-
perience serves to deepen and also to exfoliate the immediate, reality-conferring
power of movement: as a kind of surplus or excess of the object in relation to
itself, a folding into the object of its potentiality to be experienced otherwise
than it is in its strict actuality, abstract experience embeds embodied living with-
in worldly “depresencing” in a way that confounds any subject-object distinc-
tion.
Returning now to the question of cinema, of its specificity as the art of the
movement-image, we can better appreciate how it functions as a technology to
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modulate duration. In selectionally transforming worldly movement-variation
into movement-images, cinema exemplifies the potential of technology to insin-
uate itself into the process of framing – into the condensation of worldly depre-
sencing that yields the capacitation of a presencing body.
Temporalizing the “Moving-Still”
In her recent work on movement and image, Erin Manning focuses attention on
the practice of Etienne-Jules Marey who, in contrast to fellow chronophotogra-
pher Eadweard Muybridge, concentrated on creating, and not simply analyzing
and representing, movement:
To look at Marey’s photographs is to feel them. Feeling is an amodal experience that is
a passing-between of sense-modes.… Affectively, feeling works on the body, bringing
to the fore the experiential force of the quasi chaos of the not-quite seen. This not-
quite is the quality of potential we perceive in many of Marey’s movement images.
These images do not represent movement, they move-with the movement of the feeling taking
form. They are affective because to see is to feel-with, to participate in the intensive
passage from the virtual to actualization. What is amodally felt, perceived-with, is
the microperceptual appearing at the threshold of sight, but not actually seen.
Based on this understanding, chronophotography is credited with opening up
movement not simply to a retroactive appreciation of its complexity but to an
actual living through, a feeling of or being affected by, that which remains imperceptible
within it. What Marey’s chronophotographic images afford is an opportunity for
us to “see-feel” – recalling Massumi – the very emergence of movement: “What
must … be felt”, Manning specifies, “are the microperceptions through which
the displacement is activated. Many of … these perceptions are non-sensuous
because they work at the level of the barely there, below the threshold of sensu-
ous perception. Rather than the sensory perception itself, we must feel the relation
out of which the movement event emerges.”
In relation to Marey’s work and the question of its divergence from cinema,
what is of particular interest here is the claim that such seeing-feeling arises in
conjunction with the perception not of moving images, but rather of still images
that – because they enfold movement’s virtuality into themselves – are “always
already moving”. What Manning understands to be Marey’s predilection for the
still image marks a certain disjunction between his practice and the cinema, at
least as the latter was historically institutionalized:
Marey’s focus was on making felt the incipience of movement in its very taking-form.
Marey was never interested in how poses could be combined to elicit a sense of move-
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ment; his main concern was mapping the imperceptible within movement’s conti-
nuum.… [In his experimentation with gases, Marey] sought to make apparent that
which cannot be seen: the movement of air. This radically empirical exploration –
radical because it makes felt the force of the virtual within the actual – brings to the fore the
force of the imperceptible taking-form. With Marey, as with [digital artist Jim] Camp-
bell, what stands out is not the cinematographic habit of adding movement to a pose,
but a direct encounter with perception in the making. The poses are always already
moving.
In seeking to comprehend what is at stake here, we must ask an important ques-
tion about images and their relation to movement: why is it necessary – and
indeed, is it necessary – to oppose the still to the moving image as Manning
does? Is there no other way for us to move beyond our culturally-inherited fixa-
tion on displacement, on the spatialization of time and movement?
It seems to me that the answer to this two-part question is intimately bound
up with the principal wager of the second section of this paper, where the re-
ceived historical status of cinema was put into question. There, following Tom
Gunning, I argue that cinema is more than simply the animation of still images
and resulting sensory illusion, that in fact cinema presents a case of the direct
sensory “pickup” of movement (or movement-images). If we accept this posi-
tion, it becomes impossible to play off the still against the moving image in
quite the way that Manning does here: cinema – the art of the movement-image
– cannot be reduced to a mere illusion based on the animation of still images,
but is the direct presentation of movement to the perceiving mindbody. Rather
than being opposed to one another, still and moving images offer different but
complementary mediums for expressing movement, and in fact Marey’s practice
illustrates the potential of both types of image to induce the direct experience of
movement, beyond the logic of displacement.
Technical Distribution
Marey’s interest in what we cannot perceive informs his own self-distancing
from the institution of cinema. Rather than seeking to represent natural move-
ment, Marey aims to capture “extreme speeds”: thus, he slows down “the flight of
a bird” or a “bullet from a revolver” and he “accelerates the crawling of a star-
fish at the bottom of an aquarium.” In short, rather than reproducing some-
thing that we are already able to experience, Marey focuses on movements that are
not simply beyond our perceptual grasp but that open a “cognitive” interface
onto the largely imperceptible realm of movement-variation, onto what
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Georges Didi-Huberman felicitously calls “the dance of every thing”. No-
where is this anti-cinematic impetus more consequential than in Didi-Huber-
man’s characterization of the “chronophotographic magic” that appears when
the dancer Loïe Fuller gives a “concrete, indubitable, prolongable and trans-
formable existence” to the Mareysian “trail of movement”:
This dynamic touches most closely the Mareysian trail in the delay and the marvelous
slowing down produced by the drapery [the veil Fuller wears to perform the Serpen-
tine Dance]: not only does this latter produce the wake [sillage] of the bodily gesture,
but it slows down the accomplishment of the gesture through its own sumptuousness
[grandeur]…. Its trace, born of the speed of the gesture, retains its memory for a long
time and only very slowly gives way to the following trace. Such is its “chronophoto-
graphic” magic, its way not of rendering visible bodies in movement but of trans-
forming the visual milieu itself into something like a generalized site of change or varia-
tion [mouvance généralisée].”
What is at stake in the “magic” of chronophotography is a certain technical dis-
tribution of sensation: chronophotography supplements human perception by
coupling it to an open machine for recording, analyzing and visualizing the im-
perceptible “transcendental-sensible” preconditions for perception. Chronopho-
tography does not bring the imperceptible into actual experience, as Manning
would have it, but puts present perception into relation with its own immediate
pastness. What results from this is not a recomposition of the body rooted in the
enfolding of incipiency into actual perception, but a technically distributed cog-
nitive-perceptual system in which the human body is only one element among
others rather than the sole element. As part of such a distributed system, tech-
nology does not function like the emergent body; rather, it functions according
to its own protocol – in Marey’s case, as a proto-digital inscription, analysis and
visualization system – that extends cognitive-perceptual capacities in ways that
do not get directly embodied, that do not pass entirely through emergent embodi-
ment but that remain – in some crucial sense – exterior to the human.
No one has more clearly grasped this situation, with reference to Marey, than
historian of photography Joel Snyder, who writes that, in Marey’s work:
there is no question of substituting mechanical instruments for a fallible human med-
iator and of correcting thereby what might otherwise have been falsified…. The gra-
phic data show what otherwise cannot be found in the realm of events and processes detectable
by human beings and accordingly, questions concerning the reliability or accuracy of
machine-generated visualizations cannot be answered by recourse to a human arbi-
trator, no matter how exquisitely sensitive or impartial. Questions about the accuracy
of these data can be resolved only by appealing to other, perhaps even more refined
mechanical instruments.
56 Mark B.N. Hansen
Marey goes so far as to liken his mechanical instruments to “new senses of as-
tonishing precision”, by which he means not technical prostheses of human
senses, but properly machinic senses capable of sensing what remains to us im-
perceptible. The point of Marey’s work, as Synder repeatedly emphasizes, is
not substitution (of machinic senses for human senses): “machines”, he notes,
“can be constitutive of their own field of investigation”, or as Marey repeatedly
asserts, they can have their “own domain”.
What digital technology adds to this model of technically distributed sensa-
tion, when it becomes the technical basis for inscribing, analyzing and visualiz-
ing elements of our experience that we can’t directly experience, is a capacity to
temporally modulate our encounter with these imperceptible elements. This capacity is
related directly to the capacity of the digital to operate at more fine-grained
temporal intervals than previous media technologies, including chronophoto-
graphy, but this technical singularity of the digital does nothing to change the
basic structure of the human-machine coupling as Marey had already envi-
sioned it. Thus, our coupling to digital technologies still involves a coupling of
two autonomous systems: on the one hand, a computational media machine
that can, for example, inscribe, analyze, and visualize movements at temporal
scales that are simply unrecognizable to our natural perception; and, on the
other, an embodied human perceiver whose experience can be re-composed as
a result of the feeding back of what was imperceptible in perception into new
future-oriented present perception. Put another way, digital technology brings a
marked increase in the temporal granularity at which our experience can be
parsed, which is to say, a magnification of the scale of inscription, but it also
brings an unprecedented flexibility to our subsequent interaction with the ex-
perience it inscribes and analyzes as data. Rather than being bound by the form
of the still photograph or the cinematic moving image, the sensory output of the
computational media machine can range across a much wider temporal scale,
and can even animate and complexify the apparently frozen or fixed time-
frames of these earlier visualization platforms.
In the process of performing the very same two operations of Marey’s chronopho-
tography – inscription, analysis and visualization, on the one hand, and pictorial
depiction, on the other – the computational media machine brings together the
quantitative and the qualitative, or better, deploys the results of its quantitative
processing to effectuate qualitative effects. And, again like Marey’s chronopho-
tographic machines, the computational media machine performs these two op-
erations consecutively and asynchronously, or, in other words, while maintain-
ing some minimal incompressible interval between the first perceptual
experience that yields the inscription and analysis of the imperceptible and a
second perception that folds this into the ongoing experience of the perceiver.
In sum, in digital media no less than in Marey’s chronophotography, what is
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imperceptible to experience can be brought into the reference frame of experi-
ence, but always only after the fact, in a perception subsequent to the perception
emerging from this imperceptible experience and that, because of the ineliminable
temporal interval, is itself categorically unable to perceive its own imperceptible
virtual fringe, its “transcendental-sensible” condition of real emergence.
Frampton between Stillness and Movement
Among the many entertaining and inventive asides that populate the writings
of Hollis Frampton, two stand out as particularly pertinent to the media specifi-
city of photography and cinema. The first involves a story illustrating what I
propose to call the principle of cinematic equivalence (or Frampton’s law of narra-
tive). It occurs at the beginning of an article called “A Pentagram for Conjuring
the Narrative”, and recounts a friend’s recurrent nightmare “in which he lives
through two entire lives”:
In the first, he is born a brilliant and beautiful heiress to an immense fortune. Her
loving and eccentric father arranges that his daughter’s birth shall be filmed, together
with her every conscious moment thereafter, in color and sound. Eventually he leaves
in trust a capital sum, the income from which guarantees that the record shall con-
tinue, during all her waking hours, for the rest of her life. Her own inheritance is
made contingent upon agreement to this invasion of her privacy, to which she is, in
any case, accustomed from earliest infancy. As a woman, my friend lives a long, ac-
tive and passionate life. [Frampton describes various events of her life.] … In short,
she so crowds her days with experience of every kind that she never once pauses to
view the films of her own expanding past. In extreme old age – having survived her
own children – she makes a will, leaving her fortune to the first child to be born,
following the instant of her own death, in the same city … on the single condition
that such child shall spend its whole life watching the accumulated films of her own.
… In his dream, my friend experiences her death; and then, after a brief intermission,
he discovers, to his outraged astonishment, that he is about to be reincarnated as her
heir. He emerges from the womb to confront the filmed image of her birth. He receives
a thorough but quaintly obsolete education from the films of her school days. As a
chubby, asthmatic little boy, he learns (without ever leaving his chair) to dance, sit a
horse, and play the viola. During his adolescence, wealthy young men fumble
through the confusion of her clothing to caress his own unimaginable breasts.… In
middle age, his health begins to fail, and with it, imperceptibly, the memory of his
previous life, so that he grows increasingly dependent upon the films to know what
to do next.… Finally, he has watched the last reel of film. That same night, after the
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show, he dies, quietly in his sleep, unaware that he has completed his task … where-
upon my friend wakens abruptly, to discover himself alive, at home, in his own bed.
A perfect counterpoint to this tale of cinematic equivalence – let us call it the
principle of photographic compression – the second story involves the intimate ex-
perience of a massive temporal disjunction:
Several years ago, a man by the astonishing name of Breedlove became, for the sec-
ond time in his life, the holder of the world land speed record.… For two runs over a
marked course one mile long … this Breedlove averaged a little over  miles per
hour….Had the ride been uneventful, we may expect that he would have had nothing
at all to say about it; the efficient driving of an automobile at any speed neither re-
quires nor permits much in the way of conscious deliberation. But, as it turned out,
something did happen. At the end of his second run, at a speed of about miles per
hour, as he was attempting to slow down, a brake mechanism exploded, and in the
space of about one-and-one-half miles both drogue chutes failed to operate, and the
car went entirely out of control, sheared off a number of handy telephone poles,
topped a small rise, turned upside down, flew through the air, and landed in a salt
pond. Incredibly, Breedlove was unhurt. He was interviewed immediately after the
wreck. I have heard the tape. It lasts an hour and  minutes, during which time
Breedlove delivers a connected account of what he thought and did during a period
of some . seconds. His narrative amounts to about , words…. In the course of
the interview, Breedlove everywhere gives evidence of condensing, of curtailing; not
wishing to bore anyone, he is doing his polite best to make a long story short. Com-
pared to the historic interval he refers to, his ecstatic utterance represents, according
to my calculation, a temporal expansion in the ratio of some  to one.
Let us treat these two anecdotes as two poles of a temporal continuum, or more
exactly, of a continuum between two models for technically artifactualizing
time. At one pole stands cinema in its traditional image, where the time of cin-
ema (if not indeed the time of life) rigorously corresponds to the time of con-
sciousness in a one-to-one manner. At the other pole stands photography, fol-
lowing the cliché that a picture is worth, in this case, , words (roughly a
thousand words per second), and where the infinitesimal microtemporality of
photography condenses the time of experience by unimaginable – and abso-
lutely imperceptible – factors.
The juxtaposition and resulting interpenetration of these two models – and of
these two allegorical anecdotes – establishes (at least) two things: ) that cinema
need not, and typically does not, fulfill the principle of cinematic equivalence;
rather, to the extent it is constituted on the basis of techniques for disjoining
event time and spectatorial time, cinema can be said to converge with photogra-
phy, to introject or subsume the latter’s power of temporal contraction and dila-
Digital Technics Beyond the “Last Machine” 59
tion; ) that cinema and photography cannot be, in the last instance, opposed, as
they typically have been, for the simple and precise reason that both comprise
technical artifactualizations of the very same temporal phenomenon, of the very same
time. Bearing in mind these two points will help us understand Hollis Framp-
ton’s very strange, and very prodigious conception of the “infinite film” – and to
understand it not simply in its initial formulation, but as it evolves during the
final decade of his art practice and as it continues to evolve in relation to the
changes ushered in by new media technologies.
Frampton introduces the infinite film as the cornerstone of what he calls the
metahistory of film, in the famous article that bears this phrase in its title. In
order to sidestep the supposedly “vexed question” of the relationship between
cinema and still photography and to elude the received wisdom that “cinema
somehow ‘accelerates’ still photographs into motion”, Frampton shifts gears en-
tirely, offering a metahistory of cinema that suspends the empirical record ac-
cording to which “photography predates the photographic cinema”. Hence the
conception of the “infinite cinema”:
A polymorphous camera has always turned, and will turn forever, its lens focussed
upon all the appearances of the world. Before the invention of still photography, the
frames of the infinite cinema were blank, black leader; then a few images began to
appear upon the endless ribbon of film. Since the birth of the photographic cinema,
all the frames are filled with images.
On this metahistorical account, far from being the source of cinema, its “origin-
ary instance”, photography comprises a particular phase in the (logical) evo-
lution of cinema: the phase in which cinema’s leader becomes filled with
images. Following this premise, the relation between photography and cinema
is entirely liberated of all the baggage associated with any historical account.
We no longer need to ask how cinema emerged from photography or entertain
the notion that cinema is just the animation of still images – something that one
day simply happened to befall photography: “History”, notes Frampton,
“views the marriage of cinema and the photograph as one of convenience; me-
tahistory must look upon it as one of necessity.” Even more importantly, we
become free to reconceptualize the relationship of still to moving image accord-
ing to a logic of inclusion or immanence rather than one of media specificity:
“There is nothing in the structural logic of the cinema film strip that precludes
sequestering any single image. A still photograph is simply an isolated frame
taken out of the infinite cinema.”
Rethinking the correlation of still and moving images following this logic of
inclusion allows us to introject the temporal heterogeneity of photography into
the mechanized temporal flux of cinema. Following such an introjection, the
traditional picture of cinema as the simple animation of still images becomes
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untenable for the specific reason that it does violence to the temporal dynamism
specific to photography, and not just to the primacy of the movement constitutive
of cinema. When the photograph (or still image) is taken, as it typically has been
by post classical film theorists and historians, as the elementary unit out of
which cinema is constructed, it undergoes a fundamental reification: specifi-
cally, it is wrested from the processual context from out of which it emerges in
order to be objectified as a static and purely empirical entity, a fixed, fully actua-
lized building block for the something else that is cinema. What is lost in the
process is the capacity that photography affords – a capacity virtually “con-
tained” in every photograph – to modulate movement (movement-images) at
temporal scales that are both extra-perceptual and extra-cinematic. It is pre-
cisely this capacity, I would also like to suggest, that informs the theoretical
concept of the time-image and that differentiates a Frampton-inspired rethink-
ing of this latter from its Deleuzian “original.” Thus, rather than arising in the
space between-two images (where the images are per force treated as static and
fully actualized), the direct power of time animates the photograph itself, and
indeed, the photograph as itself a movement-image, a framing of movement-varia-
tion at a micro-temporal scale that is beneath the threshold of both human and
cinematic perception. The rather counterintuitive conclusion here is that the
photograph, no less than cinema and in its own right, is a movement-image, and
also, that whatever opportunity we might get to “perceive” time directly, to
perceive “time-images”, involves some interface with infinitesimal movement-
variation, which is to say, with the sub-perceptual micro-temporal domain –
and virtuality – proper to photography.
Precisely such an introjection of photographic micro-temporality into cinema
seems to inform Frampton’s theoretical ruminations on movement and stillness
as well as much of his cinematic practice. Immediately after defining cinema, in
“Incision in History/Segments of Eternity”, as “an art that is to be fully and
radically isomorphic with the kinesis and stasis – … with the dynamic ‘struc-
ture’ – of consciousness”, Frampton presents a noema of photography diametri-
cally opposed to Barthes’s famous “ça a été:
On the other hand, if still photography has seemed, since its beginnings, vastly preg-
nant with the imminence of a revelation that never quite transpires, and if it has never
coherently defined a task for itself, we might make free to infer that it mimes, as does
cinema, its own condition: we might imagine, in a word, that photography is “about”
precisely those recognitions, formations, percipiences, suspensions, persistences, hes-
itations within the mind that precede, if they do not utterly foreshadow, that discov-
ery, and peripeteia and springing-into-motion, and inspiration that is articulate con-
sciousness.
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Far from capturing the conjunction of reality and pastness (“that was”) that
leads Barthes to his well-known melancholic meditations on death and mortal-
ity, photography in Frampton’s conception operates on the “just-before” of con-
sciousness, the entire microtemporal domain of processes that remain abso-
lutely imperceptible to perceptual consciousness but that nonetheless inform its
emergence and indeed make it possible.
In this conception, the “photograph” (or still image) comprises one privileged
element (and moment) in a larger photographic process, which is to say, in a
process that does not reify the photograph as an exclusive, self-contained arti-
fact (as Barthes does), but that encompasses elements of pre- as well as post-
production – the preacceleration of movement-perception as well as serial, mini-
mally differentiated takes and variant developings of a single negative. Such an
“expanded” field plays a central role in Frampton’s revisionary history of
photography’s never-quite-explicit reckoning with time. Consider, for example,
the privilege Frampton accords Edward Weston, who “simply centered his fig-
ure, outside [humanly experienced] time and within the nominal spatial ground
of the photographic artifact, celebrating, with unexcelled carnality, the differen-
tiation of the moment of perception from all those moments of impercipience
during which the resting brain processes only two billion binary bits of informa-
tion per second.” Or consider, the role of the “Quintessential Sample” in the
practice of Henri Cartier-Bresson, who, notes Frampton, “speaks of decisive
moments, in tones that seem to suggest that the making of art is a process of
tasteful selection”. When he subsequently recounts his own encounter with Car-
tier-Bresson’s contact sheets, Frampton describes the process of this selection:
“ images of a dying horse were as alike as intelligence could make them, and
I am constrained to believe that the ‘decisive moment,’ if such a thing occurred,
happened when the photographer decided which of the three dozen pictures he
would print and publish”.
Where cinema remains focused on its “appalling ambition” to mime the flux
of consciousness, photography offers the potential for – though not the actual
experience of, or at least any kind of sustained actualization of – perception
beyond perception. Photography, that is, opens vistas onto an imperceptible
that, following Frampton’s musings, would seem to liberate “our mind” from
“our body”, or more exactly, to awaken “another mind” attuned not to con-
scious contents but precisely to the indiscernible nuances that occupy and ren-
der dynamic the space between discrete, identifiable stages of movement. On
Frampton’s account, this potential emerges with the rapid-exposure camera
which is able to displace the “single epiphany” of the individual, privileged
photograph in favor of the seriality of “ consecutive images.” A certain New
York Times Magazine cover featuring the serial image of a former American Pre-
sident perfectly illustrates this displacement:
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About two-thirds of [the  images] exhibited the President’s face as a familiar icon of
benignant, immobile blandness. But the remaining dozen, more or less uniformly dis-
tributed, were pictures of a face that was not quite the same nor yet entirely different,
whose expression suggested, during instants newly visible, the extremes of terror and
of rage, suicidal despair, the forgetfulness of sleep, or the vacuity of utter confusion.
Commenting on the significance of the displacement, Frampton imagines the
birth of a non- or sub-conscious agent operating at cross-purposes to conscious-
ness and capable of directly grasping the micro-perceptual: “It seems to me, al-
most, that another mind grasped and manipulated the features, reaching out
with a kind of berserk certitude through temporal fissures whose durations
could be measured in thousands of a second.”
If photography came to realize such a potentiality as the culmination of its
historical mission, that has everything to do with its own shift from a concern
with exploring the visual detail of representable space to a focus on exposing
and making proleptically actual the microtemporalities hidden within time. As
Frampton depicts it, this culmination coincides with, and is intensified by, tech-
niques of frame-by-frame analysis and subsequent development of technical ca-
pacities for analyzing film – or, to be more precise, for slowing down, reversing,
and delinearizing the filmic flux. Photographic exploration of film furnishes the
richest instance of our access to the properly imperceptible domain of micro-
temporal sensibility, and Frampton’s reference to anthropologist Ray Birdwhis-
tell’s use of filmic analysis reveals precisely how such access can impact future
perception by being fed back into, and thus indirectly influencing, the flux of
experience. Birdwhistell, who founded kinesics as a field of inquiry and re-
search, used film to capture the interaction of a mother and infant in a house-
hold that had already produced two schizophrenic children; through meticu-
lous, frame-by-frame analysis, Birdwhistell was able to identify one moment in
which the mother appeared to give the child contradictory signals. In his recap-
ping of this mediated research, Frampton appears to be struck by the massive
temporal disjunction between the time of inscription and the time of analysis:
“Birdwhistell states that rigorous examination of such films requires, on the
average, about one hundred hours per running second of real time.… If there is
a monster in hiding here, it has cunningly concealed itself within time, emer-
ging, in Birdwhistell’s film on four frames … that is, for only one-sixth of a sec-
ond.”
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Modulating Movement-Perception
Generalized from this specific deployment, the temporal disjunction opened up
by the photographic exploration of film forms the impetus for Frampton’s own
concrete experimentations with the temporal flexibility of cinema. The formal
principle at work in these temporal excavations is, as Annette Michelson inci-
sively discerns, the logic of the Dedekind cut. Named for German mathemati-
cian Richard Dedekind, the Dedekind cut (formulated in , the year before
Fox-Talbot’s first photographs):
is a partition of the rational numbers into two non-empty parts A and B, such that all
elements of A are less than all elements of B and A contains no greatest element. The
cut itself is, conceptually, the “gap” defined between A and B. In other words, A con-
tains every rational number less than the cut, and B contains every rational number
greater than the cut. The cut itself is in neither set.
For our purposes, which is to say, insofar as it concerns Frampton’s introjection
of photographic (micro-)temporality into film, Dedekind’s cut introduces a cer-
tain scale flexibility into the concept of the instant. The significance of this flex-
ibility can be discerned by contrasting it with Deleuze’s concept of the “any-
instant-whatever”, which cinema inherits from early modern science and which
understands instants to be identical to and equidistant from one another. If the
any-instant-whatever names the cinematic construction of the instant, the Dede-
kind cut – understood as an operation to divide past and future and thus as
coincident with the “now” – designates a variable, counter-cinematic, prop-
erly photographic instant. This variable instant marks a caesura that can occur
anywhere within a continuity, and not simply at privileged regular intervals (the
spatial equivalent of rational numbers). Indeed, it belongs to a conceptualiza-
tion of continuity in which continuity is prior to division. As the basis for a
media practice, the Dedekind cut thus affords the possibility for an intensive
logic of division, one that does not oppose continuity and discontinuity; specifi-
cally, it affords the possibility to operate on an intensive timeline and suggests a
correlation between virtuality and scale-specificity such that what emerges at
more coarse-grained temporal scales relates to what transpires, simultaneously
but beyond perception, at finer-grained scales, as actualization to virtuality. On
such an intensive timeline, the standardized time of cinematic movement would
be doubled by a variable, intensive time of photographic (micro-) movement.
To get even more concrete: the logic of the Dedekind cut informs the ontology
of Frampton’s infinite film; indeed, on one understanding, Frampton’s film sim-
ply is the postulation of an infinite continuum that can be divided and delimited
– actualized – through variant media interfaces and at variant timescales, only
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one of which is cinema in its dominant, consciousness-miming form. The logic
of the Dedekind cut also informs Frampton’s critical media practice insofar as
this practice involves the introjection of photographic (micro-)temporality into
cinematic time. Accordingly, if the Magellan project comprises the larger con-
text for Frampton’s theorization of the infinite film, his media practice finds its
primal scene somewhat earlier in his career as filmmaker, namely in Critical
Mass, the  film made directly in the wake of – and as I shall suggest in
response to – his second most critically acclaimed film, (nostalgia). Indeed, if
(nostalgia) marks Frampton’s conversion from (still) photographer to filmmaker,
as has been suggested by more than one of Frampton’s commentators, Critical
Mass may mark his further conversion from filmmaker to media modulator.
Critical Mass, in other words, inaugurates Frampton’s own anticipation of
new media art practice as part of what I termed, at the beginning of this article,
experimental film’s aspiration to the condition of new media.
While (nostalgia) and Critical Mass both address the elective affinity linking
photography and memory, they could not differ more in how they do so nor in
their respective visions of what is at stake in this affinity. Most striking in this
regard is their divergence of temporal scale: whereas (nostalgia) embraces the
temporal flux of mainstream cinema ( fps) in order to highlight, and perhaps
also to question, the power of photography to recall and to mourn the past,
Critical Mass literally introjects the static instantaneity of photography into
the cinematic flux.
(nostalgia) comprises thirteen sections (thirteen -foot reels of film), each of
which includes an image sequence featuring a photograph displayed on a stove
burner for about  seconds before it begins to burn up and is accompanied by a
voice-over description that, as it becomes slowly apparent, does not correspond
to the presently depicted photograph, but to the very next one. The effect of the
asynchronous presentation of description and image is to activate the viewer’s
faculty of recollection such that the appearance of each image subsequent to the
first one revivifies the now past description, though not without imparting a
nagging feeling of lost detail and some sense of disjunction between sensory
modes of cognition.
By contrast, Critical Mass depicts a heated domestic argument between a
man and a woman standing in front of a blank white wall, and is edited to
produce visual and aural stuttering as well as progressively mounting desyn-
chronization of image and sound. While the editing algorithm varies across the
film’s duration, the most commonly used pattern is, as Frampton describes it
“two steps forward and one back”, a pattern he calls “phasing”; for example,
the line “It was a very spontaneous thing” is depicted as a series of back-and-
forth phases: “It was ... It was a ... was a very ... a very spont ... very spontaneous
... taneous thing.”
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Compared to (nostalgia), the scope of “memory” in Critical mass is vastly
condensed and enclosed upon itself: thus, rather than a past event or descrip-
tion, the memory of the content of former experiences, what is remembered here
is quite literally the sequence of frames or “photograms” (following the terminol-
ogy of Garrett Stewart) immediately preceding the now of perception. Precisely
because of its back-and-forth play with the linear flux of cinema, Critical
Mass foregrounds the texture of what philosopher Jean-Michel Salanskis, com-
menting on Husserl, has called “adherent” time (or adherent temporal inten-
tionality). Differentiated from “referential” (temporal) intentionality, which re-
members or “recollects” at the time-scale of lived experiences (contents of
consciousness), adherent intentionality retains the just-past (and protends the
just-to-come) at a time-scale that lies beneath the threshold of representation.
Even more starkly: whereas referential intentionality intends the time of the ex-
perience of a consciousness experiencing objects in the world, adherent inten-
tionality intends nothing but the passage of time itself. Accordingly, if referen-
tial intentionality supports the time of consciousness as lived experience,
adherent intentionality produces the time of life, the basal continuity that un-
derlies and energizes all events in time, including the events of consciousness
that constitute lived experience. In normal circumstances, the experience of ad-
herent intentionality remains outside of the scope of awareness; it is more or
less akin to the “preacceleration” or incipiency that Manning positions as the
virtuality of perception.
Yet because it interferes with this normally nonconscious production of ad-
herent intentionality, Critical Mass brings the structure of retentionality (and
protentionality) into the scope of viewer awareness, though certainly not with-
out continuing to stimulate the viewer’s ongoing production of temporal adher-
ence. More specifically, Critical Mass introduces a disjunction into the process
of temporal intentionality that has the effect of separating what is normally in-
tertwined and putatively inseparable: namely, adherent intentionality and the
external “content” that is its necessary manifold and stimulus.
With Critical Mass, then, Frampton would seem to add a new element – a
third stage – to the ongoing contemporary critical project of revealing the tech-
nical basis of time-consciousness. If Husserl’s foundational work in phenomen-
ology emphasized the necessity for time-consciousness to externalize its opera-
tion via a “temporal object” (paradigmatically, the melody), and if Bernard
Stiegler has recently demonstrated that such an object must be a technical object
with temporalizing power of its own (paradigmatically, the real-time televisual
flux of global cinema), Frampton underscores the productive dimension of the
correlation between the technical synthesis of consciousness and the adherent
intentionality of the living. As Frampton configures it, this productive dimen-
sion emerges out of the interference that is always, as it were, virtually present
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when technical syntheses are superimposed upon living ones. In stark contrast
to the technical temporal objects Stiegler proffers as surrogates for our collective
temporalization in the world today, Critical Mass introduces a tension be-
tween the two fluxes that are at issue in the operation of any technical temporal
object, no matter how concealed from view: on the one hand, the flux of cin-
ematic images (or photograms) and, on the other, the flux of the living (adher-
ent intentionality). More specifically still, Frampton’s unsettling film desynchro-
nizes the flux of our spectatorial time and the flux of the image machine that is
supposedly driving it; the result is a certain liberation of our adherent intention-
ality as the force of time’s forward movement.
Insofar as it modulates our encounter with the imperceptible, micro-temporal
domain of pre-experiential incipiency, Critical Mass participates in the devel-
opment of a new, media-centered stage in the technical contamination of phe-
nomenological time-consciousness: rather than a laboratory for excavating the
temporal structure of consciousness as it generates lived experiences in the
world at large (Stiegler’s contribution), the technical temporal object that is Cri-
tical Mass explores the temporal experience of its own viewing, or more ex-
actly, it temporally excavates its own constitution in and through the viewer’s
lived experiencing of it. To put this contrast more starkly: unlike the cinematic
temporal objects Stiegler discusses (exemplarily Fellini’s Intervista), Critical
Mass doesn’t use cinema as a means to explore the temporal dynamics of some-
thing else (i.e., time-consciousness), but engages a concrete series of cinematic
images (the images on two  feet reels of film) as itself the experiential struc-
ture to be explored.
With this difference in mind, we can understand the profound implications of
Frampton’s pedagogical claims for his film: “One of the things that goes on in
Critical Mass”, he tells Scott MacDonald, “is a process of training the specta-
tor to watch the film. The work teaches the spectator how to read the work.”
In so doing, I want to suggest, what the work in fact teaches the spectator is
how she produces adherence – how, by processing the flux of concrete images
(photograms), she generates not just the sensory experience of the film, but also
the continuous time of her own living. What makes Critical Mass capable of
revealing the operation of adherent intentionality is precisely what makes it an
experimental film and also, not surprisingly, what explains its anticipation of
digital media art: it is precisely because Critical Mass complicates the tempo-
ral paradigm of cinema – the coincidence between the flux of images and the
flux of spectatorial consciousness – that it can focus attention on adherence. For
what Frampton’s editing algorithms effectively do (and this applies equally to
both the two steps forward and one back that organizes the photograms as well
as the gradually mounting desynchronization of the sound track from the
images) is create a crisis within retention: in watching the film, the spectator
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is confronted with situations where what is retained (the just-past of the present
of experiencing consciousness) does not in fact coincide with the just-past of the
current image or set of photograms, – but rather with its just-to-come. Frampton’s
film literally forces its spectators to retain, and to do so repeatedly, what – at the
level of the image and soundtrack – remains still to come. In this way, it not only
destroys the temporal coincidence central to cinema’s “appalling ambition” to
mime the flux of consciousness, but also liberates adherent intentionality from
its subordination to the production of a fictional reality effect. In viewing Criti-
cal Mass, in short, we do not lend our adherent intentionality to the time of the
cinema, that is, to the time of images as the representational content of a fic-
tional or at least remembered experience. On the contrary, we place – or rather,
are compelled to place – our power to generate temporal adherence in the ser-
vice of photogrammatic flux, and learn through the startling disjunction between
our feeling of our own forward-moving continuity and our perception of a halt-
ing, stuttering narrative progress that this power stems not from the media
temporal object but from our own living embodiment of worldly “depresen-
cing”.
Notes
. Peter Lunenfeld, “Hollis Frampton: The Perfect Machine” in Snap to Grid (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, ), -.
. Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ), -
.
. Manovich, .
. I have criticized Manovich for this in New Philosophy for New Media (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, ), chap. .
. Frampton, “For a Metahistory of Film: Commonplace Notes and Hypotheses” in On
the Camera Arts and Consecutive Matters: The Writings of Hollis Frampton, B. Jenkins




. “The infinite film contains an infinity of passages wherein no frame resembles any
other in the slightest degree, and a further infinity of passages wherein successive
frames are nearly identical as intelligence can make them”, ibid., .
. Lunenfeld, .
. Gunning, presentation at the Roundtable on Cinema and Art History, SCMS, Los
Angeles, March , , as heard by the author. Se also Gunning’s article in the
present collection.
. David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Film Art: An Introduction, th ed. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., ), .
68 Mark B.N. Hansen
. For an example of this line of questioning, see D.N. Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ); Rodowick claims that digital
cameras cannot capture duration, which is to say the temporal reality of human
experience, but can only inscribe the cycling of the computer as it performs the var-
ious algorithms it utilizes to generate images.
. For an example of this line of questioning, see Babette Mangolte, “A Matter of Time:
Analog Versus Digital” in Camera Lucida, Camera Obscura: Essays for Annette Michel-
son (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, ).
. Tom Gunning, “Moving Away from the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Rea-
lity”, Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies . (): -, here .
. Christian Metz, “On the Impression of Reality in the Cinema” in Film Language: A
Semiotics of the Cinema, transl. M. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
), -, emphasis added.
. Gunning, -.
. Metz, -, emphasis added.
. The original context for Metz’s concept of cinema’s “insubstantiality” is the compar-
ison of cinema with the theater, a contrast introduced by Arnheim. Based on Arn-
heim’s view, the theater differs from the cinema in that it takes place in real time and
space (whereas films gives us “images only”), and it gives us an experience of “rea-
lity itself” rather than an “illusion of reality.” While Metz rejects the binary terms of
Arnheim’s contrast, its basic framework still seems to haunt his conception of “in-
substantiality” or at least the unquestioned assumption that what is visual is non-
material.
. Gunning, , emphasis added.
. Deleuze, of course, famously argues that Bergson misunderstood the cinema in
Creative Evolution, but that his analysis of movement in Matter and Memory – which
informs the Deleuzian concept of the movement-image – comprises the fundamen-
tals of a solid understanding of cinema’s operation. Gunning offers a more specific
criticism of Bergson’s error in Creative Evolution and suggests that Deleuze only re-
inforces this error: “Great confusion (which I feel Deleuze increases rather than dis-
pels) comes if we do not realize that the analytical aspect of the cinematograph that
Bergson took as his model for this tendency to conceive of motion in terms of static
instants derives from the filmstrip in which motion is analyzed into a succession of
frames, not the projected image on the screen in which synthetic motion is recreated”
(Gunning, ).
. Massumi, .
. I borrow the term “depresencing” [Entgegenwärtigung] from Eugen Fink, Husserl’s
last student who worked on the late manuscripts on time (the so-called C-Manu-
scripts) in the early s. Fink coins the term “depresencing” to name the world’s
ongoing temporalization, the world’s continuous moving out of the present into the
past (and hence opening up the reality of a future) that, Fink argues, is itself the
condition for time-consciousness to continue to presence (and to experience its pre-
sencing as a thick nowness, that includes a retentional and protentional supple-
ment). See Fink, Studien zur Phänomenologie, - (The Hague: Nijhoff, ).
. Manning, -, emphasis added.
. Ibid., , emphasis added.
Digital Technics Beyond the “Last Machine” 69
. Manning does suggest – in the mode of counterfactual speculation – that Marey’s
work might have opened up a fundamentally different trajectory of cinema than
the trajectory that was actualized, and that now comprises the empirical history of
cinema: “had Marey’s experiments with movement been foregrounded within the
history of cinema, cinema’s early emphasis on theories of semiosis might have been
derouted into a more developed exploration of how cinema moves. This might have
redirected the study of cinema from its early academic embeddedness within form-
alist thought toward early twentieth-century expressions of movement such as the
invention of modern dance, Futurism’s concern with ontogenesis, Bergson’s theory
of duration. The effect of this convergence of cinema and movement would have
been a foregrounding less of narrative strategies within the cinematic than experi-
mentation with how images provoke durational flows that are themselves mobile
even before passing through a projector” (). Notwithstanding its questionable
claims regarding cinema’s early emphasis on semiosis and formalism (which prob-
ably arose with the advent of post-classical film theory), this is an interesting sug-
gestion. Indeed, I would suggest that Metz’s privileging of movement – and Gun-
ning’s return to it – marks a moment in what we might, in fact, consider to be
Marey’s cinematic legacy.
. Erin Manning, “Coloring the Virtual”, Configurations, . (Fall ): -, here
, emphasis added.
. I borrow the concept of a direct sensory “pickup” from psychologist James Gibson,
who argues against a theory of the senses as subjective mediators of perceptual ex-
perience. Rather than the senses “translating” environmental information into a
form that can be experienced by human mindbodies, sense perception for Gibson
involves the direct pickup of information from the environment. See J.J. Gibson, The
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Taylor & Francis, ), Chap. .
. Georges Didi-Huberman, “La Danse de toute chose” in Mouvements de l’air: Etienne-
Jules Marey, Photographe des fluids, Didi-Huberman and Laurent Mannoni (eds.) (Edi-
tions Gallimard/Reunion des musees nationaux, ) p. .
. See Didi-Huberman, : “It is as if the graphic method and chronophotography
had as their ultimate stake to make us see and understand the dance of every thing.”
He specifies that this ultimate stake operates a subversion of “the explicit intentions
formulated by his system.”
. Didi-Huberman, .
. This is my definition of technogenesis. See my Bodies in Code. Interfaces with Digital
Media (New York: Routledge, ).
. Joel Snyder, “Visualization and Visibility” in Picturing Science, Producing Art, eds.
Caroline A. Jones and Peter Galison (New York: Routledge, ), p. , last em-
phasis added.
. Etienne-Jules Marey, La Méthode Graphique, cited in Snyder .
. Snyder, ; Marey, cited in Snyder, .
. Hollis Frampton, “A Pentagram for Conjuring the Narrative” in On the Camera Arts
and Consecutive Matters, -.
. Hollis Frampton, “Incisions in History/Segments of Eternity” in On the Camera Arts
and Consecutive Matters, -.
. Frampton, “For a Metahistory of Film”, .
70 Mark B.N. Hansen
. I borrow this term from Christopher Phillips, “Word Pictures: Frampton and Photo-
graphy,” October  (spring : -, here .
. Frampton, “For a Metahistory of Film,” .
. Ibid., .





. Wikipedia, “Dedekind Cut,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedekind_cut, last ac-
cessed //.
. “It is in this sense that the cinema is the system which reproduces movement as a
function of any-instant-whatever that is, as a function of equidistant instants, se-
lected so as to create an impression of continuity. Any other system which repro-
duces movement through an order of exposures [poses] projected in such a way that
they pass into one another, or are ‘transformed,’ is foreign to the cinema” (Gilles
Deleuze, Cinema I: the Movement-Image, transl. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam
[Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, ], ).
. Following the suggestion of Annette Michelson, who writes in her foreword to the
original volume of Frampton’s collected essays, Circles of Confusion: “It has been
pointed out that Dedekind’s axiom constitutes a particularly adroit presentation of
our representation of time. [cites the Dedekind axiom] … So it is that we intuitively
establish, within Time, a past and a future which are mutually exclusive. Together
they compose Time stretching into eternity. Within this representation, ‘now’ consti-
tutes the division which separates past and future; any instant of the past was once
‘now,’ and any instant of the future will be ‘now.’ Therefore, any instant may consti-
tute this division” (Michelson, “Time Out of Mind: a foreword” in Circles of Confu-
sion: Film, Photography, Video: Texts, - [Rochester, NY: Visual Studies Work-
shop, ], .
. See “Hollis Frampton,” in Scott MacDonald, A Critical Cinema: Interviews with Inde-
pendent Filmmakers (Berkeley: University of California Press, ), .
. Bruce Jenkins, dissertation, .
. This is especially so in the context of recent work bridging Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy of time-consciousness and neuroscientific explorations of perception. See, for
example, Varela, “The Specious Present…”where the lived experience of conscious-
ness literally emerges out of microtemporal neural processes that, in relation to it,
remain virtual.
. MacDonald, .
. Frampton gives some insight into his process in the interview with MacDonald:
“The whole film, of course, was shot as two long takes: the original material is two
-foot rolls. The sound was continuous; the Nagra was simply left on and that’s
why you hear the squeals of the slate. Except for that very brief opening passage in
which it starts out in sync and immediately disintegrates, it’s divided very roughly
into fourths, with the passage in the dark forcing two pairs apart. At first, they
match, and then in the dark, where there is only sound, each segment of sound,
instead of going two steps forward and one back, is simply repeated exactly three
times. When the imagery reappears, the temporal overlap resumes, but the unit of
Digital Technics Beyond the “Last Machine” 71
sound cutting is slightly larger. Typically it’s about six frames (or a quarter of a
second) larger than the image unit, which means that once every four seconds they
will coincide exactly. They rotate in and out of sync with each other until finally,
they lose sync entirely and are out of step first by one repetition of the word ‘bull-
ship’ and then by two repetitions of the word ‘bullshit’….” (MacDonald, ).
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The Use of Freeze and Slide Motion

The Figure of Visual Standstill in
R.W. Fassbinder’s Films
Christa Blümlinger
Currently, questions of film theory regarding phenomena of cinematographic
temporalization are discussed in relation to new media. At the same time, how-
ever, these discussions also pick up on earlier theoretical models of the relation-
ship between standstill and motion, the prehistory of the cinema, theories of
photography and the snapshot, as well as the aesthetics of modernism and the
avant-garde. In the s, the classical film theorist and avant-garde filmmaker
Jean Epstein was already describing film in general as a machine that perspecti-
vizes space and time: the ultimate “machine to think time”. Slow motion and
fast-forward as well as the close-up are central figures in his thought. With his
concept of the cinematograph as a “robot brain,” Epstein points out the fact that
the filmic connection of standstill and movement, discontinuity and continuity
represented a profound transformation of perception: Epstein conceives of the
cinema as a paradox – the inorganic, “mineral” production of the living. The
apparent standstill of a film operates precisely on this paradoxical constellation.
It is no coincidence that film theory later worked off the key neorealist works of
modernist cinema, such as the films of Rossellini: the Bazinian description of
film as a “change mummified” also targets the strange nature of movement in
the cinema. Recently, Laura Mulvey has explored once more the contradictory
materialization of life and death in film using the example of Rossellini’s Jour-
ney to Italy: cinema’s punctum, according to Mulvey, is precisely realized
where the repression of this contradiction fails, thereby making the spectator
feel uncertain.
When Garrett Stewart defines the figure of the freeze-frame as a repeated,
projected individual image that entails the suspension of succession and the
negation as moving picture, he sees in this form of disruption – with an eye on
the narrative cinema – the potential of “cinematic reflexivity” within a narra-
tion, “that paradoxical case of real motion without real movements that merely
takes the condition of cinema to its limit”. But we should qualify this point: the
dialectics of standstill and movement can only be examined in a concrete filmic
form, and should be considered historically. While the freeze-frame in classical
cinema is quite rare, that is only because classical cinema developed other
modes of stasis and the production of fascination (Mary Ann Doane, for exam-
ple, points out that the close-up also serves to interrupt narrative flow), Serge
Daney argues that advertising, video clips, and the films based on these forms
today mobilize an excess of visual standstills that becomes a form of exchange
between visual regimes.
As Gilles Deleuze points out, what we directly perceive as a moving image in
the cinema is an “intermediate image as immediate given,” created from single
frames. The individual frame of the filmstrip cannot be perceived as an image in
the projection unless it is frozen, and thus becomes a visible “freeze-frame”.
From the perspective of the spectator, Roland Barthes writes about the possibi-
lity of the virtual selection of an individual frame that was selected not in rela-
tion to a suggested meaning, but in light of the filmstrip. The choice would be
made not according to criteria of the moments privileged in the course of the
film – or in any narrative – but, as it were, a random card would be taken from
the deck in search of an additional significance, one that is at a distance from the
realistic authority of the running image, what Roland Barthes calls the “obtuse
meaning” in the individual photogram. This meaning emerges fragmentarily
and unpredictably, as a kind of utopian virtuality. Deleuze also seems to define
the cinema as a system that reproduces movement in relation to a random mo-
ment, the “any-instant-whatever,” but as a function of “equidistant instants se-
lected so as to create an impression of continuity.” Raymond Bellour, com-
menting on Barthes’s and Deleuze’s conceptions of the relationship between the
instant and duration, raises the question of the nature of the interruption of film-
ic movement: Should it be seen as one privileged instant among many “any-
instant-whatever,” or rather as a privileged instant that appears singular and
unique? Bellour points out that the answer cannot be of a general or formal
nature, but that the question needs to be explored historically or singularly in
relation to a particular oeuvre or film.
The question that Bellour poses in his consideration of the filmic instant in
modern cinema’s forms of interruption is that of the snapshot, when it becomes
both “the pose and the pause of film”, that is, the more general question of the
figure of the “photographic” in film (and not just the individual stilled image,
the “photogrammatic”). A similar argument for conceiving standstill and move-
ment via the relationship between photography and film can be found in Phi-
lippe Dubois, who locates the possibility of conceptualizing photography as it
inheres in film at the point of intersection between the two media. He describes
the filmic individual image as a “dialectic image, that points to an object that is
neither (truly) film, nor (simply) it is a bit more than a photograph (it is its be-
yond) and a bit less than film (it is its this world),” furthermore as the “embodi-
ment of the idea of an intermediate member of the chain, the fold between
photograph and film, the exact point (punctum) of passage between the two”.
Individual images are only perceptible if we slow down or stop the film. If
the film is not run according to its realistic running time, but in a new space-
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time order linked back to its textuality and its materiality, a form of reflexivity
can emerge. Such an analytical gesture applied to the relationship between
standstill and movement draws the filmic itself into consideration, a system
consisting of mutually determining categories of the visible and the invisible.
The film in projection, based on a celluloid strip, usually conceals its material
basis from the consciousness of the spectators, achieving what film theory terms
the “reality effect.” The arrêt-sur-images or freeze-frame may point to the materi-
ality of film, the celluloid strip, which is usually denied by what Thierry Kunt-
zel calls the “projection film”.
As far as the historical dimension of the phenomenon is concerned, Serge
Daney has proposed one of the most interesting theories of the freeze-frame or
arrêt-sur-image. In a series of writings, Daney shows, with the freezing of the
last shot in Truffaut’s Les quatre cents coups, how a figure enters the film
body that he terms a “hallucinated form”, a figure that represents a modern
form of transgression. According to Daney, this figure eventually transforms
over the years, often as the final shot in a film, becoming a clichéd, symptomatic
standstill that, unlike Truffaut’s film, is no longer part of the (cinema) image, but
rather, the so-called “visual” (i.e. advertising, logos, or television series). In Da-
ney’s terms, I would like to propose that in Fassbinder, the freeze-frame can
indeed be placed on the side of the image (that is, the cinema), but paradoxi-
cally, it is actually produced in the interest of a critique that aims at certain di-
mensions of the so-called “visual”.
Various stylistic figures observed in Fassbinder’s films – the framings that
allow for a theatricalization of scenes, objects cut off in the visual foreground
that have the function of a scenic ramp, or shifts in focus that accentuate various
points of view – have caused critics to place the work, despite the seriality of
some productions, in the category of modern auteur cinema. However, the fig-
ure of the standstill in Fassbinder’s work has seldom been noted until recently,
probably because it often appears marginally in a literal sense: in Fassbinder’s
films, the freeze-frame as a specific form of visual standstill can be found as a
figure of pause or sudden interruption usually at the beginning or end of his
films.
As I would like to demonstrate in this chapter, in Fassbinder’s work, this form
of standstill in light of its complexity and variability does not solely represent a
kind of banalized repetition of a modern stylistic figure in the wake of the Nou-
velle Vague, but rather is tied to a specific idea about film and a kind of media
theory. Furthermore, it implies a certain critique of the consensus of the contem-
porary society, which sometimes even assumes a utopian dimension. In so
doing, it is located within a literary modernism, where the sense of the moment
is bound to reflection, becoming an interface for relating past and present.
Moreover, this form of interruption surfaces in Fassbinder’s films as a closing
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figure, but also at the opening of some of his films, where it has the capacity to
bind itself to other forms of suddenness.
Without supplying a comprehensive list of freeze-frames in Fassbinder’s
films, I have selected a few moments of visual standstill from his extensive
work to show the variation and complexity of this figure to develop a theory of
interruption in film. I would like to begin with one of the most famous films,
Die Ehe der Maria Braun (The Marriage of Maria Braun) (). This
film, as we know, is literarily framed by photographs: a portrait of Hitler at the
start and a series of large portraits of West German chancellors at the end intro-
duce the notion of a temporary expansion of the narrative, placed in the post-
war years. This series of “negative” monuments – Willy Brandt is missing – is
often analyzed in terms of semantic content. For me, however, it seems just as
essential that this insertion of the photographic in the movement image on a
formal level forms a symptomatic correspondence to another form of standstill
at the start of the film. Even before the credits, the opening of the film brings us
the scene of a newly married couple and a registry official leaving a German
registry office during an air raid. We watch as the excited couple throw them-
selves to the ground, imploring the official to sign the marriage certificate right
there. A sheet of paper floats upward, borne on the gust of wind caused by
exploding bombs, and then, in the middle of the visual field, there is a sudden
standstill in the form of a freeze-frame, while the soundtrack continues to her-
ald the horror of the approaching artillery. This is followed by the film title in
red letters that fill the entire visual field, word after word, as if it were a page in
a book. At the end, Fassbinder’s name appears alone on a white backdrop.
With this standstill, the floating sheet of paper is simultaneously captured
and displaced by the film. Due to the non-sync between image and sound, of
visual interruption and auditive flow, we are confronted from the very start
with two various temporal modi: the time of the film narrative (the postwar
years) and the time of the making of the film (the s). At issue here is Fas-
sbinder’s time-place: when the author tells stories and histories, they are always
primarily in the present tense.
In Ich will doch nur, daß ihr mich liebt (I Only Want You to Love Me)
(), there are numerous suspensions of movement toward the end of the
film. As a whole, the narration is structured around flashbacks that are all moti-
vated by conversations in a prison. The conversation in the beginning of the film
is accorded therapeutic value for the (anti)hero Peter (Vitus Zeplichal), as well
as symbolic capital for the psychologist, who intends to write a book about the
story. Slowly, in the form of flashbacks, a story develops around a young man’s
psychic repressions, his “blockage”, Oedipal confusions and a system of alien-
ated exchange relations. At the end of the film, a series of three visual stand-
stills introduces the passing of the final titles in white letters. These visual stand-
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stills astonishingly do not only serve as a curtain or backdrop for the final cred-
its – this is Daney’s critique of several films that have allowed the freeze-frame
to petrify into a clichéd figure. Quite on the contrary, Fassbinder’s final stand-
stills are structurally tied to the psychologist’s last question, which goes unan-
swered. In this series of blockages of the image (a kind of figurative displacement
of the protagonist’s own symptoms), an over the shoulder-shot from behind the
psychologist is at first briefly arrested, framing a slight bottom view of Peter,
who, in that moment, stands up as the question is posed. The movement is then
resumed, and, in a counter shot, we see Peter’s hands banging on the cassette
recorder on the table. This gesture becomes the object of the second interrup-
tion, accompanied by the continuous sound that repeats the sentence that was
just recorded. Leben Sie eigentlich gerne? (Do you like living?). After this,
the “frozen” image “melts”, the movement resumes once again and Peter leaves
the frame. The third and last standstill occurs in this final shot and corresponds
to the beginning of the film: the camera pans towards the window, while behind
the bars a landscape opens in the twilight. This final shot marks the end of the
story, but also indicates that the story doesn’t end for the protagonist, who still
has many years of imprisonment ahead of him.
It is telling that the same type of serial interruption can be found at the end of
another melodrama, where the story also ends in a disciplinary institution. In
Wildwechsel (Jail Bait) () Hanni (Eva Mattes) is, by the end of the film,
all alone in the column-lined hall of a courthouse, while she waits to be called to
the witness stand to testify against Franz (Harry Baier), her former lover, whom
she had murder her father. The final credits pass over the frozen moments of the
final shot, showing Hanni, outdoors, hopping across the stones, oblivious to
everything as she plays with a cootie catcher. The riddle of her attitude toward
the accused is underscored by a gaze toward her warden (Irm Hermann), as
well as by the brief appearance of another witness. The issue in this interrup-
tion, as in Ich will doch nur, daß ihr mich liebt, is the Truffautian idea of
an expansion or transgression of the narrative frame. On the other hand, in the
serial decomposition of a movement, the imaginary capture of a character is
established, just as in Godard’s Sauve qui peut la vie (Slow Motion) (),
in that filmic time divides between an actual and a virtual mode (between pre-
sent and past).
The series of visual standstills in Ich will doch nur, daß ihr mich liebt
exhibits two significant aspects. First of all, we should emphasize the relation-
ship of the suspension to the physical movement of the hero, who with a rough
gesture escapes the confessional setting (or dispositif, in a Foucauldian sense).
This outbreak counters the long series of motionless and blocked moments of
hesitation, with which the hero’s Oedipal speeches are embodied throughout
the film. When movement is inscribed into the body as an outbreak of pathos,
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more truth is seemingly implied by the formal relationship between standstill
and movement than in the exchange of words that is usually central in Fassbin-
der’s films. On the other hand, there is a complex relationship between the vi-
sual standstill and the apparatus. The image is frozen while the sound of the
recording device repeats the words that were just stated as always already re-
corded, preformed, reiterated speech, an emblem of therapeutic control that
(quite in the Foucauldian sense of dispositif) maintains the disciplinary system
of the prison in another form. Here, confession is shown within an agency of
power (or dispositif) that is explored in connection with a media apparatus. If,
during the entire film, Peter’s speech is transmitted as “blocked” speech, this
blockage is ultimately related to the enigmatic image of the trauma of the deed
that returns near the end, which is solved as a hermeneutic puzzle for the spec-
tators. With a different apparatus, in this case a telephone, which is the object
and symbol of his blockage, the hero is able for the first time to tear himself
away from his compulsive petrification, in an acting out, to kill a restaurant
owner whom he suddenly perceives as looking like his father. The body’s
stance, media apparatus and visual standstill coincide at the end of this film in
a figuratively condensed constellation.
Certainly, the most striking freeze-frame in Fassbinder’s work is found at the
end of Mutter Küsters Fahrt zum Himmel (Mother Küsters Goes to Hea-
ven) (). The violence and suddenness of this final interruption may be
modernistic, whereas the motionlessness of the aerial views at the beginning
awakens the desire of the spectator to watch a story begin that can be read as a
homage to classical cinema. The final shot of the film shows Mutter Küsters in a
medium-long shot, frozen in horror as she is confronted with the reversal of her
political leanings. Her struggle for dignity ends, to her own surprise, with a
hostage-taking organized by a group of radical activists who use her like the
political party had earlier done.
The all-too spectacular event of the hostage taking, which ends the story, is
ultimately told with intertitles on the “obtuse” side of the freeze-frame that
further highlights the frozen stare of Mutter Küsters: cf. the intervention of the
police, the death of Mutter Küsters, as well as the newspaper’s chief editor,
whom she feels has victimized her. The visual standstill here appears as a sus-
pension of both filmic narration and motoric action. This arrest leads the specta-
tor without a transition from visual projection to mental projection using text.
The end is presented as a screenplay, which reasserts the projective function of
the latter. By leaving out a spectacular ending, the visual standstill insinuates
the virtuality inherent in any screenplay. Incidentally, the American version of
the film has a happy ending.
A comparable example of narrative virtuality and contingency is found in
Despair (), where Dirk Bogarde, after murdering his doppelgänger, with
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the police giving chase, attempts to escape the fiction. In the final tense scene, he
suddenly turns to face the audience, asks for their help, confirming his own
identity as a mere actor. The last shot is a freeze-frame that fades to white and
opens up a reflective layer of the film, underlining the arbitrariness of the end-
ing.
If the opening credits of Maria Braun have become a site of the signature,
then the final credits of Mutter Küsters serve as the scene of writing. The fig-
ure of standstill in Fassbinder’s films always leads beyond this purely reflexive
dimension, binding itself to other privileged instants. On the structural level of
the narration, for example, the freeze-frame in Maria Braun is tied to the
bombing that occurs during the wedding. This figure of suddenness and stand-
still corresponds structurally to the explosion at the end, through which the re-
cently reunited couple is annihilated. In Mutter Küsters, the final standstill
that serves as a disruption of the visual movement is linked to the sudden
move toward terrorist activity, which repeats and replaces the husband’s despe-
rate act of violence that the radio had announced at the beginning of the film.
The list of visual standstills at the end of his films is long, but there are also
more discrete freeze-frames in other Fassbinder films.
As Karl-Heinz Bohrer argues from his aesthetic theory of “suddenness”
with regards to language and literature, the figure of suddenness places the
spectator in a perceptive situation within which the uniqueness of what is seen
counters standard modes of perception and dominant values. The radical tem-
poralization that characterizes the pregnant moment (or privileged instant)
lends it a simultaneously subjective and utopian dimension. It is on precisely
this level that Fassbinder links the visual standstill to other figurations of sud-
denness. The clearest layer of correspondence to figurations of standstill is that
of the mise-en-scène of bodies and machines.
Fassbinder in his early films was already emphasizing the link between the
mise-en-scène and the setting in motion or the arresting of the body through sud-
denness. In Das kleine Chaos (The Little Chaos) (), where Fassbinder
plays a sadistic petty criminal, the criminal “orders” his invisible victim, shout-
ing “Rauf, runter!” (“Up! Down!”) showing himself in a half close-up. The idea
of the director controlling the body is further radicalized by the image of the
blows of the fist and the shootings that literally throw bodies out of the visual
field (in Das kleine Chaos, Liebe ist kälter als der Tod (Love Is Colder
Than Death) (), and Whity ()). Like his violent slaps (Katzelmacher
(), Warnung vor einer heiligen Nutte (Beware of a Holy Whore)
()), these blows and shots are often quite surprising and serve to dynamize
a stationary configuration.
These sudden dynamizations always generate narrative consequences, as in
the restaurant scene in Wildwechsel where Franz spits into his palm and then
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suddenly wipes the spit onto the overly-made-up face of his girlfriend Hanni.
She leaves the visual field with her makeup smeared across her face. Such an
inexplicably brutal instant occurs not only in connection with violent gestures
but also in moments of pathos. There is, for example, a long shot in Warnung
vor einer heiligen Nutte, where Fred (Kurt Raab), who has collapsed along
with his buddies in a state of exhaustion and drunkenness, suddenly gets up to
tame the uncontrolled fury that seems to be slowly building by leading the
group in singing a religious song by Schubert, assuming the role of a conductor,
rousing his drunken buddies to join in the chorus.
As far as machines are concerned, the ambivalence of the mechanism of
standstill and movement appear even more clearly than in the scenic outbreak
of a body from a statuary pose into kinetic gesture. In Fassbinder’s work we
find that the omnipresence of audio devices has often been noted – jukeboxes,
record players, and tape recorders. Their running or pausing is sometimes char-
acteristic of shots or entire scenes, or are even responsible for structuring entire
films, as In einem Jahr mit dreizehn Monden. Here, Irene awakens the trans-
vestite Elvira by removing a record needle stuck in a groove, thereby causing a
dramatic silence. At the film’s end, another song is heard skipping in a groove,
highlighting a freeze-frame as the last shot, in which we see the sister Gudrun
disappearing, as a witness to Elvira’s childhood trauma. This is also echoed later
when the playing of a tape with Elvira’s voice on it announces her death.
In Mutter Küsters, the recording equipment and bugging operations repre-
sent the control and power of the media. After her first public speech before
Communist party members, Küsters departs, only to discover that her speech
was recorded without her knowledge. A similar situation involving audio
equipment and power is found in Ich will doch nur, daß ihr mich liebt,
but the association with the visual standstill is more obvious. The visual inter-
ruption in Mutter Küsters paradoxically represents the definition of an al-
ways-already-recorded image, a kind of “robotic image” (Serge Daney) that
serves as a mobile idol. It is no accident that at the beginning of Lola (), in
a certain sense as a motto for the film, a photograph of Adenauer is shown,
revealing the chancellor leaning on the armrest of a sofa beside one of his favor-
ite objects, a music box including a radio, record player, television, and tape
deck. Another example is the “sound terror” that accompanies the mendacity
of images that Eddie Constantine mentions at the beginning of Die dritte Gen-
eration ().
The ambiguity of the always-already-recorded image and sound in Fassbin-
der’s films is bound to the affixation of each speech act by power, whether it is
the language of love or politics. At the same time, the idea of control in Fassbin-
der’s work also encounters a dimension that Jean-Luc Godard in hisHistoire(s)
du Cinéma (), in paying homage to Fassbinder, calls the “control of the
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universe”, that is the productive power of a filmmaker. From this standpoint,
we can say that in Fassbinder’s films at issue is the question of bringing things
to a standstill and suddenness. The freeze-frame here serves either as a blockage
loaded with symbolic character that announces eternal repetition – that would
be the nihilistic version – or can be seen as a virtualization of the filmic narrative
itself – that would be the utopian version of his poetics of expulsion.
If, for the film analyst, as Thierry Kuntzel writes, the filmic lies neither in
movement, nor in standstill, but somewhere between the two, the utopian mo-
ments of standstill in Fassbinder’s oeuvre can be understood as something in-
between, as an interval between privileged instant and any-instant-whatever (or
between pregnant and fleeting moments), as an opening towards a non-measur-
able time or towards a space in which the imaginary force develops and where
the image is temporalized, not as eternal, but as becoming.
Translated by Brian Currid, revised by Christa Blümlinger. Reprinted with the
kind permission of Bertz+Fischer Verlag, from the digital, English version of the
book Word and Flesh: Cinema Between Text and the Body, eds. Sabine Nessel, Win-
fried Pauleit et al. (Berlin: Bertz+Fischer Verlag), .
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The Temporalities of the Narrative Slide
Motion Film
Liv Hausken
The Mexican director Jonás Cuarón’s first feature film Año Uña (Year of the
Nail, ) is a -minute film narrative composed of still photographs with an
entire range of filmic sounds edited into a narrative that spans a year in the lives
of Molly (Eireann Harper), a -year-old American traveling through Mexico,
and Diego (Diego Cataño), a typically and perpetually horny -year-old – na-
ïve, romantic and troubled by a persistent ingrown toenail. The son of Alfonso
Cuarón, Jonás Cuarón’s film has been said to draw on many notions from his
father’s work (Y Tu Mamá También in particular) and the broader context of
recent Mexican cinema; a cross-generational relationship, the trials of puberty
and the fleeting moments that shape young lives. It has been characterized as a
“piece of work that resembles the exotic child from a union between La Jetée
and Y Tu Mamá También”. The reference to Chris Marker’s film La Jetée
() is due to the stills. It as been suggested that it is “inspired in style if not
content by La Jetée”, and even claimed to be “La Jetee-style”.
Chris Marker’s La Jetée (The Jetty) has become a cult classic, inspiring var-
ious tributes including Terry Gilliam’s  Monkeys (). Set in a bunker in a
devastated Paris in the aftermath of World War III, it tells the tale of a man, a
slave, exposed to experiments into time travel, sent back and forth, in and out of
the present time of the diegetic world, into the past and eventually into the fu-
ture, to replenish the decreasing stocks of food, medicine and energies of the
present world. The story is told using black-and-white stills, voice-over, music,
and minimal sound effects, including a distant, whispering sound of a mutter-
ing German dialogue between the scientists (the men conducting the experi-
ments).
La Jetée is often referred to whenever there are sequences of stills in a film,
like, for instance, in Ingmar Bergman’s Scener ur ett äktenskap (Scenes from
a Marriage, ) or Pernille Fischer Christensen’s En Soap (A Soap, ), to
mention just two. Briefly put, La Jetée is not only the title of Marker’s  sci-fi
film, but La Jetée also appears to be emblematic of a film style where photo-
graphic stills are used to compose a fiction film, the “La Jetee-style”. I will sug-
gest that we use the term slide-motion film.
Slide-Motion Film
In his dictionary with the pretentious title The Complete Film Dictionary (),
Ira Koningsberg uses the term “slide-motion film” for “A film, generally a docu-
mentary, that uses a series of still pictures like a filmograph, but in which the
camera seems to move among the picture’s elements by means of panning or a
zoom lens”.
The typical example of films that fits Koningsberg’s conception of slide-mo-
tion film would be a documentary about a particular historical event, or a bio-
graphy about an exceptional individual (a famous adventurer, or a distin-
guished artist) composed of singular photographs from different times and
places, illustrating the story told by a voice-over. Only in exceptional cases is
the voice-over is left out, as is the case in Ingmar Bergman’s  short film
Karins ansikte (Karin’s Face), a -minute portrait of the filmmaker’s mother
Karin Åkerblom Bergman. The film opens with a close up of a passport, its
identity information pages indicating a person’s identity in terms of name, na-
tionality, date of birth, hair color, eye color, etc. We are shown the passport
photo of an elderly woman and the passport holder’s signature before an inter-
title is cut in to note that Karin got this passport only a few months before she
died. Karins ansikte then slips into Bergman’s family album, for the camera to
visit, in some cases scrutinize, one old photograph after another, with the earlier
ones as sepia prints, and more recent ones in black-and-white. There is no dia-
logue, no voice-over, only the occasional inter-title and a spare, delicate piano
score. It is a collection of singular photographs presented in a film that does not
treat them as illustrations of a verbal narrative. The film creates a space of re-
flection and association, where the audience – based on their assumed knowl-
edge of Bergman’s biography and his other films or, more generally, based on
experience with family relations and photo albums – is invited to indulge in
identification and memory.
A similar status is accorded (or allowed) the photographs in Anja Breien’s
nine-minute short film Solvorn () that, in contrast to Karins Ansikte,
does present a voice-over but also fits Koningsberg’s definition and is thus of
interest here. The film is based on a collection of one-hundred-years-old glass-
plate photographs discovered in the attic of the filmmaker’s grandmother’s
house. They all appear to have been taken in the same, somewhat narrow geo-
graphical area, in and around the house over a period of few years. The voice-
over does not tell a story that is illustrated by photographs. Instead, the voice-
over questions the photographs and, even more profoundly, the photographer’s
desires, and the wishes and intentions of the unknown photographic practice of
the filmmaker’s grandmother. The film investigates the photographs in an ex-
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quisitely elegant way without explaining what they can tell, instead creating
relations between characters, composing small sequences of action and develop-
ing architectural space out of the singular photos in a way that seems to invite
the audience into the scene to reflect on what it was like to be there during her
grandmother’s time.
Both Bergman’s and Breien’s films feature photographs that have been filmed
by a film camera. These photographs are, however, not just the object of a film
camera, but also part of a filmic universe where they are just one component
among many (cinematography, editing, genre, etc.). Koningsberg’s definition of
slide-motion film seems to imply a fundamental relation between two instances
or dimensions, the narrator and the photographs, the first being the active di-
mension, the voice speaking and the camera looking, the other dimension being
the things looked at, the photographs as relics to be examined or documents to
be shown as illustrations or evidence. There are no doubts that both Karins
Ansikte and Solvorn are based on photographs. They, however, also create a
temporally organized space, where the photographs are not only objects for the
gaze but also components in the creation of a film universe. In Solvorn’s case
this is done in a way quite similar to Año uña, a film that arguably does not fit
Koningsberg’s definition of the slide-motion film.
Being a fiction film, Año Uña has an unusual production history. It is based
on analogue photographs of everyday life, family and friends, taken by Jonás
Cuarón over a period of one year. He then collated the , shots before reas-
sembling , to , of them into a fictional narrative. The negatives were
scanned, digitally edited and printed to  mm film. Combined with dialogue,
voice-over, music and other sound well-known film elements, Año Uña’s film
style seems quite ordinary for a narrative fiction film, except that it visually pre-
sents a series of stills. Moreover, even if each individual frame appears as a still
image, they are organized in sequences and present their static objects as inte-
grated into sequences of cohesive actions.
Its production history resembles both Karins Ansikte and Solvorn. They
all have a collection of photographs as their starting points. Moreover, they all
focus on one or on a few individuals and their closest, social relations. All three
may even tell a story about their main characters. Looking at the photographs
from his mother’s life, Bergman creates a story about the pictures of Karin from
her youth, her marriage to his father, her having children, before she seems “to
disappear into the family pictures”, as he puts it (in one of the film’s inter-titles).
Solvorn, on the other hand, poses a series of questions to the pictures (and to
why they were taken in the first place), but it also composes a story by the way
the pictures are arranged. However, compared to Año Uña, both of these stor-
ies are fairly vague, due to the scarcity of images, the lack of – or never com-
pleted – narrative sequences, and the lack of information that is provided for the
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audience about what the pictures show (this is a theme in Solvorn, and more
enigmatic in Karins Ansikte).
Año Uña does not present singular shots from different locations, like many of
the frames in Bergman’s photo album. Rather, it composes scenes and sequences
from images of the same location, images of a limited set of characters perform-
ing their activities as part of a narrative universe, which is kept constant during
the whole film. We find Diego in his room early on in the story, troubled by his
toenail, fantasizing about his cousin Emilia. The scene is composed of stills of
the kid in one single narrative situation, with just slightly altered positions, vi-
sually framed in nearly identical manners from shot to shot. His voice-over also
supports the unity of the scene both as continued sound bridging the change of
images and as an inner monologue directing the audience’s attention towards
the experience of the boy rather than towards the pictures as such. But the sheer
number of images of the same object, presented in the same place in one and the
same situation distinguishes it from the scenes composed in Solvorn. Whilst
Solvorn creates a virtual scene from a small collection of photos of the same
environment, Año Uña make us look at the scene as if there had never been a
photographer. The scene does not look staged, like most of the pictures in Berg-
man’s album and many of the photos in Breien’s film. The story does not appear
to be the result of an investigation of images, like Karins Ansikte and Sol-
vorn, even if its production history may show this to be the case. Año Uña
focuses on characters interacting, their motives and feelings and how they
change during the story, rather than on the existence of photographs (like Sol-
vorn) or what a particular collection of preexisting photographs may reveal
about a particular person’s identity (like Karins Ansikte).
The three films are all based on photographs. Karins Ansikte and Solvorn
present preexisting photographs. But they create a filmic space where the
photographs are only one of several ingredients. In Año Uña, this second char-
acteristic supersedes the first. The images in Año Uña appear as series of
photographic stills, but not as photographs. There are no cameras filming
photographs and moving among the picture’s elements. This is not a film pre-
senting photographs of events, but a film about the events, the visual dimension
of the film appearing as stills. Año Uña appears, in other words, less a double
layer of photographic presentations (photographs and film), with all the impli-
cations this may have for narration and temporality rather than simply a filmic
presentation of events employing a slightly unusual form of visual expression.
The same can be said for La Jetée, a film with a visual image comprised al-
most entirely of optically printed photographs, containing only one brief shot
by a motion-picture camera, but nevertheless a film in which the static frames
appear as photographic stills, but not as photographs. Just like Año Uña, Mar-
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ker’s film does not seem to fit Koningsberg’s conception of the slide-motion film.
La Jetée is presented as a “photo-roman”, a photo-novel (from the film’s titles).
One might, therefore, expect to see a film using a series of still pictures, “but in
which the camera seems to move among the picture’s elements by means of
panning or a zoom lens”. However, not only La Jetée, but the entire field of
“photo-romans”, filmic or televisual “photo novels” or “photo plays” (includ-
ing the French series of short films simply called “Photo-Romans” which I will
turn to later) seems excluded from the term slide-motion films, not because they
are narratives, not because their stories are fictional, but because they do not
appear as films presenting photographs. One could argue that we should leave
Koningsberg’s definition of the slide-motion film behind and reserve it just for
those films he had in mind. However, the terms used to describe films like La
Jetée – photo novel, photo play, and sometimes even photo montage – has
some of the same problems as Koningsberg’s term when it comes to under-
standing the filmic space as well as narration and temporality. The films are
understood in terms of photography. For the photo novel, the photoplay, and
the photomontage, the notions explicitly signal this as such. In Koningsberg’s
definition of the slide motion film, photography is implicitly a premise, which
arguably is insufficient for both Solvorn and Karins Ansikte and presumably
also for the other documentaries that fit into Koningsberg’s definition.
The photo novel, the photoplay, and the photomontage are all notions used
for films including photographic stills. These films are, however, more often,
referred to as “films similar to La Jetée”, a practice that must be considered a
sign of the lack of a proper term. I will argue that a photo-related designation
has more drawbacks than advantages. To understand a film like in terms of
photography often implies paying little or no attention to its sound and editing
principles. Moreover, naming it after something photo-related also reproduces
unrecognized assumptions about photography that have an influence on the
conception of the film that may not be beneficial. The tendency to consider a
documentary effect as intrinsical to photography is an example of this. Instances
of this can be found in users reviews for Año Uña, like one at the Internet
Movie Database (imdb.com) saying “Nobody knows what he [Cuarón] was ac-
tually documenting at the time [he was making the photographs] but the story
Cuarón created … is poignant and funny”. It can also be read in film reviews,
like James Dennis’s at the website twitch, who characterizes Año Uña as “A
work of fiction with no actors, a documentary with a fictional narrative.” This
description actually echoes the introduction of the film, written in Spanish and
English with white letters on a black screen: “From  to  I photographed
my surroundings. At the end of that year, I ordered the images in such a way
that they suggested the following narrative.” In the next image, again with
white letters on a black screen, we read: “These are documentary images. The
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moments and characters are real,” and finally: “Only the story is fictional.”
Thereafter, we get the first ordinary film image, a series of stills showing a
young woman coming down the stairs towards us, or towards the camera, as
we hear the sound of a distant female voice saying something vaguely compre-
hensible in Spanish. It seems reasonable to see the three verbal slides as the film-
maker’s expression. But why should Cuarón photograph to document anything
at all? And if he did, why should the photographs be considered a documentary
after they have been reworked and inserted into a fictional story?
In contrast to the viewer comments and film reviews of Año Uña describing
it as a film “composed of only photographs and dialogues”, placing the word
“movie” in quotation marks or even proclaiming (enthusiastically) “‘Año Uña’
isn’t even a ‘movie’“, or “Strictly it is not a film. It is more than a film”, I
believe Año Uña, as well as La Jetée and also Solvorn and Karins Ansikte
should be named explicitly as films or movies.
Another possible description could be “still film”. This term has been used
for works characterized as “nearly static films, like Teatro Amazonas” and
Douglas Gordon’s “slowed” films. George Baker argues that this notion is im-
plicitly dependent on a tension between film and photography, film reduced to
its “foundation of the still frame” and, at the same time, “linked conceptually to
a field mapped out by the expansion of photography, to which ... neither of them
[the examples mentioned above] will of course correspond”. To include films
like La Jetée and Año Uña under this label would imply a redefinition of the
term “still film”, involving both a rethinking of this conceptual link to photogra-
phy and the idea of the film still as a “reduction” of film to “its foundation”.
As an alternative, we could simply redefine Koningsberg’s term slide-motion
film. Whilst “still film” has the possible advantage of ascribing importance to
the stillness of the images in a film, “slide-motion film” emphasizes its motion.
Admittedly, one problem with redefining Koningsberg’s term might be that
“slide” refers both to the verb “to slide, or glide” and the noun “slide” pertain-
ing to the photographic still viewed with a slide projector. To include Año Uña,
La Jetée and similar films under this label, the primary meaning of “slide”
must be the transparent, photographic image mounted in a frame, the image as
projected, the still on the screen, rather than the gliding movement of the cam-
era, tracking across the surfaces of pre-existing images, that may also be part of
the filmic expression I am describing here, but which doesn’t define it as such.
The motion involved, then, refers not so much to the movement of the camera
as to the impression of movement produced by sequences of projected images
(often supported by the sound). As Christian Metz once noted, “... even if each
image is a still, switching from one to the next creates a second movement, an
ideal one, made out of successive and different immobilities”. I consider this
“ideal movement” as a formative notion of the filmic expression of Año Uña,
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La Jetée and Solvorn, and arguably, it is also important for the understanding
of the aesthetics of Karins ansikte.
So, I will suggest broadening the term and adjusting (or adapting) the con-
ception of the slide-motion film so that it can be used as a label for any film –
fiction or factual, narrative, descriptive, poetic or argumentative – which vi-
sually appears as a composition of stills, the stills being of any kind including
the freeze-frame. Furthermore, instead of discussing these films by juxtaposing
stasis and kinesis as if these qualities or modes of expression were exclusively
connected to two different media (photography and film), I will propose that
the slide motion film should be conceptualized as a filmic form of expression, as
a particular form of stasis within the field of moving images. As Noël Carroll
once argued, “... if you know that you are watching a slide, then it is categori-
cally impossible that the image should move. ... Movement in a slide would
require a miracle; movement in a film is an artistic choice and an always avail-
able technical option”. To associate the slide-motion film with the family of
moving images provides it with a range of perspectives and conceptions that I
believe will benefit the understanding of these films and their expressive poten-
tial. In the rest of this essay, I will deal with one of these problematics, the con-
ception of temporality of the slide-motion film in keeping with the way it is
redefined above. I will confine the discussion to the narrative slide-motion films
because the complex relation between time and narrative must be understood
as different from but interacting with the complex relation between time and
photographically appearing filmic expressions. The fiction film Año Uña re-
mains my main example, as compared to the titles mentioned above as well as
the series of thirteen short, fiction films, Photo-Romans (-), and a
short, documentary called One Day ().
Story and Narration in Año Uña
Año Uña tells the story of Molly who meets Diego when she rents a room in his
parents’ house in Mexico. The two immediately strike up a relationship despite
the age gap. Both are at turning points in their lives: Diego in the turmoil of
puberty and Molly on the brink of post-education adulthood. Diego, who early
in the story is consumed by desire for his cousin, Emilia, redirects his obsession
after Molly arrives. Molly enjoys Diego’s flirtation, finding the attention and
respect missing from her relationships with boyfriends. The relationship con-
tinues to grow until Molly returns to New York. Diego decides to run away
and win Molly’s heart. Molly realizes that although it is an impossible relation-
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ship in many ways, Diego is able to cater to her needs where a string of argu-
ably even less suitable boyfriends could not.
Before we see the film titles, we read the above-mentioned paratext that de-
clares: “These are documentary images. The moments and characters are real //
Only the story is fictional”. We are introduced to Molly at the metro, an ama-
teur photographer and exchange student from New York. We hear her voice
first in Spanish, thereafter in English, as she reflects on the subway tunnel sys-
tem’s potential for photo opportunities, complaining about her boyfriend’s ha-
bits and mulling over her situation as a student in a foreign land. The position
of this voice is ambiguous: It could be considered an interior monologue – the
thoughts of Molly running through her head during the moments of the se-
quence of stills – or is it off-stage commentary – Molly’s voice-over reflecting on
the scene we see later that same day or days or weeks later? Given that this is
the very first voice we hear and the fact that the very first thing she mentions is
her photography, this ambiguous position seems to destabilize the position/sta-
tus of the written text presented just prior to the film titles: was that the film-
maker’s words or Molly’s? Or is Molly playing the character of the photogra-
pher on which this film is based?
After a few moments, the inter-title with her name – Molly – establishes a
more stable status for her: this is a story about Molly told by someone (that
might be Molly herself or someone else) treating her as a character in a universe
rather than the narrator of that universe. Then we are introduced to a less-am-
biguous male voice, as it is more obviously an interior monologue, a boy’s voice
reflecting on how his sexual fantasies about his cousin (Emilia) have caused his
falling out of shape for the soccer matches, an image we can see from a distance.
The second inter-title presents his name, Diego. A few scenes later an inter-title
indicates the first season: verano, summer, which appears as the story of Molly
and Diego starts at with the beginning of summer.
Still, the introductory text has the potential to keep the characters ambiguous:
How can the characters be real while the story is fictional? In narrative theory, a
character is often considered subordinate to the narrative’s action. This theory
goes back to Aristotle’s poetics – a normative poetics meant to prescribe the
Greek tragedy, but still influential on modern theories of narrative – in which
the fable (the story) has primacy over character (before reasoning, diction, song,
etc.). Being secondary to story is still quite different from being independent
of it, however. Most scholars of narrative theory would agree that character and
story should be treated as interdependent. This is often seen as the thrust of
Henry James’s famous dictum: “What is character but the determination of in-
cident? What is incident but the illustration of character?” A character is, in
other words, normally seen as part of the narrative and not an entity that exists
independent of the narrative. In my view, this interdependency is crucial in dis-
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cussions of narratives about actual events, transforming actual people into char-
acters. In fiction, the distinction between people and characters cannot be so
easily ignored. In Año Uña, this distinction is most clearly marked with Molly,
a name given to a fictional character, played, staged or given form by the actual
person Eireann Harper. To declare “the moments … [as] real” must be under-
stood as referring to the photographs (of which this film, along with other com-
ponents, are composed) considered as photographs of family and friends from the
filmmaker’s own world (including Eireann Harper), and not photographic fic-
tions (involving fictional characters like Molly). Hence, if “the moments … are
real” there are no photographs of Molly, at least not before the photographs are
ordered in a fictional story.
The Production of Pastness
In Año Uña, Eireann Harper’s photographic traces (in front of the camera) are
transformed into a photographic representation of the fictional character Molly.
Just like in mainstream entertainment film, the audience normally pays less at-
tention to the actor and focuses on the character, unless the actor is well known
(a star), which is not the case here. However, in Año Uña, the photographic
stills seem to inspire a certain kind of attention not towards Eireann Harper but
towards the moments of photographic exposure. Given that the sequences of
photographic stills are not considered familiar form of filmic expression for
most audiences, it seems to reinvest the culturally formative figure of pastness
connected to photographic images.
I believe that we come to Año Uña and any other slide-motion film not only
with an experience of the narrative fiction film. The moment we start watching
and notice the unusual nature of this filmic mode of expression, the experience
of the slide-motion film is also prefigured in our experience of photography in a
very specific sense, namely the experience of photography as temporal displace-
ment. This photographic experience is what Roland Barthes discusses in his last
books La Chambre Claire () when he considers the noema of the photo-
graph as “that-has-been” (or, “the Intractable”). Even if the photographic still of
the narrative slide-motion film is not a photograph, I suggest that this specific
temporal experience of photography contributes to our experience of the narra-
tive slide-motion film, particularly when it comes to the experience of its tempo-
rality.
In Año Uña, every single frame is static and so are the objects within the
single frames. The sequence of images, on the other hand, is continuously un-
folding during the course of the film: it has a certain tempo, rhythm, and dura-
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tion. Thus, the tension between the static and the unfolding in the visual dimen-
sion of this narrative slide motion film may, in temporal terms, be experienced
as a tension between the pastness of the static frame and the presence and be-
coming of the succession of images.
The auditory dimension of the narrative slide-motion film is often similar to
most mainstream films: The diegetic sound is continuously there, so we actually
hear the steps of a character coming down the stairs even if the visual presenta-
tion of the scene shows only two or three images, one from the top of the stair-
case, one from the middle, and maybe one at the bottom. Although the diegetic
sound in Año Uña is rather flimsy compared to both mainstream film and
other slide-motion films (like Photo-Romans, which I will come back to later),
the relatively rich “whereness” of the dialogue and interior monologue in Año
Uña contributes to the production of diegetic presence. The often unnoticed
muttering in La Jetée similarly produces a certain impression of presence de-
spite the scarcity of sound in this film. The sounds of the diegetic universe in
other words create the impression of presence and the unfolding of events in
the narrative slide-motion films.
Fig. . Año Uña presents a large amount of inner monologues, normally signaled
by the content of the utterance and the social norms indicated by the narrative
situation. Screen shot, color film
The extradiegetic components of the slide-motion films also work with what the
audience expects: in most of them, music highlights the action and facilitates the
transitions between images. Año Uña contains very little extradiegetic music,
but sometimes the diegetic music distracts viewers from the visual cut. More-
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over, in Año Uña, as in most slide-motion films, the sound of the voice-over
contributes to the production of a continuously unfolding of the action by its
more or less continuously sounding voice.
However, the voice-over also works against this impression of an unfolding
presence, not by presenting qualities parallel to the static quality of the single
frame, but, nevertheless, by producing an impression of pastness. The nature
and degree of this impression of pastness varies considerably for the different
slide-motion films discussed here. Before we look into these variations, it may
be helpful to introduce another temporal figure relevant here, namely finality.
The Sense of an Ending
Analytically, it may be useful to distinguish between the filmic and the narrative
in this respect. Any narrative film is a final product, and this finality is twofold:
First, the film is final. During the screening of the film, the future of the events
that unfolding, in the words of Peter Brunette and David Wills, is, “always a
future that is foreseen, that we know will come to an end within the space of
the screening”. And, as they add: “its finality imposes a kind of past upon it”.
Secondly, the narrative is also final. Just like the film, a narrative discourse
makes the events unfold into a future that is already in the past. All narratives,
even oral narratives and stories in the making, are told and listened to in accor-
dance with an “anticipation of retrospection”, to borrow a phrase from literary
theorist Peter Brooks (). This is the general, temporal logic of the plot.
However, the narrative of a final product, such as a film, is told retrospectively
in a stronger sense than stories in the making: we don’t just expect a point to the
story that we may grasp along the way or at least make sense of when the tell-
ing comes to an end. The narrative finality of the film narrative implies that
even when the narrated events are fictional, we experience the story as a recon-
struction of something that has already happened (in the narrative universe).
Hence, the narrative finality of any narratively organized filmic discourse also
imposes a kind of past upon it.
The smooth editing of images of moving objects in mainstream entertainment
film reduces the attention paid toward the experience of both filmic and narra-
tive finality and pastness. The stills of the narrative slide-motion film seem to
rupture the impression of the presence of the unfolding of events. The voice-
over appears to strengthen the impression of both filmic and narrative finality
and pastness. However, the voice-over’s production of pastness varies for the
narrative slide-motion films discussed here.
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The Temporality of the Narrating Voice
The voice-over’s production of pastness is normally threefold: The conventional
experience of a voice-over as post production, as something added onto the film
afterwards, telling about or commenting upon the actions from its position on
the balcony, to paraphrase Michel Chion’s expression, involves an experience
of temporal distance between the actions unfolding and the action verbally de-
scribed.
Moreover, besides the experience of a voice-over as post-produced sound,
voice-overs are often also considered narrating instances employing a narrative
mode in which the characters in the narrative universe are referred to, be it “he”
or “she” (third-person narrator), “I” (first-person narrator), and the less com-
mon “you” (second-person narrator). The voice-overs in most of the slide-mo-
tion films mentioned here are first-person narrators. A first-person narrator
talking about him- or herself as a character in the story is often also termed an
autodiegetic narrator. Confronted with a story of dramatic realism, an autodie-
getic voice-over narrator is often experienced as comforting for an empathetic
audience, because the narrator’s ability to actually tell the story seems to ensure
the character’s survival. The story is, in other words, experienced retrospec-
tively.
This impression of retrospective narration is often strengthened by the voice-
over speaking in the past tense: They talk about the events as something that
have already happened in the past. This is the third dimension of the voice-
over’s production of pastness and an aspect of some of the slide-motion films
discussed here.
The production of pastness in the slide-motion film varies according to the
three dimensions of the voice-over mentioned above and to the discursive
mode in which the filmic story is told. Let me elaborate on this by comparing
Año Uña to Photo-Romans, One Day, and Solvorn.
The Narrative Past of P-R
Photo-Romans is a French series of thirteen short films produced circa  in
cooperation with television networks in twelve European countries. They are all
classic, urban short stories, with one or two main characters and a beginning,
middle, and end.
The filmic expression of the series Photo-Romans is quite similar to Año
Uña and La Jetée: Visually, these short films present a series of photographi-
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cally appearing black-and-white still pictures. These are mainly sequences of
freeze-frames, sometimes combined with photographs mediated by a moving
film or video camera zooming in or tracking across the surface of the picture.
Sound-wise, they are like most live action films: they include music, diegetic
sound, sound effects, voice-over and even dialogue – less common in slide-mo-
tion films, but present in Año Uña.
Confronted with this series of short films, the first thing that struck me was
the impression of the character’s vague presence, or non-presence, but the im-
pression of having been there. Unlike mainstream fictional entertainment films
where we get an impression of a character’s being presence during the unfold-
ing of an event, these short films never create the impression of characters actu-
ally being present. It is as if the images present the character’s presence in the
past tense. It has often been claimed that film “has no past or future tense, only
the present”, and that “The linguistic equivalent for cinematic presentation of
the past is: ‘This is how it was’; and for the future: ‘This is how it will be’.”
Photo-Romans, however, seems to present past events in their pastness.
The impression of past events being presented in their pastness in Photo-Ro-
mans can be explained as a result of the combination of several factors, the most
important being that they are all classic narratives of singular events and that
most of them also have a voice-over with all of the three above-mentioned char-
acteristics: The pastness invoked by the filmic expression as such (the slide mo-
tion film) is strengthened by the pastness produced by the voice-over. But it also
seems important that the events referred to are singular. Let me explain this by
comparing it to the short film One Day.
The Narrative Present of O D: The Reportage
One Day () is a -minute documentary in color (which is quite unusual for
slide-motion films) that presents a -year-old boy from Kenya who lived on the
streets until he was adopted in the slums of Korogocho outside Nairobi. It
opens in medias res at an urban garbage dump where several youngsters are
talking in Keswahili. There is no music in this pre-credit sequence, but, even-
tually, an English male voice-over appears as we see a boy with a clean shirt
singled out of the small crowd. The voice-over is an autodiegetic narrator
speaking in a past tense, describing how he used to live in the streets. There-
after, the image shifts to a different place, a slum. There is more extradiegetic
music, an establishing shot, super titles that indicate place, date and year: Kor-
ogocho, Kenya, th of May, . We hear a cock crow, and the film’s titles
appear before we actually see a close-up of the same boy looking straight into
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the camera, and hear the voice-over state: “My name is Thomas Munene. I am
 years old.”
In festival programs and short film overviews, this film has been presented as
“A stills documentary. A normal day in an unusual life. Thomas () has lived
half his life as a street child in Nairobi. He has been adopted by a family living
in the slum.” This “stills documentary”, “still film”, or as I will suggest, “slide-
motion film” (in the broad sense I have already described) does not tell a story
about one, single day in Thomas’s life. Instead, it represents a typical day in the
boy’s life. After the credits, the film commences with a cock crowing at the
break of day and ends with the boy going to bed and turning off his light. In
between sunrise and sunset, Thomas has been our guide through his life, a re-
porter who presents his new family, takes us to his school on an average day,
brings us along on one of his Sunday trips to visit his old friends at the dump-
ster in Nairobi. The voice-over varies between past and present tense. In both
cases, the voice-over describes general situations rather than specific events,
about how his life used to be living on the street, and how it changed after a
family adopted him. There is no footage of his life on the street. Everything we
see is from the present. One gets the impression that the film crew simply fol-
lowed him for a day, except that the school visit and the trip to Nairobi prob-
ably happened on different days. Even when we see and hear Thomas interact-
ing with his classmates at school and with his friends at the dumpster, this
present day imagery and the voice-overs general presentation of what his days
looks like, what he likes and what he wishes for the future, creates a strong
experience of temporal presence. The title of the film, One Day, therefore im-
plies the future more than just a single day, a future of hope for his friends at
the dump and for himself, because he wants to become a journalist and also
hopes that he will eventually meet his biological family again (which is con-
firmed in the epilogue that he narrates four months later). Even if the voice-
over sometimes speaks in the past tense and most likely has been post-pro-
duced, the voice-over does not appear retrospective in this film. Thomas is look-
ing back on his life, contrasting his days now with how it used to be. But the
voice-over, the many illustrative images, the hope with which he describes his
situation, and the general comments and reporter’s style of Thomas’s voice-over
seems to work against the culturally formative figure of pastness connected to
photographic stills.
The color film may also be important in this respect. There is nothing about
color film as such that signals present tense. However, most slide-motion films
are black-and-white, and after the introduction of color film, choosing to shoot
in black-and-white film has certain connotations of “old time footage”, “docu-
mentary” or “art”. Without going into any details, these categories of black-
and-white photographic imagery often connote confirmation of what some-
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thing or someone looked like and contemplation (reflection), and therefore also
distance to what is seen. If the footage appears old, the distance is connected to
a historic past. There is a historic past in One Day, although it is a recent past.
The film refers to a specific past in the life of an actual person. But this historic
pastness is not indicated by the footage as such and nor by any old auditory
record. In Solvorn, the situation is quite opposite.
The Historical Past of S
Like One Day, Solvorn is also a documentary that refers to a rather vague
historic past. The film presents a collection of photographs made by a specific
photographer between  and  in one particular geographical area, but,
except for the fact that several of the characters are named in the voice-over, the
details of these pictures remain vague and unspecified: Was there a specific oc-
casion that these images show? Do they present a typical situation or something
that happened only once? Like One Day, the voice-over narration in Solvorn
also produces a strong sense of presence. Despite that, the voice-over in Sol-
vorn is obviously added to the imagery as part of the film’s post-production,
that it employs a retrospective mode, uses the past tense, and the second-person
pronoun “you” and a curious attitude regarding why the pictures were made in
the first place (what motivated the grandmother’s photographic practice and
what made her stop taking pictures in ), creates a strong emphasis on the
voice-over as contemporary with the audienc. The form of address seems to
establish the audience as a witness to the filmmaker’s voice-over monologue or
unidirectional dialogue with her dead grandmother, while she is looking at, and
showing us, her grandmother’s pictures.
However, in contrast to One Day, the historic pastness in Solvorn is clearly
marked by the older footage. Its age is indicated by the style of the photographs
and the way the people are portrayed (their clothing and poses) as well as by
the voice-over, which informs us about the one-hundred-year gap between the
film and the production of the glass-plate photographs. The historic distance
between the filmmaker’s era and that of the photographer is also underlined by
the strong emphasis on the presence created by the voice-over’s form of address
and the lack of information about the photographs. The sense of narrational
presence, in other words, accentuates the experience of historical pastness in
Solvorn.
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The Narrative Present of Año Uña: The Chronicle
As we have already indicated, the filmic expression of Año Uña is quite similar
to La Jetée and the series Photo-Romans: it is a narrative fiction about indivi-
dual events. It does not illustrate a typical life situation (like One Day) nor is it
about the historic past (like Solvorn). Its production of pastness is, neverthe-
less, less strong than in Photo-Romans. The fact that it strangely enough turns
from black-and-white film into color film one-third of the way into the film may
be significant here. More importantly, however, is the combination of several
first-person narrators who often speak in the present tense, and the unclear dis-
tinction between voice-overs and interior monologues.
There are numerous interior monologues in Año Uña. This narrative mode is
most obvious in the case of Diego. Diego’s voice is often heard when seen alone
in a room, filled with sexual fantasies or troubled by his toenail. Given the priv-
acy of his thoughts and the visual presentation of him being alone, Diego’s voice
most likely should be recognized as giving the auditory equivalent of his
thoughts. However, due to the impossibility of lip-synching in a slide-motion
film, the distinction between interior monologues and ordinary monologues
may be difficult to distinguish. The grandmother’s birthday party in Año Uña
may be indicative: On her th birthday, Diego’s grandmother is at the center of
everyone’s attention while she is looking through some images and reflects on
what she sees. Her slightly hushed voice may be perceived as a depiction of her
thoughts being overheard by the audience, but it is unclear whether some of
those sitting close to her can also hear what she is saying.
In Molly’s case, it is not only the distinction between these two different die-
getic modes – monologues and auditory representations of thoughts – that may
be difficult to distinguish. It is also difficult to ascertain the difference between
diegetic and extradiegetic modes, that is, whether or not what she says is part of
the action we see unfolding or a reflection upon it made at a later stage. It seems
reasonable to consider most of the first-person narrators in this film as part of its
narrative universe (that is, diegetic narrators, perceivable by the other charac-
ters or not). Molly’s voice, on the other hand, seems to float between narrative
modes, in and out of the diegesis, never far away in time, but often reflecting
upon her situation at a slight remove in time and/or emotion. We follow Molly
from when we first meet her coming down the stairs in a subway station some-
where in Mexico until she returns to New York as if we are getting an overview
of her whereabouts and overhearing her thoughts as dictated to her diary.
The private chronicle of Año Uña, its many present-tense narrators and their
somewhat uncertain status (thoughts, talks, comments) creates a certain tempo-
ral instability between the intimacy of the present and the temporal distance of
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the diary or the somewhat retrospective narrative. Compared to the production
of presentness in One Day, with its illustrative narration and reportage style
and its focus on the hopes for the future, the presentness of Año Uña appears
more as a moderate version of the production of pastness in Photo-Romans.
The pastness invoked by the filmic expression as such (the slide motion film) is
moderately intensified by the pastness produced by the voice-over and the sin-
gularity of the events marked as past rather than typical and repeatable.
Fig. . In the slide-motion film, the visual composition of the image and the quality
of the voices gives the strongest indications of who is speaking and whether or not
the others can hear his or her voice. Screenshot from Año Uña, black and white
The Social Temporality of the Narrative Slide-Motion
Film
We have seen how the production of pastness in the narrative slide-motion film
varies according to the status of the voice-over and the discursive mode in
which the filmic story is told. However, compared with mainstream entertain-
ment films, where both filmic and narrative finality are normally experienced as
a balanced play between past, present and becoming, the narrative slide-motion
film ruptures this balance by pointing more clearly towards the pastness of the
photographic stills. In Año Uña, as in the other slide-motion films discussed
here, the photographic stills seem to instigate a certain attention towards the
moments of photographic exposure. These moments are past moments. I will
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now argue that the pastness of these moments is experienced as inscribed into
the historical and existential time of the audience. Allow me a short detour via
photography.
“The date belongs to the photograph,” Barthes declares in La Chambre Claire:
not because it denotes a style (this does not concern me), but because it makes me lift
my head, allows me to compute life, death, the inexorable extinction of the genera-
tions.... I am the reference of every photograph, and this is what generates my aston-
ishment in addressing myself to the fundamental question: why is it that I am alive
here and now?
In principal, the photographic still is datable: it is possible to assign a date to the
moment of photographic exposure. The point here is not whether or not the
image is given a date. Neither is it a practical matter (a question of whether or
not we are able to ascertain the production date of a particular photograph, or
any other object for that matter). The question is whether or not the datability of
the image makes it part of a social and cultural history of human beings. Many
photographs are considered culturally important and, as such, are included in
our common cultural heritage. However, photographs are normally included in
the public conception of culture and history in a more fundamental way,
through the temporality of the photographic trace. No matter what is depicted
in an actual photograph, the temporality of the photographic trace is inscribed
in our socially constituted calendars, the calendars of our social and political
histories, the calendars we relate to in our everyday life, the calendars of birth-
days and anniversaries.
I will suggest that the photographic trace is experienced as a technical effect
which via its historicity (that is, its character of datability in a socially and cultu-
rally constituted world of real objects) is also given an existential dimension.
Further, I will argue that the social and cultural reality of the photographic trace
is important if we are to understand the temporalities of the narrative slide-mo-
tion film, even if the still is a freeze-frame in a film, and even if the narrative is
fictional like in Año Uña, La Jetée, and Photo-Romans. No matter what the
image depicts, and independent of the status of the depiction as fiction or fact,
the single frame seems to incite the experience of the photographic stills as hold-
ing back or withdrawing the photographic moment from the otherwise unfold-
ing of an event and to inscribe this sequence of moments into the (historical and
existential) time of the viewer.
In narrative fiction films like Año Uña, La Jetée, and the Photo-Romans
series, the voice-overs support the impression of pastness evoked by the static
frames (even if this varies among the different examples). As sound, on the
other hand, the voice-over also seems to have all the various sounds and the
succession of images as its ally. There is, in other words, a tension between past-
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ness and presence (or becoming) across the simple division between sound and
image in the narrative slide-motion film that is made perceptible by the stills,
but which is potentially there in all moving images. Sometimes this tension in
filmic expression is intensified by the temporality of the narrative mode, as in
Photo-Romans, which is a series of classic short stories that is somewhat rup-
tured by its filmic style. At the other end of the spectrum we find La Jetée, a
film about memory and loss told as a time-travel story, arguably a perfect theme
and genre for a smooth exploration of the expressive potential of the slide mo-
tion film. Año Uña can be placed somewhere between these two extremes. Its
mundane love story and chronological narrative makes it similar to the stories
of Photo-Romans. However, the rather loose narrative structure of the film as
well as its resemblance to a road movie (the traveling, the characters being at
turning points in their lives, their evasive actions) and the way it adopts the
narrative mode of the chronicle seems to fit more smoothly into this particular
filmic expression.
As we have seen, there is a great amount of variety between narrative slide-
motion films, which also involves their complex temporalities. Given the com-
plexity of the temporality of the narrative slide-motion film I have sketched
here, the temporality of this filmic mode of expression cannot be reduced to the
cultural figure of pastness connected to the photographic still. However, I will
argue that, along with the notion of the ideal movement “made out of successive
and different immobilities” (Metz), the pastness of the moment of photographic
exposure should be considered a formative notion of the filmic expression I
have suggested that we call slide-motion film.
Parts of this argument were presented as a paper at the SCMS conference in Philadel-
phia, March -, . I am particularly grateful for all the useful comments from our
panel respondent Mary Ann Doane. I also express my warm thanks to the participants
at the workshop preparing this book at Lysebu Conference Hotel, Oslo, September -,
.
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The Museum and the Moving Image: A Marriage Made at
the documenta?
One of the most significant phenomena in the world of contemporary sound-
image media – seemingly far removed from the almost daily revolutions on the
Internet, and yet intimately connected with them – is the extent to which the
moving image has taken over/has been taken over by museums and gallery
spaces. There are many – good and not so good – reasons for this dramatically
increased visibility in the contemporary art scene of screen, projection, motion
and sound. Some are internal to the development of modern art practice, if one
accepts that, for many of today’s artists, a digital camera and a computer are as
much primary tools of the trade as a paintbrush and canvas or wire and plaster-
of-Paris were a hundred years ago. On the other hand, there are also reasons
internal to the cinema for such a seemingly counter-intuitive rapprochement:
not least the much-debated (i.e., as much lamented as it is ridiculed) “death of
cinema”, whether attributed to television, the video-recorder, the end of Euro-
pean auteur cinema or to digitization and the Internet. Cynics (or are they
merely realists?) may rightly conclude that the ongoing musealization of the cin-
ema suits both parties: It adds cultural capital to cinematic heritage and re-
deems its lowly origins in popular entertainment, and it adds new audiences to
the museum, where the projected image or video installation – the statistics
prove it – retain the visitors’ attention a fraction longer than the white cube,
with its framed paintings, free-standing sculptures or “found objects”.
On reflection, however, matters are not at all straightforward, when the mov-
ing image enters the museum. Different actor-agents, different power-relations
and policy agendas, different competences, egos and sensibilities, different ele-
ments of the complex puzzle that is the contemporary art world and its com-
mercial counterpart inevitably come into play. In short, from a historical point
of view, the museum and the motion picture are antagonists, each with its own
institutional pedigree, and during the past century, often fairly contemptuous of
the other. Shifting from the institutional and the discursive to the aesthetic, the
contrast is even sharper: however snugly the “black box” can be fit into the
“white cube” with just a few mobile walls and lots of dark fabric, the museum
is no cinema and the cinema no museum: first of all because of the different time
economies and temporal vectors, which oblige the viewer in the museum to
“sample” a film, and to assert his or her attention span, oscillating between con-
centration and distraction, against the relentless forward thrust and irreversibil-
ity of the moving image in the cinema, carrying the spectator along. But mu-
seum and movie theatre are also poles apart because they belong to distinct
“public spheres”, with different constituencies, popular and elite, collective and
individualized, for the moment (of the film’s duration) and for immortality (of
the “eternal” work of art).
Given these incompatibilities and antagonisms, the forces that in the last
three decades have brought the two together must have been quite powerful.
The dilemma of contending public spheres having to come to terms with each
other, for instance, can be observed quite vividly in the fate of (often politically
committed) avant-garde filmmakers from the s and s. Since the s,
their films could no longer count on screenings either in art-et-essai cinemas, film
clubs or even hope to find a niche on late-night television programs. As finan-
cing from television and state subsidies began to dry up, some found careers as
teachers in art academies, and others welcomed a second life as installation ar-
tists, commissioned to create new work by curators of international art shows
like Kassel’s documenta. Especially after Catherine David in  invited film-
makers from France, Germany, Belgium and Britain to documenta X (among
them Harun Farocki, Sally Potter, Chantal Akerman, Ulrike Ottinger as well as
H.J. Syberberg and J.L. Godard), the cross-over has continued at the Venice Bi-
ennale, the Whitney Biennial, at Carnegie Mellon, the Tate Modern, Berlin, Ma-
drid and many, many other venues. These filmmakers-turned-installation artists
are now usually named along with artists-turned-filmmakers such as Bill Viola,
Fischli & Weiss, Johan Grimonprez, William Kentridge, Matthew Barney, Tacita
Dean, Pippilotti Rist, Douglas Gordon, Steve McQueen or Sam Taylor-Wood.
Without opening up an extended balance sheet of gain and loss arising from
this other “death of (this time, avant-garde) cinema” and its resurrection as in-
stallation art, a few observations are perhaps in order. First, the historical avant-
gardes have always been antagonistic to the art world, while nevertheless cru-
cially depending upon its institutional networks and support: “biting the hand
that feeds you” is a time-honored motto. This is a constitutive contradiction that
also informs the new alliance between the film avant-garde and the museum
circuit, creating deadlocks around “original” and “copy”, “commodity” and
“the market”, “critical opposition” and “the collector”: films as the epitome of
“mechanical reproduction” now find themselves taken in charge by the institu-
tion dedicated to the cult(ure) of the unique object, whose status as original is
both its aura and its capital. Second, as already indicated, several problematic –
but also productive – tensions arise between the temporal extension of a film-
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work in a gallery space (often several hours: Jean-Luc Godard’s -minute His-
toire(s) du cinéma, Douglas Gordon’s  Hour Psycho, Ulrike Ottinger’s -
minute Southeast Passage, Phil Collins’s -hour Return of the Real), and
the exhibition visitors’ own time-economy (rarely more than a few minutes in
front of an installation). The mismatch creates its own aesthetics: for instance,
how do I, as viewer when confronted with such overlong works, manage my
anxiety of missing the key moment, and balance it against my sense of surfeit
and saturation, as the minutes tick away and no end is in sight? Some of these
extended works, in confronting viewers with their own temporality (and thus,
mortality) are no doubt also a filmmaker’s way of actively “resisting” the quick
glance and the rapid appropriation by the casual museum visitor: regret or a
bad conscience on the part of the viewer being the artist’s sole consolation or
revenge. Other time-based art, on the other hand, accommodates such random
attention or impatient selectivity by relying on montage, juxtaposition and the
rapid cut: artists have developed new forms of the collection and the compila-
tion, of the sampler, the loop and other iterative or serial modes. In the film
work of Matthias Müller, Christian Marclay or Martin Arnold, it is repetition
and looping that takes over from linear, narrative or argumentative trajectories
as the structuring principles of the moving image.
Returning to the institutional aspect: one of the most powerful forces at work
in bringing museum and moving image into a new relation with each other is
the programmatic reflexivity of the museum and the self-reference of the mod-
ern artwork. Entering a museum still means crossing a special kind of thresh-
old, of seeing objects not only in their material specificity and physical presence,
but also to understand this “thereness” as a special kind of statement, as both a
question and a provocation. This “produced presence” of modernist art is both
echoed and subverted by moving image installations, often in the form of new
modes of performativity and self-display that tend to involve the body of the
artist (extending the tradition of performance artists like Carolee Schneeman
and Yvonne Rainer, as well as of video art quite generally), even to the point of
self-injury (Marina Abramovic, Harun Farocki). Equally relevant is the fact that
installations have given rise to ways of engaging the spectator other than those
of either classical cinema or the traditional museum: for instance, the creation of
soundscapes that convey their own kind of presence (from Jean Marie Straub/
Danielle Huillet’s synch-sound film-recitations to Janet Cardiff/George Bures
Miller’s audio walks), or image juxtapositions/compositions that encourages
the viewer to “close the gap” by providing his/her own “missing link” (Isaac
Julien, Stan Douglas, Chantal Akerman) or make palpable an absence as pre-
sence (Christian Boltanski), each proposing modes of “relational aesthetics” (Ni-
colas Bourriaud) that are as much a challenge to contemplative, disinterested
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museum viewing as they counter or critique cinematic modes of spectatorship
(voyeurism, immersion, as well as its opposite, Brechtian distanciation).
However, what the marriage between museum and moving image most tell-
ingly puts into crisis is the relation between stillness and movement, two of the
vectors that have always differentiated painting and photography from the cin-
ema and sound. The museum space here is able to take key elements of the cin-
ema – such as the face and the gesture, or action and affect – and articulate them
across new kinds of tensions and (self-) contradictions, also conducting a more
general interrogation of what constitutes an “image” and what its “viewer” (Bill
Viola, Dan Graham, Christian Marclay, Chris Marker and many others).
Suspending Movement, Animating the Still
Before developing some of the consequences of the dividing line between still
and moving image having become “blurred” – the blur being one of the con-
cepts I shall touch upon in passing – it may be useful to look at how this “sus-
pended animation” has been theorized and contextualized in a recent study,
Eivind Røssaak’s The Still/Moving Image: Cinema and the Arts. Røssaak’s inquiry
into the current state of the moving image situates itself strategically at the inter-
face of several crossroads and turning points: the photographic/post-photo-
graphic/digital divide, but also the divide between “attraction” (or spectacle)
and “narrative” (or linearity). It takes on board the dissensus between the com-
mercial film industry and avant-garde filmmaking, just as it thematizes the in-
stitutional divide between screen practices in cinema theatres and screen prac-
tices in the museum space. To quote from the author’s programmatic
introduction: “In recent decades there has been a widespread tendency in mov-
ing image practices to resort to techniques altering or slowing down the speed
of motion. Creative uses of slow motion, single frame advances and still frame
techniques proliferate within digital cinema, avant-garde cinema and moving
image exhibitions. This project investigates this tendency through a focus on
aspects of three works that are representative for the tendency, show different
aspects of it and are widely influential: Andy and Larry Wachowski’s The Ma-
trix (), Ken Jacobs’s Tom, Tom, the Piper’s Son (orig. , re-released
), and Bill Viola’s The Passions (-).”
As can be seen by the choice of works – all three situated both at the threshold
of the new millennium and in different ways referring back to another moment
in time, of which they conduct a form of archaeology – Røssaak raises a number
of pertinent issues, while concentrating on “movement” and “immobility” as
the key parameters. Aware of the self-conscious historicity of the works chosen,
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the author can focus on some aspects of the aesthetic regime put in crisis, with-
out having to examine the full historical and critical ramifications, as briefly
sketched above, when considering the moving image meeting the museum.
“Immobility” thus becomes a shorthand or cipher, thanks to which different
theoretical-aesthetic investigations into the nature and fate of “the cinematic”
today can be deployed, while allowing the focus to firmly remain on these three
specific, yet significantly distinct examples of filmic and artistic practice.
The strategic advantage of The Still/Moving Image for someone within film
studies is that several of the key concepts are well established in the field and
will be familiar to readers with an interest in cinema studies: “cinema of attrac-
tion”, “media archaeology”, “structuralist film”, “found footage” are terms
with firm connotations gained over the past two decades. Other concepts are
more vague or metaphorical (“spirituality”, “negotiation”, “excavation”, for in-
stance). While this can lead to problems of coherence and consistency, with oc-
casionally abrupt shifts in the levels of abstraction, the usefulness of the book
lies above all in the judicious and felicitous choice of contrasting-complemen-
tary case studies, each of which is given a highly original historical placement
and subjected to a complex and multi-layered historical hermeneutics. The the-
oretical framings, taken from art history (G.E. Lessing, Ernst Gombrich), new
media theory (Lev Manovich, Mark Hansen) and film studies (Sergei Eisenstein,
Raymond Bellour, Tom Gunning), are combined with empirical research (in ar-
chives, on site and in museums), which in turn lead to insightful observations
on a wide range of works (from Mantegna to Franz Kline, from Tintoretto to
Hogarth, from Hieronymus Bosch to Eadweard Muybridge), spanning five cen-
turies and encompassing sculptures, altar pieces, paintings, etchings and
chronophotography. Such a broad sweep does not only offer valuable context
and historical background to the three works discussed in detail; it locates
movement and motion in artworks across several moments of transition in the
history of Western pictorial representation, thus contributing to the new disci-
pline of “image-anthropology”, as championed, for instance, by Hans Belting
and inspired by Aby Warburg.
The first chapter on The Matrix is, in one sense, typical of the thesis as a
whole, in the way it homes in on a selected part of the work, but then offers an
in-depth reading of the detail thus isolated. This, in the case of The Matrix is
the so-called bullet-time effect, which occurs three times in the film, taking up
no more than one minute of the film’s overall  minutes. On the other hand,
this bullet-time effect in , when the film came out, was the most talked
about special effect since Jurassic Park’s dinosaurs, and quickly became a locus
classicus among fans, “nerds”, and philosophers. Defined both by its extreme
permutation of time (slow enough to show normally imperceptibly fast events)
and space (thanks to the camera’s – and thus the spectator’s – point-of-view,
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able to move around a scene at normal speed while actions or people are shown
in suspended animation or immobility), the bullet-time effect can be related
back in its technique to Muybridge’s chronophotography, but in its effect of mo-
tion frozen in time, also to Andrea del Verrocchio’s statue of Colleoni on horse-
back. Linking CGI effects to both early cinema and Renaissance sculpture and
thus to a long art-historical discourse about the representation of motion and
time in the visual, photographic and plastic arts is a commendably illuminating
contribution to several disciplines.
Equally full of surprises is the chapter on Tom Tom the Piper’s Son. Here, the
many layers of correspondences and interrelations between the  Billy Bitzer
film and Ken Jacobs’ - version are explored, all of them adding to the
central discussion of movement and stillness. Røssaak shows that Jacobs’s repe-
titions, decelerations and “remediations” of this “found object” from early cin-
ema – itself, as it turns out, a “remediation” or “re-animation” of a famous print
from , William Hogarth’s Southwark Fair – keep doubling back into the
very same problems already encountered by Hogarth (how to represent the a-
synchronous and yet collective movement of crowds) and Bitzer (how to isolate
and thus “arrest” in both senses of the word, one of the participants – Tom who
stole the pig – in the milling masses of spectators and players). Each of the three
artists deals in his own way, and appropriate to his time and medium, with
multiple planes of action, their consecutive phases, and the tensions between
guiding but also refocusing the spectator’s gaze and attention. Even the
modernist allusions in Jacobs’s work now make sense as part of the movement/
stasis/focus problem, which artists have posed themselves repeatedly over the
centuries. But the references to abstract expressionism also afford an intriguing
glimpse into the New York avant-garde scene of the s and s, with its
intense cross-fertilization between artists, theorists and filmmakers. The brief
section on copyright and the legal status of the moving image at the turn of the
th century between “paper” and “photography” (the famous “paper print
collection”) makes Bitzer’s original material and Jacobs’ rediscovery of it a parti-
cularly interesting case of the persistence of issues of ownership and common
property when it comes to our image heritage and its preservation: all issues
central to the museum’s role as potential guardian also of the cinema’s history.
The book’s key notion, “negotiating immobility” is, however, most aptly ex-
emplified in the third chapter, which deals with Bill Viola’s installation The Pas-
sions, and particularly the piece called The Quintet of the Astonished, a
large rear-projected digital image of five people gradually and almost imper-
ceptibly changing expression over a period of almost half an hour. Here, an-
other formula from early cinema scholar Tom Gunning is put to good use: “the
aesthetics of astonishment”. While Røssaak sees it mainly as a refinement and
clarification of the better-known “cinema of attractions”, which due to its often
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indiscriminate application has now also come under attack, I think the term
“astonishment” goes beyond the visual register of spectacle and “show”, as
well as avoiding the problematic binary divides between “norm” and “de-
viancy” (especially when “cinema of attractions” is played out against “classical
cinema” of “narrative integration”). More helpful, also for Røssaak’s case of
how we perceive stillness and movement in relation to each other, seems to me
the possibility that “astonishment” can identify what Gestalt-psychologist and
others have referred to as “cognitive dissonance”, that is, a level of discrepancy,
say, between eye and mind (as in: “the eye sees as real what the mind knows to
be impossible”), or between the body and the senses (as in cases where the clas-
sic divide between mobile spectator/immobile view [museum] and immobile
spectator/mobile image [cinema] is subtly displaced and rearticulated, which
happens when the moving image enters the museum). Bill Viola himself sug-
gests as much when he talks about the high-speed photography of The Pas-
sions’ continuous, if complexly choreographed movement, replayed and di-
lated by extreme slow motion as “giving the mind the space to catch up with
the eye”. Røssaak handles an extremely suggestive analytical tool in this chap-
ter, which conveys very well one of the key techniques of Viola (besides his own
version of the bullet-time effect) for producing both cognitive dissonance and
motor-sensory imbalance: namely that of the “desynchronized gazes” among the
five figures, which create the oxymoronic sensation of a cubist temporality. As
spectators, we do not know whether to stand stock-still in front of the projected
image or mimetically mirror the slow motion of the bodies, thus finding our-
selves, precisely, caught in “negotiating immobility”, i.e., trying to adjust to a
“different” motion of “life” – or if you like, experiencing “ecological time” – in
the midst of our hectic lives, dominated by timetables and the tick-tock of me-
chanical clocks.
Towards a Politics of Slow?
What is more natural than Røssaak ending his book with a gentle plea for “the
politics of slow”: a worthy sentiment, no doubt, but hopefully also not just in-
tended as a “reaction” to the generalized speed and acceleration of modern life.
We do not want to make the museum merely a refuge, and art a compensatory
practice. Especially if it is a question of “politics”, we need to see the “critical”
dimension in movement itself – process, becoming, the possibility of transfor-
mation – lest immobility comes to signify not the absence or suspension of
movement, but its arrest, with all the connotations of politics, policing and
power this implies: “freeze” is, after all, what the cops say to a suspect in Holly-
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wood movies. And one thing that the cinema is definitely not, in the world of
the fine arts is a “suspect”, and one role the museum should not play is that of
the cop (from The Matrix), “freezing” the cinema, either in time or in history,
the way he unsuccessfully challenges Trinity, the film’s Protean heroine. “Nego-
tiating immobility” must not become either a euphemism for the museum as
mausoleum, or a code word for resistance to change.
And yet, resistance has been the mark of art for much of the th century,
including that of cinema. In the contest of motion and stillness, however, what
is “the dominant”, to which the artist is compelled to offer dissent? Is it the
stasis of the photograph, overcome by the cinematic image that brings life and
animation, or is it quick editing and the montage of fragments, with its over-
powering rhetoric of agitation and propaganda, demanding of the artist to
counter it with images that absorb and focus, rather than mimic the frenzied
onrush of a speeding train, as in Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera?
If speed was once perceived as the mark of modernity in the s by Marinetti
and the Futurists, or hailed by the Russian avant-garde of the s as thrilling
to the promise of technology and the impatient rhythm of machines, then the
destructive energies unleashed by “lightning wars”, supersonic aircraft or rock-
et-propelled missiles have also reversed the perspective: just as “progress” is no
longer the only vector taking us into the future, so speed may not be the only
form of motion to get us from A to B. The modernist paradox seems inescap-
able: we are obsessed with speed, not least because we are fearful of change, a
fear of the relentlessly inevitable which we try to make our own – appropriate,
anticipate and inflect with our agency – through speed. In the cinema, a static
high-velocity vehicle par excellence, we seek out that which moves us, transports
us, seduces and abducts us, propels and projects us, while keeping us pinned to
our seats and perfectly “in place”. Paul Virilio has expressed it most breath-
lessly, in his “aesthetic of disappearance”: Velocity, understood as space or dis-
tance, mapped against time or duration, reaches its absolute limit in the speed
of light, where space and time “collapse”, i.e., become mere variables of each
other. Is the cinema, as an art of light, asks Virilio, not always at the limits of
both time and space, at the threshold of “disappearance”, whose negative en-
ergy is stillness? Gilles Deleuze’s opposition of the movement image and the
time image intimates, among other things, not only a break in the relation of
the body to its own perception of motion in time and space, but also a moment
of resistance, a reorientation, where perception neither leads to action nor im-
plies its opposite, while stillness does not contradict motion.
These “dromoscopic” considerations are to be distinguished from what has
been called “the aesthetics of slow”, indicative of a kind of cinema that has re-
formulated the old opposition between avant-garde cinema and mainstream
narrative cinema around (the absence of) speed. Possibly taking its cue from
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David Bordwell’s characterization of contemporary Hollywood, the “cinema of
slow” sees itself as a reaction to “accelerated continuity”, where slowness –
however expressed or represented – becomes an act of organized resistance:
just as “slow food” is a reaction to both the convenience and uniformity of fast
food, appealing to locally grown ingredients, traditional modes of manufacture
and community values. No longer along the lines of “art versus commerce”, or
“realism versus illusionism”, slow cinema (also sometimes referred to as “con-
templative cinema”) counters the blockbuster’s over-investment in physical ac-
tion, spectacle and violence with long takes, quiet observation, an attention to
detail, to inner stirrings rather than to outward restlessness, highlighting the
deliberate or hesitant gesture, rather than the protagonist’s drive or determina-
tion – reminding one, however remotely, of the “go-slow” of industrial protest,
but also the “organic” pace of the vegetal realm.
Yet “slow cinema” can also be seen as a way of already thinking the museali-
zation of the cinema into the contemporary practice of cinema, making the clas-
sic space of cinema – the movie theatre – into a kind of museum (of the Seventh
Art), understood (in the counter-current that not only preserves the anti-cinema
of the avant-garde, but also the “cinema of disclosure” of Europe’s post-war
new waves) as the site of contemplation and concentration. The aural silentio of
the museum’s ambient galleries, conveyed in measured pace and the stillness of
the image, would return us to an inner-space that is both womb and refuge,
both protest against and a retreat from a world, increasingly experienced as
spinning out of control.
Different Ways of Thinking of the Moving Image
We are thus faced with two conceptions of the moving image in light of its
century-old history. If we consider the classical view, arguing from the basis of
the technical apparatus, there is no such thing as the moving image, neither in
photographic, celluloid-based moving images nor in post-photographic video
or digital images. In photographic film each static image is replaced by another,
the act of replacement being hidden from the eye by the shutter mechanism in
the projector; in the analogue video image and the digital image, each part of
the image is continually replaced either by means of a beam of light scanning
the lines of the cathode ray tube, or refreshed by algorithms that continually
rearrange the relevant pixels. Motion is in the eye of the beholder, which is why
cinema has so often seen itself accused of being a mere “illusion”, an ideological
fiction, only made possible by the fallibility of the human eye: regardless of
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whether this “failure” was compensated by “persistence of vision” or the “phi-
effect”.
The other view could be called Heraclitean. Given that “everything moves”
and that change and thus motion, whether perceptible to the human eye or not,
is the very condition of life (animal, vegetal and even mineral) at the macro-
scale as well as micro-level, the cinema (as moving image) is not an illusion,
simulation or imitation of life but its approximation, by other (mechanical,
mathematical) means. Henri Bergson is the much-quoted philosophical guaran-
tor of such a view, at least as understood and interpreted by Gilles Deleuze. For
Bergson, there is always priority of movement over the thing that moves, em-
bedded as it is in duration, which, however, no image can represent. In Creative
Evolution, Bergson even criticizes the cinema for passing static images off as
movement, but Deleuze – with Bergson contra Bergson – argues that an image
is always “in motion”, not merely because the eye restlessly scans, probes and
touches even the (still) image in the very “act of seeing”: the still image is a
“stilled” image, slowed down to the point of imperceptible motion, or stilled
because it is taken out of the flow or extracted from it, but carrying with it as its
virtuality the signs and traces of the movement to which it owes consistency,
energy and substance.
While Deleuze’s Bergsonism is part of his overall philosophy of “multiplicity”
and “becoming”, with roots in Spinoza and Nietzsche, his “revolution” in the
way we can think about images in general and the cinematic image in particular
is well suited for the recasting of the relation between stillness and movement
also in the digital age. Before the advent of the digital image, photography and
the cinema were traditionally seen as each other’s “nemesis”: each could speak
to a particular truth, repressed or hidden in the other: the cinema – based as it
initially was on the chrono-photograph – made us aware of the temporality en-
closed or encased in the still image, which the cinema could liberate and re-
animate, as it did in the very early performances of the Lumière Brothers, whose
films habitually started with a projected photograph, suddenly springing to life.
Conversely, photography has always been the cinema’s memento mori: remind-
ing us that at the heart of the cinema are acts of intervention in the living tissue
of time, that the cinema is “death at work”, in the famous phrase of Jean Coc-
teau. Film theory in the s even went a step further: since cinema, in the very
act of projecting moving images, represses the materiality of the individual
frames that make up the celluloid strip, its “apparatus” cannot but be an instru-
ment of power, at the service of an “idealist” ideology.
In art history, the s also saw a revaluation, if not the incorporation, of
photography into the canon of Western art. Photography’s ability to hold a mo-
ment in time and freeze in it not just a past, but to sustain a “future perfect” has
been the source of its peculiar fascination to art historians, taking their cue from
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Walter Benjamin, Susan Sontag and especially Roland Barthes, whose insistence
on the “tense” of the photograph is nonetheless unthinkable without the cultur-
al experience of cinema against which it formulates a silent protest. Cinema is
thus also the “repressed” of photography in the th century, at least in its in-
tellectual-institutional discourse. As David Campany put it:
Still photography – cinema’s ghostly parent –was eclipsed by the medium of film, but
also set free. The rise of cinema obliged photography to make a virtue of its own
stillness. Film, on the other hand, envied the simplicity, the lightness, and the preci-
sion of photography.… In response to the rise of popular cinema, Henri Cartier-Bres-
son exalted the “decisive moment” of the still photograph. In the s, reportage
photography began to explore the possibility of snatching filmic fragments. Since the
s, conceptual and post-conceptual artists have explored the narrative enigmas of
the found film still.
As Campany goes on to point out, filmmakers in the s like Andy Warhol,
Michael Snow and Stan Brakhage “took cinema into direct dialogue with the
stillness of the photographic image”.
Working on the Moment: Stillness in Motion and Motion
within Stillness
These dialogical-dialectical relations between photography and cinema may
well have come into another crisis with the effective disappearance, in the digi-
tal image, of either material or ontological difference between still and moving
image. Instead, attention is gradually being refocused on the aesthetic possibili-
ties that arise within digital imaging for the degrees, the modulations and mod-
alities of stillness, arrest and movement, such as suggested earlier around the
“bullet time” effect in The Matrix, but now in the realm of the fine arts. As
Chris Dercon, commenting on the work of Jeff Wall, has remarked:
The moving image has liberated exhibition spaces from the illusion of the static
world. Things we generally associate with the visual arts suddenly start to move on a
large scale. Or should we say that suddenly we have become aware that there are
static images? As a result of the new applications of photography, cinema and video,
we can now really reflect in our museums on what stillness is. From Jeff Wall’s point
of view, the stillness of still pictures has become very different, otherwise one couldn’t
explain the current fascination with still photography.
In consequence, just as digital photography can now produce the “photo-
graphic mode” as one of its options or effects, so the aesthetics of both photo-
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graphy and cinema have to be re-thought in terms of particular historical “ima-
ginaries”, rather than being defined by specific properties inherent in each me-
dium, least of all the criteria of stillness and movement. Such an idea of photo-
graphy and cinema as merely different applications or culturally coded uses of
a new (or rather, age-old) mode, namely that of the graphic image (including
the photographic image), of which the digital image would merely be the latest
installment, as it were, no doubt challenges our concepts of the photographic
and the cinematic in all manner of ways. For example, it places the relationship
between movement and its suspension into a temporal frame that belongs more
to the spectator rather than to the object. Cartier-Bresson’s “decisive moment”
that needs to be “captured” before it disappears “out there” and “forever” is
turned against its own metaphysics of time (i.e., the manifest palpability of
time we call the moment), when compared to Jeff Wall’s photographic light
boxes or the video portraits of Gillian Wearing, where an elaborate staging of
the “instant” or the “moment” (whether taken from a Hokusai woodblock
print, a London mews, or a sunlit afternoon street in Los Angeles) produces
and post-produces time (i.e., the temporal attention and extension the viewer
gives to the work). It comes to constitute the artist’s work on the moment rather
than registering the moment’s work on the artist.
A quite different example of such “work on the moment” occurs in Chungk-
ing Express (), directed by Wong Kar Wai, who, together with his camera-
man Christopher Doyle, might be said to realize a “photographic imaginary”
but using cinematic means: not by inserting stills into his film, freezing the
frame, or composing his films of photographs, as one finds them in the films of
the Nouvelle Vague, from Jean-Luc Godard (A Bout de Souffle) to François
Truffaut (Les Quatre Cent Coups) and Chris Marker (La Jetée). I am also not
thinking of the scenes in Chungking Express that feature “stains” of motion
blur in an otherwise sharp image – though these shots deserve more comment,
not least because they play another variation on our theme, insofar as the blur
records objects and people still in motion when the image has already been
fixed. As the trace of a movement that exceeds another movement, the motion
blur in the photographic-cinematic mode was often regarded as either a techni-
cal flaw or an index of a special kind of authenticity. The sharp image, from
which any trace of motion (and thus its temporal index) is banished, came to be
the paradigm of normative representation. From the vantage point of the “digi-
tal”, on the other hand, the blur can realize a “layering” of degrees of stillness
and motion repressed or deemed unacceptable in the photographic (or the cin-
ematic), while nonetheless embedded as a possibility and an absent presence in
the very opposition of stillness and motion.
However, I have in mind another scene: in order to convey the co-presence
and overlap of two temporalities – one iterative and in the modality of “dura-
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tion”, the other focused on the moment; one external and impersonal, the other
subjectively inflected with anticipation and boredom – Doyle shot a scene of
passersby in a busy shopping street, while inside a bar, one of the protagonists,
Cop , sits drinking coffee, with the amateur stalker Faye gazing at him in
rapt absorption. What we see, however, is the non-encounter between the man
and the woman taking place in a drifting, slow-motion dreamy haze of un-
requited longing, while the people outside speed past these ghosts, lost to desire
and ennui – a powerful metaphor for the life that escapes them, as they seek
ways to live it more intensely, in a city that never rests. It is the sort of slowing
down of movement we associate with Bill Viola, but instead of being “done
digitally”, Doyle shot the scene with an analogue camera, asking the actors to
go into slow-mo mode, as if in a Kung Fu movie, while filming the crowds at
normal speed – except that there is nothing “normal” about a scene so effec-
tively combining two different “sheets of time” in the single image: time stands
still for some, while it rushes past for others. Realizing an effect now considered
typical of the “digital”, and doing so with the resources of the cinema, Wong
Kar Wai and Doyle anticipate one of the changes that the digital was to bring to
the parameters of motion. Demonstrating a different kind of materiality and
malleability of time in the image, they also implicitly confirm that we should
not attach these changes to digital technology per se. Such scenes herald a new
aesthetic of duration beyond movement and stillness, arising from both film
and photography, but perhaps to be realized by neither.
Having become a “way of seeing” as well as a “way of being”, the cinema has
made itself heir to photography, one might say, not by absorbing the latter’s
capacity for realism, or by turning the still image’s irrecoverable pastness into
the eternal present of the filmic now. Rather, by handing its own photographic
past over to the digital, it might fulfill another promise of cinema, without
thereby betraying photography. The particular consistency of the digital image,
having less to do with the optics of transparency and projection and more with
the materiality of clay or putty, carries with it the photographic legacy of im-
print and trace, which as André Bazin saw it, is as much akin to a mask or a
mould as it is a representation and a likeness. Bazin’s definition of the cinema
as “change mummified” may have to be enlarged and opened up: extended to
the digital image, it would encompass the double legacy of stillness and move-
ment, now formulated neither as an opposition in relation to motion, nor as a
competition between two related media, but in the form of a paradox with pro-
foundly ethical as well as aesthetic implications: the digital image fixes the in-
stant and embalms change: but it also gives to that which passes, to the ephem-
eral, to the detail and the overlooked not just the instant of its visibility, but the
dignity of its duration.
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Here, then, lies the task for the museum, as it comes to terms with time-based
art increasingly supplementing if not substituting for the lens-based art of the
last century. With photographs now digital and intuitively understood as seg-
ments stilled from the flow of time, both film and photography, whether digi-
tally produced or merely digitally understood, are an archive not only of mo-
ments, epiphanies and illuminations, or actions in the mode of the movement,
cause and consequence, but also of sensations, affects and feelings that are ex-
perienced as transitory, inconsequential and ephemeral. Hence the ethical task
of their sustainability, ensuring that they endure: in memory, as intensities, as the
shape of a thought, even as their perception exceeds the eye and encompasses
the whole body as perceptual surface. This “duration of the ephemeral” would
not be in the service of slowing down the pace of life, nor an act of resistance
against the tyranny of time, but would grant to the fleeting moment its transi-
ence as transience, beyond stillness and motion, beyond absence and presence.
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After “Photography’s Expanded Field”
George Baker
In what follows, I would like to do at least two things that my essay “Photogra-
phy’s Expanded Field” did not do. First, I would like to present an extremely
close reading of a specific artist’s practice as it is opened up and indeed was
formed by the precise interpenetration of photography and cinema that I ex-
plored in my earlier essay. In fact, I will treat in detail a project by the Los An-
geles-based artist Sharon Lockhart entitled Pine Flat that came to fruition in
, the year of my essay’s publication (and was thus not at all covered). Sec-
ond, and more importantly, I offer this close reading as an amplification of the
formal mapping of photography’s expansion that my earlier essay hoped to
broach. By amplification, I mean radicalization, in a way; what I hope to do
here is deal not just with the forms and possibilities opened up by the expansion
of the medium of photography, but with the meaning, and perhaps too the moti-
vations, for the insistence with which many artists today emplace their practice
between mediums, or engage in the cinematic opening of the still photograph
that has been my concern. Another way of stating this radicalization would be
to say that my concern today is less with the “objective” or structural mapping
performed in my earlier essay; the interpenetration of forms, the expansion of
mediums like the photograph has too a “subjective” logic, and it is to the desir-
ing politics of the expansion of photography that I hope to turn.
In the first “episode” of Sharon Lockhart’s recent film Pine Flat, we see a pine
forest blanketed by falling snow. We then hear – but do not see – a young girl,
whose plaintive cry echoes through the winter landscape: “Ethan...! Where are
you...?” And then: “Please Ethan! Come back...!” It seems like a game of hide-
and-seek that has perhaps gone awry. But this cry of loss strikes me as signifi-
cant, given the origin of Pine Flat in what we might call photographic strate-
gies of “objective chance” and the “found object”. Looking in  to get away
from her home and work in Los Angeles, Lockhart drove some four hours
north, into the foothills of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. There, she came across
a rural community by chance and decided to stay, because it struck her as deep-
ly “familiar”. While her previous work was known for an engagement with
ethnographic representation that led to far-flung projects in Japan, Mexico, and
Brazil, now Lockhart’s attention was held by a locale that reminded her of a
different sort of distance, a temporal one, as she claimed the community was
similar to sites where she had been raised. Over the course of the next four
years, the artist visited and re-visited the town, setting up a portrait studio
where she created images of the local children, and collaborating with them on
a film where they are portrayed in the pristine surrounding landscape.
The large format images in the portrait series, entitled Pine Flat Portrait Studio,
are hardly outmoded in terms of their literal form or medium. Instead, it is the
photographs’ conventions – and perhaps their subject, rural youth, as well – that
bespeak the past, as Lockhart engages the history and address of a specific kind
of vanished, non-art photographic portraiture, produced in rural locales in the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries by commercial photographers
from August Sander in Germany to Mike Disfarmer in the United States. While
Sander photographed his subjects in the context of their environment (some-
thing Lockhart engages more in her film than in her photographs), Disfarmer
isolated his in an extremely Spartan studio setting, with all his subjects posed
on a bare concrete floor against the same dark, blank backdrop. It was as if Dis-
farmer’s subjects existed in a mournful void, the industrial setting and tech-
nique of the photograph emerging as the most extreme opposition to the rural
Arkansas population. Lockhart replicates this scenario exactly, and follows
Disfarmer’s reliance only on natural light and thus longer exposure times, al-
lowing the subjects perhaps to “grow” into their image, almost to “bloom”. Pro-
voking an observing attentiveness with an extreme focus on detail, we would
seem to be in the presence of an embrace of that leave-taking before the world –
a kind of involuntary documentary impulse – that theorist Kaja Silverman has
characterized as the “author-as-receiver”. And yet the images present problems
for us, in ways beyond the fact that their conventions are “appropriated”.
In each photograph, the children adopt a pose; they do not present them-
selves “objectively” or analytically, all in the same position. Hands are placed
on hips, or stuffed into pockets; arms are crossed defensively, or hold an attri-
bute, like a drawing pad or a hunter’s rifle or a lollipop. While the criticism of
Pine Flat has emphasized that Lockhart entered into a form of collaboration
with her subjects that is characteristic of all her projects – which, for the most
part, revise problematic conventions of human portraiture – we cannot be sure
of the origins of the pose, whether it comes from the artist or subject; the attri-
butes may also have been the children’s idea or were potentially provided for
them by the author. We face a similar quandary with regard to costume, which
ranges here from everyday jeans and T-shirts to elaborate biker outfits and com-
binations even more outlandish than the general tendency of children to mix-
and-match clashing pieces (witness a young girl seemingly buried beneath her
accoutrements, which include a catcher’s mask, cowboy boots, fringed tur-
quoise riding chaps, a hunter’s vest and an out-sized plaid flannel shirt marked
with the word “Wrangler”, a cowboy nostalgia brand popular with American
children in the s). It is entirely unclear, in other words, whether the photo-
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graphs are to be understood as fictions or as documents, whether they engage
in performative acting or testify to an unselfconscious “being”, whether they
approximate Disfarmer’s models from the past or locate an untouched pocket
of rural existence in the present.
And Lockhart’s film presents us with a similar set of problems. Working in
mm, Lockhart’s medium in this instance is deeply obsolescent; however, here
too there is a paradox. Pine Flat connects its outmoded analog form to the
pristine subject of youth and nature – however potentially threatened in our
postindustrial present. The form is almost classical: Lockhart films episodes
that are all ten minutes in length, with six of individual children and then six
more of the children gathered into groups. The ten-minute expanse corresponds
to the full length of a single reel of mm film. During the time in which the film
is allowed to roll to its depletion without interruption or cuts, Lockhart’s camera
remains absolutely still. It is also insistently frontal or “objective”. In this, the
camera’s fixed and passive gaze registers the non-heroic, non-narrative activ-
ities of the children, as they perform simple tasks – like reading a book in a field,
sleeping near some mountain rocks, listening to the forest sounds while hunt-
ing, or waiting before a verdant valley for a slowly approaching school bus –
throughout the full duration of the scene. All of the “open” passive attributes of
the author-as-receiver seem in effect. And yet, while Lockhart supposedly
“scouted” her pristine locations with the children, and perhaps discussed with
them what activities they might enjoy based on their own proclivities, we again
are not faced with a film of “found” documentary footage, even though this is
its address. All of the episodes were staged for the camera. It is as if Lockhart
does not recognize the opposition between fiction and documentary at all.
Such has been the ambivalence of Lockhart’s images from the very beginnings
of her career. The vast majority of her earlier portrait projects were focused on
children or young adults. In her Audition series from , Lockhart photo-
graphed children locked in an awkward but deeply touching embrace, as if she
were trying to capture the non-replicable moment of one’s “first kiss”. However,
Lockhart produced five of these images, each with different children but in the
same locale. Impossible then to read as documentary or photojournalism –
hardly examples of the “decisive moment” – Lockhart’s images instead de-
ployed the Hollywood or theatrical conventions of the audition, and each image
was the result of the children’s attempt to replicate a prior image, in this case the
climactic “first kiss” scene from one of François Truffaut’s films about children,
L’argent de poche (). They thus presented a series of “memories” we
might characterize as “falsifying” – we might even say “exteriorizing”. Lock-
hart’s photographs for the later project Goshogaoka () followed a similar lo-
gic. We see a series of individual or group portraits of Japanese girls, members
of the same high school basketball team, seemingly captured while the team
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was playing or practicing. However, Lockhart’s images were arrived at only
after the girls chose favorite sports photographs of (mostly American) basket-
ball stars upon which to model their actions and their poses.
Lockhart’s photographs thus dismantle many of the assumptions both of art
portraiture and ethnographic documentation, the two discursive formations to
which her work seemed oriented. Modeling pose and costume upon prior
images was not her only strategy. As in Pine Flat, the settings in which the act
of portraiture occurs became an over-riding concern–the photograph’s “world”
in other words. This was enacted most poignantly in her Brazil projects that led
up to the film Teatro Amazonas (). Following anthropologists on research
trips in the Amazon basin, Lockhart produced a series of images that moved
laterally away from direct portraits of the ethnographic “subjects” of the field
research. In her series Interview Locations, she photographed the homes in which
the subjects had been interviewed, but absent of their inhabitants. Simulta-
neously, she requested treasured snapshots from the same families, which she
then re-photographed for a series entitled Family Photographs. The result was a
first series that gathered to itself so many images of seemingly abandoned
homes, emptied-out domestic spaces, and another that spoke of time past in an
anonymous voice, like rootless or discarded memories bereft of their individual
owners.
Nostalgia whispered through both of these two projects inasmuch as the
abandoned domestic interiors appeared like old black-and-white photographs
of the kind Walker Evans had once made for his project Let Us Now Praise Fa-
mous Men; the re-photographed family snapshots also attached themselves to
older imaging technologies and bygone times. But nostalgia attached itself even
more deeply to those early works by Lockhart where her focus on youth por-
traits and on domestic interiors came together. All without titles, these now sin-
gle images were filled with a general sense of languor and of suspension: a
photograph of a young girl napping on or near a glass table, enveloped by its
mirror embrace; a young woman in an old, fading home turned away from the
camera. Rather than snapshots or documents, whose content they imitated,
these images were elaborately staged, with locations scouted, costumes chosen,
and lighting arranged again along the cinematic model. Similar images of chil-
dren were made simultaneously in natural settings, looking forward in this way
to Pine Flat. But the peculiarity of almost all of these latter photographs, like
the diptych Julia, Thomas () or other Untitled images from  – and per-
haps attributing to their enigma and suspended sense of time –was how in each
image the subject did not look forward but turned away, or turned back, to look
along with the viewer into the black or fog-enshrouded distance of the photo-
graph.
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It has gradually become apparent that these early portraits take an opposite,
but linked, approach to that evidenced in a series like Audition. For if the latter
photographs approximated snapshots but had been modeled upon a cinematic
“source”, here Lockhart’s cinematic portraits held a kind of mysterious dialog
with prior documents, in this case family snapshots. Beginning in , Lock-
hart had already adopted the strategy enacted later in Brazil for the Family
Photographs series, engaging in a kind of “self-ethnography” as she began to re-
photograph her own personal archive of her family’s photo-albums. The series
continues to the present day; Lockhart calls each of these images an Untitled
Study (re-photographed snapshot). In many of these “studies” we see Lockhart as
a child in the arms of her father, or holding hands with her mother or sister,
almost always turned away from the camera. Hardly any critical accounts have
noticed or remarked upon these images. One exception is the early essay on
Lockhart by Timothy Martin, who comments on their relation to the Untitled
photographs of -:
Lockhart’s pictorial language was now beginning to take the role of characterization
upon itself, employing a cinematic sense of mise-en-scène as its chief device–though
making no further overt reference to specific films. Nearly all of the untitled large-
scale color photographs of - pursue this pictorial language to greater and
greater degrees of scenic involution and mystery. And in nearly all of them the human
subject is obliquely posed, many with back to camera: a figure of vacancy, stillness,
and deferral within a picture of tense visual expectation. Curiously, a few of these
poses echo those seen in the artist’s rephotographed family snapshots, which she has
produced from  [sic] to the present day. In these nostalgic images, she, her sister,
mother, and father appear as solitary or paired figures, typically with backs to cam-
era, before natural vistas or more domestic placid scenery. The sense of longing and
deferral in these images offers a powerful, though muted, personal counterpoint to
the cinematic grandness of the large-scale photographs, which appear to derive from
them in ways that remain essentially indeterminate and private.
The Untitled Study series thus does not exactly amount to a set of image
“sources”. Instead, they are held in lesser-or-greater dialog with Lockhart’s cin-
ematic portraits – a strangely distanced relation to images of one’s personal his-
tory coming into contact with a distanced, staged image of intimacy in the pre-
sent. And this “dialog”, I would say, continues into the present, as the natural
scenery and the poses of the re-photographed family snapshots find a startling
series of echoes in the current images from Pine Flat. Indeed, now Lockhart
has re-photographed a series of commercial portraits of herself and her sister
produced in the s and s as Untitled Study images, documenting some
kind of historical survival of the portrait practice engaged in by Disfarmer into
her own personal history, which she then extends to the children in Pine Flat.
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And many of Pine Flat’s filmed scenarios seem to follow closely from Lock-
hart’s enigmatic family images, with pairs and trios of children playing in both,
or with the snapshots of herself or her family members with back to camera
now taken up in episodes of Pine Flat like “Bus” or “Snowy Hill”. It is as if an
initial analogy first occurred to the artist around the issue of pose–the fact that
these enigmatic (failed?) snapshots of family members seen from behind created
a correspondence with the situation of the viewer’s orientation toward the im-
age, with both viewer and photographed subject gazing toward a distant hori-
zon, like the unfathomable vista of the enigma of the past itself. Both viewer
and viewed were positioned similarly in relation to that unknown scene, and to
a kind of thus infinitely deferred desire. And then it is as if this initial analogy
inspired Lockhart to seek out another series of affinities, “attuning” her earlier
cinematic photographs or the current images from the Pine Flat project to
these auratic images from her own past.
Attunement, I want to claim, has become Lockhart’s overriding artistic con-
cern. More “aural” than visual, Lockhart’s strategies of “attunement” expand
the literal obsolescence of the analog into what we might call a conceptual strat-
egy of analogy. To “attune” something requires two forms; it can never be a
solitary endeavor. Attunement is the attempt to bring forms close, to have them
“rhyme”. It is a word we could use to understand Lockhart’s insistent linkage of
terms we normally perceive as oppositions, rhyming in her work document and
fiction, past and present, viewer and viewed, subject and object, self and other–
until the opposition will no longer hold. Attunement is a desiring and emotive
mode; it is the form of Lockhart’s disorienting version of “receiving”, the way in
which even while intensely manipulating her images, she makes space for the
world outside. It is an action modeled on the workings of memory itself, the
affinities through which desire can be displaced from past to present and vice
versa. It is a device through which we might finally begin to understand that
commonplace of the criticism of Lockhart’s work that sees it as an uncanny com-
bination of both distance and affect, of “objective” photography or “structural”
film and the emotions – a combination that, moreover, Lockhart seems to signal
precisely in the connotations of her project’s title Pine Flat.
This is because attunement, Lockhart has shown, can come from strangely
readymade conventions, and unlikely, perhaps alienating places. It can emerge
from practices of mass culture, Hollywood for example: Witness her photo-
graph of actor Ben Gazzara (Ben Gazzara, Los Angeles, California, March ,
), photographed in close-up, gazing almost longingly into the camera,
head resting on his hands and on a pillow while he lies in bed. Evidently, the
photograph of the aging actor was taken on a film set, for Lockhart has paired it
with a second image of a young woman in exactly the same pose. This is Gaz-
zara’s “stand-in” during shooting, as Lockhart’s title informs us: Emilie Halpern,
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Stand-in for Ben Gazzara, Los Angeles, California, March , . The result is im-
mensely confusing, and yet intensely auratic: it is as if this commonplace cin-
ematic practice during filming has produced a document of two individuals
now deeply aligned, exchanging places with each other, “attuned” from one to
the other. Possible scenarios proceed from this uncanny attunement, narratives
having nothing to do with the story that we assume was being filmed: perhaps
we face an amorous situation, a document of a couple in the intimate space of
their bed. Or perhaps we face a memory, like those where we recognize an in-
tensely personal attachment to a parent, but can’t remember if we are thinking
of an image of our “father” or our “mother”, interchanging them within our
minds. Or it is as if we see a scene of deep but loving identification, where a
“daughter” takes the place and position of her “father”. All of these scenarios
seem legitimated by the images; none of them are definitive. And we hardly
need to stop here. For the situation only becomes more expansive when we
realize that these two photographs are themselves attuned to earlier images
within Lockhart’s oeuvre, by pose with the Untitled  portrait of the sleeping
girl near the glass table, for example, or by gaze with Lockhart’s diptych of two
teenagers standing before the sea, staring into the camera as if they were reach-
ing toward each other as much as toward the viewer, across the gap of both
space and time – Lily (approximately am, Pacific Ocean), and Jochen (approximately
pm, North Sea) (). And since all of these images may (or may not) be photo-
graphs aligned with Lockhart’s own memory images, the attunement becomes
more disorienting still.
In addition to alienating ready-made conventions, attunement can also
emerge from dissonance itself; Lockhart’s tactics seem dependent on such oppo-
sitions, and on the redemption implicit in overcoming them. Such was the task
of Lockhart’s film Teatro Amazonas, where she filmed from the point of view
of the stage an audience in Brazil gathered to listen to an “atonal” composition
by Lockhart’s frequent collaborator Becky Allen. First, the project aligned the
atonal composition with the community portrayed before us; a choral work for
many voices attuned to a group of many faces gathered by Lockhart according
to similarly “atonal” – or rather alienating and inorganic – procedures derived
from sociology and statistics (a “scientific” sampling of the full range of the
population in the Brazilian city of Manaus). As the burst of vocal music began
to diminish over the course of the film – voice after voice eventually dropping
out – the music’s fading allowed the ambient “sound” of the community to
emerge, to be “born”. And so multiple dissonances came into alignment here,
climaxing in what we might consider a foundational series for the artist: the
attunement of the viewer and the viewed, of self and other, and of history and
the present, as an audience in the past faces and models an audience gazing at
the film at each moment of its present or future screening.
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Music was included in Pine Flat as well, where an intermission linking the
two halves of the film was filled with the sound of a young boy playing guitar
and singing along to a prior “model”, creating his own, tentative version of the
angst-ridden pop-punk anthem “Stay Together for the Kids” by the California
band Blink-. We listen to the boy as he diverges from the original song, and
even changes key from time to time. With this, Lockhart signals the processes of
attunement that in fact run throughout the whole of the Pine Flat project. For
here, it is the staged, “manipulated” image that registers the model of the
author-as-receiver, producing an uncanny rhyming of past and present, a mel-
ancholic looking back (to a time of origins, or of the lost object) that paradoxi-
cally locates or models a new beauty in the world today, a new value in the
present time.
Indeed, aside from considerations of artificial costume and pose, or potential
models in image banks from other places, people, and times, the photographs in
the series Pine Flat Portrait Studio manifest one manipulation more directly than
any other: each of the images are “attuned” to all the rest. By precisely altering
the distance of her camera to the children based on their relative sizes, Lockhart
was able to photograph each child at the very same scale within the frame; the
oldest and tallest of the children occupy the same space within the image as the
youngest and smallest. The children thus all seem to literally “rhyme” as they
are brought into physical correspondence with each other. The tactic seems ega-
litarian, but it is also deeply de-individuating, confusing the series’ reliance on
photographic objectivity and the portrait genre’s role in the construction of
identity. Arranged in a set diegetic horizontal line and mostly organized from
younger to older children, the portrait series’ attunement of all its images works
against this ordering device as well. For we seem to perceive the slowing of the
linear march of time, or witness it halted in its tracks altogether. Photographs of
sisters perhaps taken at the same time seem like potential images of the same
person taken at two different ages; photographs of the same child taken at two
different moments during the project’s life become impossible to reconcile, as if
aging bifurcated the child into two different subjects, or conversely, was held in
abeyance, its physical signs such as growth all but cancelled out. In this, the
portrait series finds itself beset by wayward analogies, unruly photographic cor-
respondences and affinities, and begins to produce forms of what we might
imagine as the kind of “falsifying movements” within time more characteristic
of the medium of avant-garde cinema. The photographs thus attune themselves
to film.
Conversely, the Pine Flat film attunes itself to photography. Each image
within it remains largely static; cinematic movement lies suspended; the film
seems to slow, to become, like a photograph, almost “still”. In this, the photo-
graphic attunement of film appears like a turning back of Lockhart’s medium
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upon itself, a return of cinema to its photographic pre-history, and in this turn
backward the film begins to attune itself to its subject: to the look back at the
rural and at youth, to the activities and temporality of childhood. A slowed im-
age, positioned by attunement squarely between photography and film, opens
itself to the in-between, suspended activities of the child: reading a book with
rapt attention; napping quietly; waiting distractedly; playing on swings, mov-
ing languorously back and forth; treading water slowly in a country stream.
Critics have remarked that all of these activities seem reminiscent of the unself-
conscious attentiveness often depicted in pre-modernist painting, where a de-
picted subject seems to block out the surrounding world, and that the art histo-
rian Michael Fried has called “absorption”. Moving from these absorptive
activities to the peculiarity of Lockhart’s mise-en-scène, which seems to drain
each episode of any sense of contrast between figure and ground, the point has
been made that Lockhart wishes to engage not only with painting, but with
modernist painting, and with its self-reflexive and ultimately solipsistic project.
But this hardly seems the case at all. What appears to embody a belated mod-
ernism, again amounts to a project steeped in new analogies, connections, cor-
respondences. For Fried, “absorption” signaled a mode in which painting was
able to throw off its narrative functions, and begin an ultimately monomaniacal
focus on the self-reflexive logic of vision, paradoxically by negating the conven-
tion that a painting was meant to be beheld. Absorptive subjects were thus so-
lipsistic; they cancelled out the presence of the spectator, turning inward upon
themselves. Later modernist conventions of suspending oppositions between
figure and ground, foreground and background, achieved this eradication of
painting’s narrative basis in an even more radical way, severing the painting
from the task of depicting the world, securing its lonely autonomy. If Lockhart’s
Pine Flat “rhymes” with this history of another medium, recalling the prehis-
tory of modernist painting, it is in the spirit of canceling oppositions in a much
different manner, oppositions that modernism needed to uphold. It is in the
spirit perhaps of canceling modernism’s melancholic withdrawal from the
world altogether. Lockhart’s film is anything but “autonomous”, solipsistic,
self-absorbed. It is not “lonely” but a document of cohabitation, togetherness,
and collaboration. Pine Flat is not “absorptive” (selfish) but “attuned” (gener-
ous), perhaps linking its form both to photography and to painting.
Lockhart surely does cancel all sense of figure-ground distinctions in her film-
ic images: grass spreads directly up the screen and merges through color match-
ing with the trunks and leaves of trees; horizon lines are rigorously suppressed;
snow and fog join figures with their hazy fields; we are often too close to a scene
to allow distinctions to emerge. And this closeness spreads to the children, who
fuse with these figureless fields inasmuch as we could say they become “at-
tuned” to their environment. Like an untimely sibling of what Walter Benjamin
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once said about ruins, this vision of youth portrays its subjects as “merging”
into their surroundings. Lockhart achieves this in part through details of pose
and costume: blue jeans and a plaid shirt worn by the child in the episode “Bus”
rhyming with the blue-green and purple foliage of the surrounding valley; or
the position of the child’s body in the episode “Sleeper” curled up into the
same shape as the crook between two rocks, curved into the same form as the
land. In the episodes of pairs or groups, the children – even when bickering –
seem to ally themselves with each other. And as the children throw out so many
ropes to their environs or their playmates, attuning and attaching themselves to
their surrounds, we as viewers of Lockhart’s film hardly find ourselves “de-
tached” from the children before us, negated or separated by a scene of self-
absorption. Instead, we are “attuned” to the children’s absorption by Lockhart’s
filmic form; we are attuned to their attunement. As two children, for example,
tread water in unison and look down, away from the camera, into the water’s
fluid depths, we too look down at them, positioned by the camera in such a way
as to attune our gazing with theirs. And as the children wait, or listen, or play
with no regard for the passing of time, we too find ourselves as viewers waiting.
We find ourselves “attuned” to their attentiveness, joined in their temporal sus-
pension.
Our attunement to the children in Lockhart’s film provokes a sense less of
detachment, than of care. It has thus been suggested that Lockhart’s close atten-
tion to children, her camera’s open, capacious gaze in the Pine Flat project,
should be conceived in some analogy to that of the gaze of a mother toward a
child. In her work’s transformation of a camera eye that initially seems totaliz-
ing, perhaps oriented toward surveillance or visual domination, into one of pas-
sive attentiveness and care, we do sense the opening up of a maternal and pro-
tective logic within the project. But attunement, ultimately, amounts to a quiet
but unruly form of desire; the normative familial metaphors, even the redemp-
tive forms of maternal care, do not regulate all of its paths. Attunement, for
example, is not the same thing as what psychoanalysis calls “identification”;
not based on “misrecognition” nor the rapacious drive to possess – to be or to
have, as the psychoanalytic narrative would put it – attunement places two
forms into the same “key”. It precisely does not equate them.
Instead, this mutual rhyming preserves a crucial distance, evinced in the dis-
tanced tactics of Lockhart’s oeuvre. Indeed, in Pine Flat, it is as if we gaze into
the distance – not just of so many gorgeous natural vistas, but also into the
intense mystery of the past. Ultimately, this is why the obsolete analog format
of Lockhart’s film seems so appropriate. It signals an analogy not just with the
threatened reality of rural youth in our present culture, like a pocket of histori-
cally surpassed experience subsisting against all odds; it points to the attune-
ment that the film’s images open up with Lockhart’s own memories, and per-
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haps also with our own. The project embodies a literal nostalgia, a seeming
resurrection or retrieval of youth, of childhood, of a time long past. It seems to
fixate there, and the static camera that Lockhart utilizes amounts to just one sign
of this. But we face a strange form of nostalgic pining. Pining denotes a melan-
cholic wasting away from longing – for home and for the past. In Pine Flat,
however, this pining becomes a way to turn the wasting away into a gesture of
generosity. Now it is the pining for the past in Pine Flat that displaces the
hegemony of the author; it is a “wasting away” that makes space for the other.
A giving up and giving over, such longing also hollows out the image of the
past, exteriorizing it and depersonalizing it. We hardly know to whom these
memories belong (it is why we hardly recognize them asmemories). Thus exter-
iorized, they can be claimed by others in the present. Simultaneously, this pin-
ing interiorizes; the wasting away from longing opens up a hole within the self,
the emptiness and loss of melancholia, into which the other – the past of the
other, the memories of another – can be inserted, and where they can also be
preserved. And so here, to pine away for the past becomes an opening up to
the world. It follows the ramifications of attunement, the impossible correspon-
dence, the distanced rhyming (the rhyming of distance) – where now the other
can be installed within the self, and the self shared vertiginously with the other.
Pine Flat amounts to a displaced self-portrait. But it is also an “other-por-
trait”, an imaging of the shared space between the self and the other. Thus, in
our attunement to the children of Pine Flat, we do not “identify” with them,
but we perhaps recognize ourselves in them. We are called upon to desire this
self-exile. Following the work’s disorienting logic, we almost see them as our-
selves, but in the irretrievable past, and this becomes a motor for attachment in
the present: we see and experience ourselves as them, now. These two vertigi-
nously similar experiences may appear equivalent; they are instead attune-
ments, attempts to bring close two things that will never be the same. The epi-
sodes of Pine Flat emerge as what we might call documents of memory, and
also fictions of reality. At the same time they also rhyme with the opposite of
such experience (as, in Lockhart’s work, oppositions always come undone). For
Pine Flat also embodies a collection of fictional memories and “realized” or
performed, documents. It testifies to an attempt literally to give shape to the
past – to reshape the past – as well as to allow its now-redeemed light to shine
quietly upon the present. It is an attunement of the one to the other. This attune-
ment of past and present joins all the other oppositions that structure Lockhart’s
work, the collaboration within her oeuvre of photography and film, document
and fiction, memory and imagination, artist and subject, self and other, viewer
and viewed. These oppositions are pairs, Lockhart shows us; and rather than
hold themselves apart, they call out to each other. Attunement becomes here
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the very modality of longing: it is the voyage home that never reaches its desti-
nation, the intimate approach that will never end.
Notes
. Lockhart, cited in Inés Katzenstein, “Sharon Lockhart, Ethnography Home,” Pine
Flat (Bilbao: Sala Rekalde, ), p. : “For this project, I wanted to look at some-
thing that felt very familiar to me. I immediately felt connected to the landscape and
the people of Pine Flat. It is very similar to the places I grew up.” It bears remarking
that it is unclear whether Pine Flat is the actual name of the place to which Lockhart
retreated, who, in other statements, has intimated that she will keep the site’s true
identity a secret.
. This opposition is particular to Disfarmer’s name as well, which was not his given
one (he was born Michael Meyers), and expressed an extreme dis-identification with
his rural Arkansas origins (which were also paradoxical, inasmuch as he was born
into a family of German immigrants). We may wonder if Lockhart was attracted to
Disfarmer’s not-widely-known work precisely because of this dis-identification
staged around the opposition between his rural subjects and industrial photogra-
phy – we may wonder, in other words, if Lockhart was attracted to this opposition
precisely because of a need to overcome it (as now, today, both are outmoded).
. Timothy Martin, “Documentary Theater,” Sharon Lockhart: Teatro Amazonas (Rotter-
dam: Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen, ), pp. -.
. The “Orphic” dimension of this turn away from the camera, which I am reading as a
turning “back” to the past, could be stressed. It is one of the founding metaphors of
Silverman’s forthcoming study of analogy, Flesh of My Flesh; see especially her chap-
ter “Orpheus Rex” and her study of similar poses in the chapter on Gerhard Richter,
“How to Paint History.”
. There is little “proof” that Lockhart sees her Untitled Study series as intimately con-
nected to the Pine Flat project; rarely seen or reproduced, as if they were in fact
“private,” the Untitled Study works are just as rarely discussed, and the artist has
not commented on any such relation. However, it is suggestive that the largest
grouping of the re-photographed snapshots that to my knowledge have ever been
reproduced appear at the back of the recent catalogue Sharon Lockhart: Pine Flat (Mi-
lan: Charta, ), along with the re-photographed commercial portraits of Lock-
hart herself, and a sampling of other early images like the Untitled works of 
and .
. Which I am obviously translating thus: to “pine” or to long for in the language of
the “flat,” the objective, the distanced.
. Allen also recorded all the sound for the film Pine Flat. Here is another form, we
might imagine, of attunement: the intense collaboration between two female artists,
one working in the realm of the visual, and the other in the realm of music. Attune-
ment, in other words, is also a way in which we can begin to understand Lockhart’s
constant impulse toward collaboration in all of her projects.
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. Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ). It is Mark Godfrey who has pursued
the analogy of Lockhart’s work with modernist painting most interestingly (and
with whom I am only partially disagreeing here), in his essay “The Flatness of Pine
Flat,” Pine Flat, pp. -.
. Francis Stark discusses this maternal metaphor, distinguishing Lockhart’s treatment
of childhood from an artist like Larry Clark, in “Not Church, Not School, Not
Home,” Sharon Lockhart: Pine Flat, pp. -.
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On O O: Moving Images and the New
Collectivity
Ina Blom
Part One: Cinema and Automatism Recontextualized
(Report on a Reversed Film Production Process)
I
Here is how the movie project named On Otto () starts: With a poster for a
film that is yet to be made, a film that no one, at this stage, knows if it is even
possible to make (Fig. ). No names (of actors, directors, producers) are men-
tioned. But like all movie posters, it takes film itself for granted, in fact, takes
the whole cinematic context or apparatus as absolutely self-evident. There is,
and will be, cinema: beyond individual productions, cinema is something akin
to a paradigm – a generative set of rules organizing the production of phenom-
ena at once scientific, perceptual, aesthetic, technological, economic and existen-
tial. There will be titles, music, editing, stage design, sound. Something will be
directed by, produced by, photographed by, acted by.
The poster advertises this certainty and spells it out in letters that visually
frame “the cinema” that they promise: A screening space, seen from the back of
the row of seats so that attention is directed towards the movie screen. On this
screen the enormous head of a film diva – apparently caught at the moment of
death – clings to the foreground of the screen-image: Due to the play of shadow
and light, a lock of her hair actually seems to have spilled over into spectator
space, as if to make contact. And the quest for contact is reciprocated. A boy, a
lone figure among otherwise empty seats, points a fish in the direction of the
screen, directly in the angle of the blonde coils of diva hair. Between the screen
and this spectator, a space of action is established: the poster, none too subtly,
marks this space with a red markered circle. Demarcating an “expanded” no-
tion of cinema, the poster for On Otto announces a cinematic production pro-
cess that will reformulate the place and status of so-called “moving images”.
Fig. . Tobias Rehberger, On Otto, poster, . Courtesy Fondazione Prada,
Milan
II
To reiterate: The poster was actually the point of departure for the movie project
named On Otto, whose final articulation – a city-like architectural construc-
tion, a labyrinthine cine-city of sorts – was first presented in Milan in .
And, if this project departed from the marketing devices that are normally seen
as final or supplementary elements of a movie production, it is because On
Otto was, in fact, a reversed production, an “impossible” or “illogical” project
that started with the design of the poster and ended with the writing of the
screenplay. In what follows, I will trace in some detail the production process of
On Otto – up to and including the highly particular screening situation it pre-
sents us with. But it has to be stated right away that in this project there is no
principled distinction between the production process and some final product
that might be called a finished film and that might subsequently be studied in
terms of a concept such as “reception”. The project is essentially a process of
production that is perhaps better understood as a specific process of construc-
tion. And what is constructed here is not a cinematic “work” in the ordinary
sense of the term, but more precisely a social world or an instance of sociality
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emerging in terms of specifically cinematic materials, agents and ways of doing.
To trace On Otto’s production process is then not just a way of grasping how
the features of an idiosyncratic work of art come together, but – more perti-
nently – to be able to understand this instance of cinematic sociality, i.e., the
social proposition launched by this project. Hence, the question of the role and
status of moving images in this project is also a question of their function in the
construction of this particular social world.
Tracing this production process, one rapidly comes face to face with one signifi-
cant fact concerning the role assigned to moving images – in their generalized
difference from still images. Usually, the difference between moving vs. still
images is approached in terms of the difference or intermingling of distinct
mediatic frameworks or technical support systems, such as film versus photo-
graphy or film versus painting. In contrast, On Otto departs from a displace-
ment and generalization of one key feature of moving images that is subse-
quently deployed in the construction of a complex urban environment and
associated with the operations of a social collective. In this project, the term
“movie” does not just connote images that move automatically – i.e., images
that are defined by an immanent capacity for movement that does not depend
on the mobilizing perception or imagination of the spectator. It is also, and just
as importantly, the name for a whole series of other automatic mobilizations or
automatisms that take their cue, so to speak, from the automatic movement as-
sociated with cinematic images. In film-related philosophy, an expanded con-
cept of automatism is primarily associated with Stanley Cavell’s open-ended
definition of artistic media: as Cavell saw it, such media are not given or defin-
able a priori, but forms that arise out of the material conditions of specific art
practices and that are unknowable prior to the creative act of artists. The con-
cept of automatism is here, so to speak, transposed from the notion of imma-
nent movement in and of a cinematographic image to a more generalized con-
cept of automatic creation well known in the history and theory of th-century
art – the materialist concept of a machinic instance that produces, moves for-
ward, all by itself, beyond the conscious control of any one artist, producer or
otherwise transcendent instance, and beyond the framework of a formal defini-
tion of media and media technologies. Experiments with automatic writing, ca-
davres exquises and various types of chance operations were then also figures for
collectivity at work in the here and now. It is this transposition that takes place
in On Otto, where the centrality of the question of automatism is indicated in
the title itself: Spoken aloud, On Otto sounds off as on auto, abbreviation for on
automatic. Starting with the poster that announces the series of cinematic com-
ponents, On Otto is a machine, a material assembly or agencement that pro-
duces automatically – in the sense that production moves ahead beyond the
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control, will or intention of any one director or producer.  It does so thanks to
its dramatic unleashing of the creative forces of a heterogeneous assembly of
cinematic agents: dedicated film professionals as well as the non-professionals
known as spectators, human agents as well as non-human agents.
These agents all belong to the sphere of ordinary film production: the audi-
ence, the promotional apparatus, the sound designer, the composer, the editor,
the cameraman, the actors, the costume designer, the set designer, the story-
board writer, the writer of the screenplay, the poster, the trailer, the sound, the
music, the images, the cuts, the costumes, the light, the locations, the set con-
structions, the drawings, the pages of writing, and the projection space. What is
less ordinary is how they are assembled, or put to work. For this production is
moving ahead thanks to the automatisms unleashed by a simple and absolute
rule. It is a rule as simple and absolute as the unshakeable logic of narration
which decrees that a film production start with a screenplay and then move
methodically through the different moments of production and post-produc-
tion, each moment working off and adding to and correcting the results of the
former, until the final projection of a luminous image of a certain duration takes
place – what is generally referred to as “a film”. On Otto’s rule reverses this
order. Everything starts from the “wrong” end, all the while sticking to the
same rigorous film industry methods, executed in each instance by the type of
Hollywood professionals one would have called on to do a normal movie. And
the viewing situation arising from this automatic process is not centered around
a single projection but on a complex architectural construction formed and in-
formed by a variety of cinematographic materials – a spatial articulation that
seems to inscribe itself in the discourses of expanded cinema or cinema without
film that has evolved in the context of avant-garde and new media art.
Here is how the inverted production took place, step by step. Based on their
personal interpretation of Rehberger’s poster, Kuntzel & Deygas, known among
other things for the cartoon title sequence in Spielberg’s Catch Me If You Can,
created a movie trailer – after which composer Ennio Morricone and sound ar-
tist Randy Thom (Forrest Gump) created a -minute sound and music mix.
This sound mix triggered the editing work of Sylvie Landra (Cat Woman, The
Fifth Element), which, in turn, spurred the cinematography of Wolfgang Tha-
ler (Megacities). Only now – after the cinematographer had done his job –were
the actors (Kim Basinger, Danny DeVito, Willem Dafoe, Justin Henry and
Emmy Rossum) called in. Next, Mark Bridges (Magnolia) designed costumes
and Jeffrey Beecroft ( Monkeys) created the production design, passing on
the torch to J. Todd Anderson (The Big Lebowsky, Fargo) who came up with
the storyboard. The production process ended as Barbara Turner (Pollock, The
Company) wrote the screenplay. At this point the German artist Tobias Rehber-
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ger – the person responsible for initiating the project – created an architectural
construction for the screening of this project.
The screenplay was, in other words, the last stage in the production. But –
given the lack of logical continuity in the sequence above (what is the point of
editing when no film has as yet been shot? how can actors “play” in advance of
costumes, stage sets and roles?) it could not be an end product in the sense that
a projected film is the unified artistic end product of a collaborative process that
starts with a script. But then one can, of course, question the concept of a unified
aesthetic product – “a film” – the way Joan Didion ridiculed the pretensions of
film critics who earnestly read auteurial will-to-art into every spot on the cellu-
loid. A finished movie really defies all attempts at analysis: as she put it, the
responsibility for its every frame is clouded not only in the accidents and com-
promises of production but in the clauses of it’s financing. And so, to the re-
viewers trying to understand “whose” movie it is by looking at the script, Di-
dion coolly suggests they take a look at the deal memo instead. Here, perhaps,
one could get a glimpse of the almost aesthetic excitement of the deal itself:
Many people have been talking these past few days about this aborted picture, al-
ways with a note of regret. It had been a very creative deal and they had run with it
as far as they could run and they had had some fun and now the fun was over, as it
also would have been had they made the picture.
What these observations reveal is not primarily the alleged cynicism of the film
industry. What they emphasize is the peculiar phenomenology of a cultural ob-
ject that is not so much based on collaborative effort as on the assembled effects
of a number of highly different crafts and aesthetic practices that are held to-
gether so to speak at financial gunpoint. A “movie” could then very well be
understood as a series of heterogeneous materialities and temporalities, each
producing to the beat of its own logic, its own set of ideal requirements. All it
takes for these materialities to come forth in their singularity is, basically, a dif-
ferent organization of the material: in this case, a reversal of the production
sequence
III
To see how these different cinematic materialities become self-producing enti-
ties, it is necessary to trace the different steps in the production process in some
more detail. Imagine, for instance, design team Kuntzel & Deygas having to
make a trailer from little more than whatever may be conjured up by the film
title (On Otto). Sticking to what they know best, that is, to shape, outline, de-
sign, they focus all attention on the graphic outlines of the letters in the title,
making the basic circles and crosses of the o’s and t’s into a tic-tac-toe game, but
On On Otto: Moving Images and the New Collectivity 141
a tic-tac-toe game made out of bones, with sinister white shapes standing out
against a black background. A suspense theme is evoked – but above all, the
trailer demonstrates the independent power of the visual “theme”, the purely
atmospheric power of design.
Imagine, next, Randy Thom creating the sound for the yet-to-be-made film –
a -minute soundscape subsequently enriched by a small catalogue of orches-
tra and choir themes composed by Ennio Morricone for what would appear to
be a modern non-comedy movie of some style and gravity. Thom happens to be
an experienced sound designer who has frequently complained about the lack
of interest in the narrative potential of sound on the part of scriptwriters and
directors. Rather than being used to direct attention, activate memory and focus
action, sound work is essentially done only in retrospect, as a way of filling out
the picture, patching it up and smoothing it out into a seamless whole. Now,
Thom could orchestrate a full vindication of the injustices suffered by sound: A
feature length soundscape without film. A soundscape composed, more pre-
cisely, in terms of a purely aural evocation of cinematic locations and action –
the hollows of great halls, the packed dust-sound of the private apartment, the
subdued din of the outdoors – and the multiple smaller sounds that that mod-
ulate and shape them into action-spaces. There are the generic cars passing on
wet asphalt, showers splashing on bodies, stiletto-heeled footsteps and keys
turning in locks, but also the growling of unknown machinery, vague crowds,
indefinite animal life. In all events, cinematic sound here appears as an indepen-
dent entity, only hinting at the many possible but essentially interchangeable
images that would so to speak feed off it.
A similar logic of independence informs the separate contributions from the
editor and cinematographer as well. Having as yet no specific footage to work
with, Sylvie allowed editing to emerge as an entirely autonomous activity, i.e.,
as a way of imposing a certain “personal” sense of rhythm on a material that is
now above all a function of this rhythm. To foreground this sense of rhythm,
Landra cut together short sequences from hundreds of films, some familiar,
others not, some cleverly arranged to go with Thom’s soundscape and others
haphazard-seeming, with passages even shown upside down. Once the rhythm
of the edit took center stage, the imagery became supplementary, mainly indi-
cating the vast and seemingly anonymous stock of footage passing through the
hands of an editor,
In contrast, Thaler’s cinematography played up the weight and specificity of
photographic imagery, foregrounding a camera that seemed to soak up the
world as one grandiose photographic vista after another. With long footage
edits from his own personal archive, his camera seemed to seamlessly pass
over continents, seasons, cities, faces and genres, as if an issue of National Geo-
graphic was slowly brought to life. Here, Thom’s soundscape seemed to mainly
142 Ina Blom
function as a non-specific backdrop to the image sequences; if it was fore-
grounded it was mainly to draw attention to the very activity of photographic
recording. At one point, an abstract whirling sound is interpreted by Thaler as
the spinning reel of a small handheld film projector used in an Indian street
context. When, a few minutes later, the same whirling sound reemerges as the
backdrop to a desert landscape, we recall the Indian street scene and reread the
lush desert images as the actual film material spinning in the tiny projector.
Sound may serve narration – but, in this case, the narrative is that of cinemato-
graphy itself, its technical and material reality and contexts of use and abuse.
At this stage in the production process it becomes abundantly clear to all in-
volved that no one film will ever come out of this project. The poster will not
generate film in the singular. There will be multiple costumes made for scenes
that as yet do not exist and perhaps never will. There will be production design
for potential spaces hidden within incompatible layers of footage and elusive
sound signals. The possible strategic choices of storyboard and script are end-
less. The cinematic assembly or agencement is at every twist and turn present,
yet On Otto awakens you to the fact that such an assembly is not the composite
or sum of the elements that compose it: it is above all a mobile distribution of
materials.
But even with this distributive assembly of cinematographic materials, actors
are still called in to do their job. The job of an actor is notably to embody, to give
life and soul to a character as yet existing only on paper. They are points of
identification and in most cases also focalizers in the visual narrative. In this
case, however, there are as yet no specific characters to embody, nobody in par-
ticular to “play”. Instead the actors seem to give life to the media relation out-
lined in the poster that started off the automatisms of On Otto. The screen im-
age of the dying blonde shown on the poster is taken from one of the final
scenes of Orson Welles’s  film noir classic, The Lady from Shanghai. The
five actors; Basinger, Dafoe, De Vito, Henry and Rossum, are simply filmed by a
still camera, one by one and close up, as they watch Welles’movie from begin-
ning to end in a cinema space, the screen action reflected in the expressions of
their faces. Five singular feature-length movies result from this, as singular as
the facial expressions of each actor.
It is a curiously intimate form of presentation. To see the iconic face of Kim
Basinger balancing for  solid minutes between acting and just being, between
“giving” absorption and just falling in and out of it like any normal viewer, is to
observe an entirely new form of cinematic “life” coming into existence (Fig. ).
This notion of cinematic life had already been apprehended by the movie pos-
ter, which repeats a trope from early video art. The image of a zone of contact
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between the screen and a fish (held out by the young spectator) recalls the asso-
ciations between signaletic and biological life that were continually staged in
the ’s work of video pioneer Nam June Paik: Aquariums containing live
fish were built in front of TV screens or TV apparatuses were constructed as
aquariums that allowed you to see the fish through the screen. These construc-
tions played off the fact that images of aquarium fish were used by many TV
channels to fill the pauses between programs, as if to indicate that the channel
was still, and in fact always had been, “alive”. Paik seemed to suggest that the
“live” emissions of TV, its real-time feed of signals, were not primarily a presen-
tational form, but a token of the deep complicity between the new time-based
media technologies and life processes in general. 
Fig. . Tobias Rehberger, On Otto, film still (Kim Basinger watching The Lady
from Shanghai), . Courtesy Fondazione Prada, Milan
In On Otto, the positing of this new form of cinematic life depends on the dis-
tribution or refraction of the singular moving-image object named film, taking
its cue from the way in which the filmic image itself is refracted in the famous
hall of mirrors climax scene in The Lady From Shanghai. In this innovative
scene, bodies and perspectives are serialized and multiplied in a way that is
reminiscent of the early image experiments of video art. The stage for a final
shootout, the hall of mirror and its effects makes it impossible to determine
whether the bullets hit images or persons. As a consequence, we never know if
any of the characters actually die: as the film concludes, the dead-looking
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blonde (Rita Hayworth) lifts her head and cries: “I want to live!” Psychoanalytic
theory uses the concept of the mirror to explain the process of identification –
the individual discovery of (and adaptation to) a stable and ideal world-image
that includes your own self. The apparatus theory of film has, for its part, has
long referred to this psychoanalytic model in order to explain film’s identifica-
tory grip on us, and hence its unique force as an instrument of ideology. On
Otto is a cinematographic project where the mirror image of the unitary projec-
tion is not just “broken”, reflecting wildly and senselessly in every direction, but
where the very idea of mirroring (and the whole associated semiotics of mes-
sages, codes, ideological meaning) is brought up only to be dismantled. A dif-
ferent model is needed to explain the way in which this project evokes the ex-
istential reality of moving images and the politics that may be associated with
their force and appeal. Henri Bergson’s refutation of the (at once) realist and
idealist distinction between matter and representation, perception and reality
may have some relevance here. Watching Kim Basinger, media icon and living
person, pure image and “real” material body, at once watching and acting her
own watching of the image of Rita Hayworth (for  minutes), in many ways
recalls Bergson’s notion of our bodies as “images that act like other images, re-
ceiving and giving back movement”: in relation to a material world defined as a
flow of images, the human body and its perceptual apparatus is above all a
center of action, an object destined to move other objects and not the sort of
apparatus that, in the act of seeing, gives birth to a representation. Having as-
serted the general existence of cinematic images, the poster explicitly hints at
this problematic: in the lower right corner you find the legend reality strikes
back, like an additional title. If the actors in On Otto are focalizers, they might
then be seen as focalizers for this explicit shift towards an emphasis on image-
bodes in action, enjoining us trace its wider ramifications for a conception of a
world at once real and cinematic
Part Two: Automatism, Architecture and Collectivity
I
Every film is a society. It is a society in the sense that it is a complex collective
production, the result of negotiations and collaborations between multiple per-
sons, techniques, ideas, institutions and competences. However, by overturning
the mechanistic principle of normal film production – the principle whereby
each step in the production process (each application of knowledge and creativ-
ity) is potentially contained in the preceding one – On Otto raises the question
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of the relation between cinema and collectivity to a principle. The real product
of this work is then a specific collective formation – and not “film itself”. And
the most immediately available figure for this collectivity is an architectural ex-
pression – the city-like construction that both houses and is shaped by the mul-
tiplicity of cinematic materials let loose in this project (Figs. , , ). In this city,
passageways and avenues lead you in and out of labyrinthine constructions
where sounds, moving images, design proposals, drawings, texts and audi-
ences intermingle and overlay in numerous different ways and from a variety
of angles and perspectives – depending on the movements of the spectators that
visit the city or the cinematic personae or points of view that already inhabit it.
This spatial organization radicalizes the familiar notion that film is always edi-
ted in three dimensions: its effects are played out in a dialectical operation
where image, sound and the perceptual apparatus of the spectator confront one
another. But even more pertinently, the architecture redefines spectatorial
agency itself. In this city, cinematic materials are not just seen and heard by a
specific class of human subjects named “spectators”. Made up of percepts and
affects, images and sounds are themselves quite literally posited as seeing and
hearing, reacting and responding to other images and sounds. It is the architec-
tural construction that allows this to happen, by, among other things, using pro-
jection screens as constructive elements (so that the image can be accessed from
both sides) and by using sounds as territorial markers in a way that makes each
146 Ina Blom
On On Otto: Moving Images and the New Collectivity 147
Figs. -. Tobias Rehberger, On Otto. Installation shots, Fondazione Prada, Milan
. Courtesy Fondazione Prada, Milan. Photo: Wolfgang Günzel
aural territory confront and blend with others. The subtle articulation of insides
and outsides, transparencies and reflections, open trajectories and closed cir-
cuits gives each image, text and sound element multiple extensions or modes of
existence depending on their actual interaction with other elements. A decid-
edly modern city (reminiscent perhaps of the spatial complexity articulated in
the city paintings of Picasso and Braque) everything is at once seen and seeing,
heard and hearing.
II
Yet, the key question is of course how this specific cinematic articulation of col-
lectivity is to be understood. An interesting perspective on cinema’s collective
dimensions arises from the ambiguities of the term Aufnahme as it is used in
Walter Benjamin’s essay on the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduc-
tion. Signifying at once reception and recording, it points not only to the collective
mode of reception associated with the mass reproduction and distribution of
media objects. As Samuel Weber has pointed out, Benjamin also saw the repro-
ductive inscription that takes place in a film production as a specific form of
recording proper to the mass itself. The mass should in fact be identified with
recording and not just with reception: it should be understood as that which
“takes up” or repeats the shock events in which the contemplative unity of time
and place (the auratic moment) associated with great works of art is scattered or
multiplied. In fact, this new notion of the mass character of recording opens up
for a radical redefinition of aura: with cinema, focus shifts from the question of
the unique identity of auratic objects to the question of the temporality of the
unique presence implied by the concept of aura. It makes no sense, then, to
speak of the mass in numerical terms, as a simple multiplication of contempla-
tive subjects accessing reproduced media content: the concept of mass recording
means that the mass must be defined in temporal terms, as a simultaneous re-
petition and dispersal of presence. And it is in these terms that the new record-
ing technologies – the cinematographic apparatus of production – may be seen
as staging an encounter of the mass with itself, giving the amorphous mass not an
image or a representation of itself, but the semblance of a face, a purely virtual
face vested less in the idea of collective identification than in the project of col-
lective becoming.
This analysis may seem pertinent in relation to On Otto – a production that
not only highlights the collective aspect of the cinematic recording apparatus,
but that also seems to associate this collective with the ineluctable automatisms
of recording. On a purely technical level modern recording technologies are
noted for the way in which supposedly intentional artistic processes (the
thoughtful and controlled placing of paint on a canvas or words on a page) are
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overruled by a machine that “takes up” everything and anything, significant
and insignificant, all by itself. Such automatism could also be seen to apply at
the wider level of the cinematic apparatus: Individual decisions are “carried
off” in a collective process that moves ahead with a force that gathers its own
momentum and that can never be traced back to one singular artistic will or
origin. In ordinary film production, this collective may have to face itself in the
deal memo; in On Otto the cinematic collective is explicitly presented as that
which records. Furthermore, this collective is defined through an equally explicit
scattering of the very moment of contemplation: To walk around Rehberger’s
cinematic city, continually gathering and redistributing its huge array of cin-
ematic “moments” in a process that is perhaps best described as a perpetually
ongoing “spectator’s cut”, is quite literally to encounter a collective defined in
temporal terms.
However, the architectural articulation of this collective adds another, and
slightly different, dimension to the notion of a collective defined in temporal
terms. Benjamin’s concept of mass recording and its relation to the distribution
of (shock) events are among the features that define cinema and its moving
images as a time medium – i.e., a medium that produces and processes not
images or representations but time itself. Cinematic time here is the critical or
even revolutionary instance that systematically interrupts any mere representa-
tion of the historical past and its “given” collective identities: instead, historical
time is re-activated as event-time. But the collective dimensions of cinema’s time
processing capacities may also be qualified along a different explanatory axis.
To the extent that it is the human perceptual and cognitive apparatus that pro-
duces or “gives” any notion of time, film and other time media seem to operate
in a special proximity to (or interaction with) human memory. According to
Maurizio Lazzarato, these technologies mime the operations of thinking and
memory, albeit in a very rudimentary way: their free contraction and distribu-
tion of temporal material resembles Henri Bergson’s description of the memory
as an ability to process past and future material within a continually unfolding
now-time. And it is precisely through this capacity that these technologies has
become the key social machines for a form of production that no longer draws
value only from activity in the workplace but from all aspects of our lives –
through our “free time” down to the level of the affects and sensibilities that
characterize our cognitive activity.  Hence, the temporally defined collective
may perhaps also be described in terms that evoke brain functions, the mental
operations at work in sensation, perception, and memory. This proposition may,
at the very least, be explored with reference to the highly specific association
between architecture and film that On Otto sets up.
The association between architecture and film is not in itself new: in fact, film
has been compared to architecture since its invention due to how it seems to
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mobilize both spatial and temporal modes of reception. First of all, stage sets
and locations are vital parts of any film – at times they may even function as
the protagonist or subject matter of the film itself. Second, it is generally recog-
nized that film is not just a visual but also a spatial practice, in the sense that
one has to take into consideration the cinema space itself and the phenomenolo-
gical relation between the film and the spectator’s body. Third, cinema has
played a key role in the modern spectacularization of space – the formatting of
complex geographical and geopolitical sites into the homogenized “locations”
of the tourist industries, the kind of places that can be marketed for their un-
tarnished “pastness” and quasi-ritualistic resistance to change. Fourth, there
seems to be a structural relation between architecture and film based on the fact
that both art forms are intimately related to the big state and capital institutions
and in fact depend on the interest of these institutions for their existence. And,
finally, it has been argued that film and architecture are structurally similar in
the sense that both are received by a collectivity in a mode of distraction – re-
ceived that is, in an incidental, absent-minded way, reminiscent of the attitude
of a person drifting through a city and unlike the alert and contemplative vision
associated with the viewing of paintings or sculpture. This was, at least, Walter
Benjamin’s perspective, which was no doubt informed by the non-organic com-
positions of the early cinema of attractions rather than the later narrative films
of the Hollywood traditions. According to Joan Ockham, this concept of dis-
traction is the structuring principle of Jacques Tati’s Playtime, where the hyp-
notic glass spaces of international-style architecture emerge as the film’s real
protagonist as well as a visual metaphor for the luminous and “transparent”
screens of film itself.
This last emphasis on a mode of reception shared by architecture and film dif-
fers in significant ways from the specific association between architecture and
film established in On Otto: the question here is a form of production invol-
ving the “work” of the human brain. A first cue to the logic on which this asso-
ciation is based can be found in the one-man cinema Tobias Rehberger built at
Stockholm’s Museum of Modern Art in  – a construction that was initially
conceived as the actual starting point of the On Otto production. It was a
superbly stylish piece of architecture, made in the type of slick s style that
evokes all of those expansive corporate environments endlessly caressed by mo-
vie cameras: In this way, it mimicked the design logic of the early cinema thea-
tres, which were made to look like veritable palaces of cinematic fantasy, as if
the movie had already started in the lobby. In fact, this cinema space seemed to
have been conceived as the kind of construction that emerges when the image is
no longer a representation existing at a certain distance from the viewing sub-
ject. The space was, quite literally, articulated as the second skin of a body
placed so close to the screen as to be completely immersed in the moving image.
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At this point, there is no longer a principled difference between perception and
reality, images in space and images in consciousness: they belong to the same
continuum. The one-man cinema seemed to illustrate Hugo Münsterberg’s 
theory on the mechanisms of close-up that allow cinema to capture attention
like no other time-based medium because the close-up objectifies, in our world
of perception, our mental act of attention. When attention focuses on a special
feature, the surrounding world adjusts itself, eliminating what is not in focus
and making the object of attention more vivid. The spatial effect of cinema, giv-
en actual form in the Stockholm cinema, is that of an outer world, so to speak,
woven into our minds, shaped not just by its own laws but also by our acts of
attention.
It seemed only logical that this extended cinematic body could itself be the
object of spectatorship. Through tiny windows in the walls, outside viewers
could inspect this specimen of mediatic life, a uniquely modern creature. But
the Stockholm cinema was just a preliminary test case or point of departure:
Rehberger’s more fundamental idea was that an actual movie project should be
developed based on the existential vectors of his one-man cinema – that is, on
its peculiar infiltration of image, perceptual apparatus and spatial construc-
tion. And this is exactly what takes place in On Otto, where Kim Basinger,
Willem Dafoe, Emmy Rossum, Danny DeVito and Justin Henry are each being
watched as specimens of mediatic life. At once actors, spectators and screens,
The Lady from Shanghai is here as if projected through their facial expres-
sions – the automatic reactions – of bodies that are themselves already cinematic
through and through. And the perceptual responses of these already-cinematic
bodies are presented as the actual constructive elements of an architecture that
should now be understood as being made up not just of building materials in
the ordinary sense of the terms but – more pertinently – of “live” sensations,
perceptions and cognitions. As Deleuze has pointed out, Sergei Eisenstein was
interested in the capacity of cinematographic materials to directly engage the
central nervous system, to deliver a sensorial shock that would provoke not just
thinking in general but more precisely a self-reflexive “I think!”: in this way a
cinematographic “subject” of sorts would come into being. Jean-Clet Martin
seems to describe the spatial operations of this subject when he compares the
non-distinction of reality and image in terms of a body’s movement in a city: A
city, which is obviously a definite and materially invariant site, enters into a
variation and virtualization through the points of view of the bodies that act on
it – bodies that in the moment of acting process the city through all sorts of
memory materials, so that the extensive “trajectivity” of perception is redoubled
by the intensive “trajectivity” of memories. Beyond the image/reality distinc-
tion, reality itself turns out to have several dimensions: it is constituted through
the sharp point of a gaze that cuts through matter and also through a virtual,
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cumulative gaze that connects the elements “cut out” by perception along the
lines of its own perspective. Above all, “the city” in On Otto presents itself as
a space continually formed by the work of perception, memory and thinking –
an approach that differs radically from the traditional architectural focus on
“built form”.
Still it is difficult to neglect the heavily stylized dimension of Rehberger’s
cine-city, its unabashed evocation of all sorts of contemporary design trends
and sensibilities. Built form may not be the end product here, but the effects of
architectural “style” will still have to be accounted for. In fact, the specificity of
its association between architecture and cinema seems to hinge on the fact that
design styles are so to speak identified with the cinematographic capacity to
trigger thinking. This dynamic can perhaps be explored more fully with refer-
ence to the many contemporary artworks (by Rehberger, among others) that
initially come across as prototypes for elegant and trendy design solutions. But
a closer look reveals that almost every single one of these designs are actually
time machines, in the sense that they are fundamentally formed and informed
by informational materials and production principles. There are, for instance,
the many colorful and original “design” lamps that are also tele-visual in the
most literal sense of the term, since they are connected to computer programs
that make them at each moment transmit – in real-time – the quantity of day-
light at some other time and place, for instance in a city on a different continent.
Design is here not a value in itself, but a sensorial material or memory material
that evokes the reality of design as a key site of self-relation or subjective be-
coming. These “design” works then seem to trace a real if rarely discussed
complicity between contemporary information technologies and the current
overvaluation of design, a connection that makes it possible to think the precise
way in which we “live” the media surround of the contemporary time ma-
chines. The activation of memory and affects in the processes of self-styling is
just an aspect of the thinking operations that animate and are animated by the
time crystallization machines –machines whose only real product is subjectivity
itself. From this perspective, the sensory and cognitive apparatus of individuals
are seen as intrinsic parts of the media apparatuses, part of the synapses or
relays through which affective energy is accumulated and value created. Re-
hberger’s cinematographic city may well look like the quintessential media
playground or leisure palace – founded as it is on the manifold activation of
perceptions, memories, affects and tastes. But by the same token it emerges as a
place of production, a place where affective bodies are also working bodies. In
brief, the specific association between architecture and cinema that is set up
here seems to turn around the conditions of inhabitation and collective exis-
tence in a media society where the mind itself is put to work, or engaged in
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productive labor in the most concrete sense of the term and in an historically
unprecedented way.
III
What is the collective spatial expression of minds put to work, engaged in a
form of labor that exploits not work time in the traditional sense of the term but
the all-encompassing time of memory and thinking? The term “labor”, of
course, evokes its own architectural landscape: the great th-century factory
buildings, designed for efficiency, standardization and overview, quasi-palatial
monuments that gave a new form of visibility and definition to the borderline
areas between the countryside and the city. And, by extension, the development
of huge landscapes of standardized worker housing projects, extending both
horizontally and vertically and articulating (by their rational modular forms)
the definition and management of the minimum needs of laboring bodies. By
contrast, theme parks, tourist destinations, “sculptural” museum buildings,
TV-studios, real estate development projects, computer game environments
and the ubiquitous presence of everyday stylistics form a heterogeneous set of
spatial articulations whose representative functions remain obscure. Yet, if the
collective of cognitive workers may not consider their reality to be mired in a
definite architectural form, it can, at the very least, have recourse to an architec-
tural parable. This parable is a work of pure imagination – one produced at the
peak of Western industrialization but with a strong intuition for the transforma-
tions about to take place within this mode of production. This parable has been
recycled in recent years in precisely those artistic milieus most intensely preoc-
cupied with constructing a new association between design, architecture and
media technologies. In fact, it has not just been recycled but updated, tweaked
and polished so that it could function better as a guide to the contemporary
condition. In the years between  and , the eminent Italian sociologist
Gabriel Tarde wrote a short novel, an exercise in utopian imagination that –
like so many of the literary works produced by social scientists – was basically
the fictionalized expression of his own social theories. A new global society – a
world where every corner of the earth is discovered and exploited, a society of
unheard of riches where all sorts of aesthetic productions take pride of place
over the mere satisfaction of needs – is confronted with catastrophe: The sun is
suddenly extinguished. Once it no longer shines its light on the territorial ex-
panses of the earth, life on the planet’s surface becomes impossible and most
people end up dying. However, a small population survives by escaping under-
ground, carving out spaces in the deeper geological layers heated by the earth’s
burning core. Gradually a new society arises, but its mode of existence chal-
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lenges the very premises of social explanation established by the economists
and sociologists of the aboveground world.
This new mode of social existence is closely associated with the conditions of
inhabitation determined by underground life. Once you go underground, terri-
tories can no longer be surveyed, monumental building forms can no longer
exist, and axial construction and the hierarchical subdivision of space into cen-
ter-periphery relations no longer make sense. Underground, you are always in
the middle of things, in the same way that your mind is always in the middle of
its own now-time. Wherever you find yourself in the expanding network of
caves is always the centre: a society organized in terms of the extensive forms of
aboveground architecture has been supplanted by an intensive mode of exis-
tence whose organizational principle is that of force rather than form. This con-
cept of intensive existence was in fact key to a social theory that challenged the
transcendental status given to the concepts of value, scarcity and need in usual
economic accounts of human collaboration. For Tarde, any description of soci-
ality should take as its point of departure the question of sharing sensations,
perception, attention and memory rather than the question of how the means of
subsistence are shared. The traditional deduction of the former from the latter
would, in other words, have to be overturned. Society or collectivity should
perhaps be described as a brain-like network of synaptic relays where human
collectivity is first of all accounted for in terms of the “intensive” operations of
mental forces such as desire, belief, sympathy and the capacity for imitation and
differentiation.
Certain Sophists, who were called economists and who were to our sociologists of
today what the alchemists were to the modern chemists, had noted the error that
society essentially consists of an exchange of services. From this point of view, which
is quite out of date, the social bond could never be closer than that between the ass
and ass-driver or the sheep and the shepherd. Society, as we now know, consists in
the exchange of reflections. The tendency to copy one another accumulates and is
combined to create a sense of originality. Reciprocal service is only an accessory.
In the underground caves, the enormous surcharge of intellectual and aesthetic
exchanges that was already a key feature of the pre-catastrophic aboveground
world, found an architectural expression adequate to their central role in the
definition of human society itself. In this parable, architecture is tantamount to
social philosophy: if Tarde’s text describes an architecture turned inside out, it is
because it indicates a social ontology turned inside out. In a similar way, Tobias
Rehberger’s radical displacement of the moving image also contributes to an
overturning of the principles of architecture that triggers the very question of
how collectivity should be defined. In fact, the underground spaces that express
the intensive exchange of reflections sound uncannily similar to the cavernous
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and labyrinthine cine-city created by Rehberger. Where Tarde describes “the
most incredible and endless galleries of art”, magical palaces lit by “countless
lamps, some incredibly bright, others soft” glowing constantly “through the
blue depths”, Rehberger constructs spaces where insides and outsides are no
longer sharply defined thanks to the omnipresence of all sorts of luminous mov-
ing image materials that reflect off one another and also function as sources of
light. Both present us with an architecture defined by the activation of percep-
tion and intellect, rather than the spatial “functions” derived from a life divided
between labor and repose. Using cinema and its moving images as a cipher for
what has often been referred to as a dubious “aestheticization” of politics, the
public sphere, or life in general, On Otto momentarily overturns the logic of
cinematic production as if to suggest how such aestheticization might point to-
wards a new definition of the common (rather than being seen as a “problem”
for politics per se.). In this project, moving images do not contribute to a fin-
ished aesthetic monument of the kind that will compete (at the Oscars, in
Cannes) for visibility and representational value. And neither can they be asso-
ciated with the much-deplored “spectacle” that bars access to material reality
and history. Rethought as a different kind of architecture, the big movie pro-
duction here attests to the existence of a live brain network, ready to be con-
nected with anything and anyone.
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Mutable Temporality In and Beyond the
Music Video: An Aesthetic of Post-
Production
Arild Fetveit
For the last twenty years, neither matter nor space nor time has been what it
was…. We must expect great innovations to transform the entire technique
of the arts, thereby affecting artistic invention itself and perhaps even
bringing about an amazing change in our very notion of art. (Paul Valery)
…first we had the industry of the moving image, today we have the indus-
try of the accelerated image. (Gene Youngblood)
…the body of the speaker dances in time with
his speech….the body of the listener dances in rhythm with that of the
speaker! (W.S. Condon and W.D. Ogston)
We listen to music with our muscles. (Friedrich Nietzsche)
Paul Valery’s words about innovations transforming the entire technique of the
arts, quoted by Walter Benjamin in the opening of his essay, “The Work of Art
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” still resonate today. We are also in a
time when we must take stock of sizable changes in artistic production, in part
inspired by technological innovation. Today, the technological innovations
which may be “affecting artistic invention” and perhaps even bringing about a
“change in our very notion of art,” are not the apparatuses of mechanical repro-
duction that reformed artistic production in the days of Valery and Benjamin –
predominantly photography and film – but the computer and its operational
logic, which keeps penetrating and reforming the spheres of cultural produc-
tion.
The aspect of such changes that I specifically want to address here is a mutable
temporality, especially prominent in music videos, which appears to be a new
aesthetic of post-production. It is associated with a greater change in which crea-
tive performances in audiovisual works seem to be increasingly relocated, from
the site of the profilmic scene where actors, set designers and dancers display
their craft, to the site of post-production, where new kinds of computer-en-
hanced creative performances take place, and where an emergent algorithmic
culture becomes increasingly prevalent. The tendency is not only to “fix it in
the mix” or in the editing suite, but to develop “the mix” or editing suite into
the key arena for creative performance. It is when such changes seem to mani-
fest themselves aesthetically in deliberate and particular ways that it becomes
reasonable to talk of an aesthetic of post-production.
By addressing it as “an aesthetic,” I aim to do two things. First, I aim to loca-
lize it at the level of aesthetic practice, akin to a poetics, which reaches beyond
the actual means and techniques of production that are utilized, and is therefore
not simply congruent with the works where certain technologies and means of
post-production are used. Second, the emergence of this aesthetic is fundamen-
tally imbricated with the technological developments afforded by the surge of
new code written for cultural production in the aural and visual realms. These
technological developments support various aesthetics of postproduction that
are interconnected, yet different. An aesthetic of sampling, as well as a related
aesthetic of remixing – reinvigorating older practices like collage, montage and
appropriation – have been addressed. Others might also be identified, or are
yet to emerge. Thus the various aesthetics of post-production take a number of
shapes across multiple fields.
In the field of art, the French critic and curator Nicolas Bourriaud intervened
in  with an inclusive notion of post-production. He argued that the prac-
tices associated with post-production processes in audiovisual media – that is,
the taking and combining of elements that are already there rather than the
creation of something from the scratch – had become the new modus operandi in
the art world. He asserts that, “Notions of originality (being at the origin of) and
even of creation (making something from nothing) are slowly blurred in this
new cultural landscape marked by the twin figures of the DJ and the program-
mer, both of whom have the task of selecting cultural objects and inserting them
into new contexts.” This logic of creation –mirroring both the DJ and the modus
operandi of the computer itself – is vital both for the specific aesthetic addressed
here and for understanding the wider reach of the aesthetics of post-production,
and its fallout in the art world in particular. Bourriaud also points to a wider
cultural sensibility within which the aesthetics of post-production are lodged.
However, this article, as indicated in its title, aims first and foremost to interro-
gate a limited aspect of this field, what I am calling mutable temporality, which
enriches the field between the realms of still and moving images, as well as the
dynamism of moving images as they render music “visible.”
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Thus, what has triggered my interest is a fascination with the mutable tempo-
rality – not to mention the spatiality – which appears as a new aesthetic of post-
production. In the last decade, a new temporal dynamism has expanded and
vitalized the playing field between the realms of still and moving images, with
a key feature being the dynamic speed control of various sorts. A privileged
playground for such forms has been the music video, like Jonathan Glazer’s
video for the Radiohead song, Street Spirit (), Chris Cunningham’s video
for the Portishead song, Only You (), as well as his independent video pro-
ject, Rubber Johnny (), Max Giwa and Dania Pasquini’s video for Craig
David’s song, The Rise and Fall (), some of Michel Gondry’s videos, and
videos by contemporary music video directors like Francis Lawrence and Dave
Meyers. In these, and in many other contemporary music videos, we may find
more or less prominent examples where the initial temporality of body move-
ments as performed for the camera are partly overruled and controlled in the
post-production process. The cinematic mechanism of automated reproduction,
guaranteeing a temporal correspondence between the profilmic movements and
the movements we eventually see on screen, grounds what we may call ordinary
audiovisual discourse. In music videos like the ones mentioned above, this corre-
spondence is suspended by a performative temporality staged in post-produc-
tion, producing the mutable temporality explored in the following. What forms
does this aesthetic take, what does it offer, and how can it be historicized? These
are the main questions informing this article.
Hans Richter and Film as Rhythm
When considering the peculiar connection between music and image mani-
fested in recent videos like Cunningham’s Only You, which excels in visual
rhythmicity, it seems appropriate to revisit the German Dadaist Hans Richter.
As an artist taking up the new medium of film, which a number of avant-garde
artists of his period did, Richter formed part of the sweeping changes in artistic
production addressed by Valery and Benjamin, most prominently in the s
and s. In a  article, Richter claimed film to be rhythm, and explained
how he sought the development of a common language for expressing human
emotion through the temporal movement of abstract forms:
The emotional world, as well as the intellectual, has laws governing its expression….
Just as the path of the intellectual formulating power leads to thought, as a justifying
moment of intellectual activity, so the emotional formulating power leads to rhythm
as the essence of emotional expression.
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As we shall see, Richter’s envisioning of rhythm as the essence of emotional
expression seems perfectly attuned to the temporal sensibility by which Cun-
ningham conducts his images to the music. This should not entirely surprise us.
If we see our present audio-visual culture as one in which mutable temporalities
have some prominence, and note the growing preoccupation with thinking
about time and cinema as well as the realm between still and moving images,
these characteristics also define the era of the early film experiments of Richter
and other avant-garde filmmakers of the s. Tom Gunning has commented
on how a cinema of attraction is present both in early film and in contemporary
production – how “the two ends of the Twentieth Century hail each other like
long lost twins.” The historical ramifications of the avant-garde artists’ work
with a cinema of mutable temporality is beyond the scope of this article. But the
following comment from Richter, which harks back to Valery’s concern in the
opening quote, and speaks to how we should conceive of the relation between
technological and aesthetic invention, may help us to understand not only the
interest in mutable temporality in early cinema, but also its demise. When de-
scribing his making of the short fine art film Rhythm , in the early s,
Richter explains, “I did my shooting partly on an animation table, partly in the
printing machine by stop motion and forward and backward printing. The
printing machines at that time were not fully automatic….” This absence of a
fully automated reproduction process –which also applied to the hand-cranked
cameras used in early film production – provided a technological grounding for
an audiovisual culture of mutable temporalities. There are indications that the
culture of mutable temporality in early film ran dry with the automatization of
speed required by the lip-synch based sound cinema emerging in the s.
Temporal irregularities were deeply problematic for the sound, which, contrary
to the image, becomes variable not only in terms of speed but also in terms of
pitch. Of course, shifting temporalities still had an important afterlife in main-
stream cinema though slow motion – in sequences that do not involve synchro-
nized sound and lip-synch – and in experimental cinema through a series of
more disruptive practices.
“Time Warp” Software
In current practices involving an aesthetic of mutable temporality, the pitch of
the sound no longer needs to be affected. Digital technologies may compensate
by keeping the pitch at the same level in spite of variations in the speed. In fact,
a brief look at the contemporary technical support for an aesthetic of mutable
temporality quickly displays a host of technologies for producing what is often
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referred to as a “time warp” effect. A few years ago, tailor made software made
its spectacular time warp effects a selling point. Avid sold “Liquid Pro ,” by
claiming to offer the creation of “fast motion and slow motion effects in real-
time,” which makes it “much easier to try various speed changes to find the
perfect matching speed.” Algolith’s “Time Warp plug-ins” claimed to provide
similar features, and Real Viz’s “ReTimer Professional” claimed to let one “con-
trol time for astonishing slow motion or fast motion effects…giving...ultimate
flexibility during post-production.” Interestingly, these powerful “time warp”
capabilities seem now to have taken a back seat as selling points in the market-
ing of post-production software, which indicates that such affordances are in-
creasingly taken for granted as part of new and upgraded post-production
suits.
The developments in software production invite a new look into how, more
precisely, innovation in cultural production takes place. Innovation now, it ap-
pears, takes place as much in specially-designed software as in particular art
works. A new algorithm may be created for achieving an effect in a film, for
example, and outputs from such an algorithm are readily exportable to other
projects, either through the original software produced, or through other soft-
ware producers’ attempts to emulate the effects. The stunning mutable tempo-
rality of the “bullet time” effect in the Matrix trilogy provided a groundbreak-
ing achievement that echoed through audiovisual culture in a number of more
or less convincing imitations. The imminent and almost viral spread of this aes-
thetic was soon supported by specialized software offered as add-ons to widely
circulated editing tools, though the original effect was not merely a matter of
code, but a creative set-up and use of photographic still cameras drawing on
pioneering experiments by the U.S. photographer Eadweard Muybridge and
the French cartographer Aimé Laussedat.
So far, we have seen how visions and technologies supporting a mutable tem-
porality can be located in the early th Century avant-garde, as well as in the
tools for digital post-production of the early st Century. The latter tools have
been developed in concert with an emergent aesthetics of mutable temporality,
which took off in the s and now seems to be taken for granted as part of
current audiovisual discourse. A number of precursors could be identified in a
more conclusive history, which could consider music video alone, or also ad-
dress art video and various uses of animation in the wider realms of film and
television production.
Animation techniques like stop-motion and pixelation, technically positioned
between photography and film, have a rich history of interrogating the land-
scape between still and moving images. These techniques have also been used
in music videos. A notable example is the video for Duran Duran’s All She
Wants Is (), directed by the photographer Dean Chamberlain. The video
Mutable Temporality In and Beyond the Music Video 163
uses stop-motion animation and long exposure times to effect a curious discur-
sive positioning between the realms of still and moving images. It uses manne-
quin stand-ins for the band members in a number of shots, which further iter-
ates a tension between the still and the moving, as well as between the
inanimate and the animate. The video was awarded the  MTV Music Video
Award for innovation. The following fifteen years saw a creative surge in music
videos, often using animation in various forms to depict un-photographable
fantasies, also involving play with mutable temporality.
Street Spirit
Jonathan Glazer’s video for Radiohead’s Street Spirit () was groundbreak-
ing in its use of acceleration and de-acceleration effects, as well as in the com-
bining of two irreconcilable temporalities within the same frame, allowing sub-
jects in the same space to move at different speeds. One or both of these effects
is featured in almost every shot. The video, shot in black-and-white, shows a
s trailer park at night with a thunderstorm looming in the distance. Mem-
bers of the band are sitting on chairs outside one of the trailers. The opening
shot shows the lead singer Thom Yorke standing on top of a trailer, letting him-
self fall backwards towards the ground. The video decelerates to slow motion
and we never see him hit the ground. It cuts to him lying on top of the roof of a
damaged car. In the next shot, Yorke is standing in the foreground, singing. His
right arm has been digitally removed. It looks as if the footage of him has also
been altered in terms of its speed. In the background, the guitar player, Jonny
Greenwood jumps out of the trailer and seems almost suspended in the air as
the footage of him slows down. Yorke is not affected by the slow motion effect.
This is typical of the way in which irreconcilable temporalities are combined in
the same frame throughout the video. A bit later, we see Yorke smashing win-
dow-panes with a hammer. He moves at a normal speed, but the windows
break in slow motion. Shortly afterwards Yorke also encounters himself. While
one Yorke jumps in slow motion, another Yorke strikes a stick horizontally un-
der his feet at a normal speed. Between these various tableaus of irreconcilable
temporalities, we see shots of Yorke singing, often in double exposures fading
over each other, as well as tableaus with three female dancers slowed down and
speeded up again, a man’s face covered with tar, and guitar player Ed O’Brian
falling backwards in his chair as the slow motion effect halts the fall. The video
ends with Yorke jumping, while slow motion erases gravity and leaves him
suspended in thin air.
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The persistence through which the effect is used evokes a world in which
speed is a strangely variable thing, to the extent that its inhabitants may share
spaces with others, even themselves, but often accelerate into different tempor-
alities. The use of slow motion is often congruent with a desire to study body
movements in intimate detail, just like in Muybridge’s motion studies and in
Dziga Vertov’s notion of the genius camera eye (rearticulated by Benjamin as
an “optical unconscious”). In Street Spirit, such an epistemological interest in
the human body in motion comes in the background of a poetic interest in ex-
istential aspects of the human predicament. Key to the poetically surreal world
articulated here is the mutability and dynamism of time, and how a hybrid tem-
porality may render us worlds apart from the people around us who would
seem to share time and space with us, but do not.
Various forms of hybrid temporality can be found in other videos, for exam-
ple, in the video for the Goo Goo Dolls’Here Is Gone (Francis Lawrence, ).
In this video, several shots combine people from two groups, one moving in
high speed, often in a staccato, produced by time-lapse photography, and an-
other group of ghostly-looking characters moving in slow motion. One scene
draws more explicitly on the idea of being in different worlds, as a woman in
slow motion comes up to and carefully kisses another woman from behind who
is seated at a table, eating. The woman being kissed does not notice. She occu-
pies a high-speed temporality, portrayed by means of time-lapse photography.
The divergent temporalities render them worlds apart, in spite of the intimacy
of the situation. It evokes a sense of loss, much like the temporal divide in melo-
dramatic stories where feelings of love and care are sadly expressed “too late.”
Carol Vernallis, after having discussed the video with the director, suggests that
it is of a ghost who “kisses a flesh and blood relative…transgressing the bound-
ary between worlds,” but this is hardly the only possible reading. Whatever
specificity is assigned to the group (ghosts, outcasts or other), the sentimentality
produced through the hybrid temporality in Here Is Gone is quite different
from the poetic surreal world of Street Spirit.
As is often the case in music videos, the rhythm of editing and of accelera-
tions and decelerations in Street Spirit do not coincide precisely with, and
therefore do not interfere with, the beat of the song. Rather, the editing coheres
with the song’s mood the way it evolves, and with the deeper emotional logic of
the song. A radically different approach to the way the visuals of a video inter-
venes rhythmically is demonstrated in Cunningham’s music video, Only You
(), for the Portishead song of the same name.
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Mutable Temporality in “O Y”
In Only You the mellow and cinematic trip-hop soundtrack – based on a strong
baseline, laid-back drums, sparse use of electric piano and guitar, audio samples
and record-scratching – is topped by the intimate melancholy of Beth Gibbons’
characteristic voice, relating thoughts on what seems like a relationship beyond
repair. The video locates us in a desolate back-alley where we see a boy who
comes floating in the air towards the camera and lands his feet on the street.
His shoelaces are untied. They draw interesting patterns though the space. His
hair does as well. Beth also comes floating into the space, singing. A third motif
is an insistent zooming in on a window above them, where a man is standing
looking out, as if monitoring the action below. The curious floating movements
of the boy and Beth are generated by a series of effects. First, their bodies are
shot under water. Visible traces of the water itself are then removed. What re-
mains is the water’s effects on the bodies’ gravity, their logic of movement, as
well as on their eyes and skin. This material is then further subjected to Cun-
ningham’s acceleration and de-acceleration effects and extensive use of slow
motion. The movements generated through having them take place under
water are quite uniquely fitted to the dreamy, cinematic slow motion-like atmo-
sphere of the music. The under water footage offers a peculiar vantage point for
controlling the movements later in post-production.
If the mutable temporality of Street Spirit was based in slowing footage
down and speeding it up, as well as in the hybrid temporalities inhabiting the
same frame, in Only You, the mutable temporality takes a more explicitly mu-
sical approach. Cunningham, in effect, dances the bodies to the music by means
of adjusting the speed of the footage in post-production. The implication of this
dancing is not only to overrule the automated reproduction process audiovisual
discourse is based upon. It is also to re-situate the human body as a malleable
“puppet” body open to control by another performer, who, in effect, takes on
the role of a master puppeteer. If the puppet answers to the master puppeteer,
he again answers to the rhythmic pulse of the music itself. With its temporal
performance so intimately answering to the logic of the music, this video rea-
lizes new potentials for an exploration of fundamental rhythmic pulses – pulses
that may inform both body movements and musical beats, and facilitate corre-
spondences between them – like we see in dance closely synchronized to music.
The level of synchronization at stake in Only You is reminiscent of the extreme
forms observable in the way Michael Jackson danced his funky pop, drawing on
the tap dance tradition, or from a different continent, the aggressive, yet sweet
care for the beat displayed by the British dancer Akram Khan when performing
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in the Indian kathak tradition. In Cunningham’s video, such a synchronicity is
brought to bear on the very different musical style offered by British trip-hop.
An even more important reference for the aesthetic in play here is the
“scratching” practice developed by the modern DJ – by which the original tem-
porality of the music is overruled in a rhythmic performance whereby the re-
cord is moved manually (a technique which is now often simulated electroni-
cally). From this DJ culture has also emerged a VJ (Video Jockey) culture,
shaping an aesthetic congruent with what Cunningham offers in Only You.
The close relation between the scratching tradition of the DJ and the mutable
temporalities effected in post-production is explicitly commented on in Dave
Meyers’ video for Missy Elliott’s Work It (), through cross-cutting between
a DJ scratching and bodies moving to his rhythm, as if indicating that the DJ
operates as a master puppeteer. Work It follows up on several Missy Elliott
videos that utilize mutable temporality in synch with the music.
T R  F and the Aesthetics of Post-Production
In the music video for The Rise and Fall, we can also observe a mutable tem-
porality, and the presence of a master puppeteer, as it were, who conducts the
movements in a way that is anchored in the music, as well as in a logic of body
gesture. But there is also another logic at play that involves a different aspect of
the aesthetics of post-production.
When making his song, Craig David sampled a main theme from Sting’s 
hit, Shape of My Heart. Thus, Craig David’s song positions itself already with-
in a logic of cultural production defined through borrowing and re-circulation.
Moreover, his use of an Auto Tuner to overrule the original phrasings in his
vocal performance – which affords a human and intimate feel, touched by the
algorithmic logic of the machine – ensures that both aural and visual elements
are inscribed within the aesthetics of post-production. How, then, is the mutable
temporality inscribed in The Rise and Fall, and in which ways are body move-
ments overruled by the master puppeteer?
In the song, Craig David sings about the dangers of fame, how he can “lose
it.” We see him in a pub, where he gets two beers at the bar, and sits down with
Sting at a table. Sting is singing the chorus part at the beginning of the song, as
inserts of other pub guest looking at and discussing them illustrate the effects of
fame. Among the other characters in the pub, there is a bartender with dread-
locks about to pour some coins into the cash register, a female waitress on her
way to a table with a tray full of drinks, a group of people playing darts and
another group having fun playing pool. A lot of slow motion is used, which
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adds to the calm atmosphere of the song and helps create the general mood of
the video. As Craig David sings, “my life was never gonna be the same – cause
with the money came another status – that’s when things changed,” things also
start to change in the video. As if on a cue from the word “money,” the image
showing the coins pouring into the cash register from the hand of the bartender
slows down to a freeze frame. Similarly, following the words “when things
changed,” and Craig David pointing to his watch as if to invoke the issue of
time, we see an image of the waitress about to lose her tray with all the drinks,
also slow down and freeze. The loss of the drinks is marked on the sound track
as well, as if someone touched the turntable of a record player for an instant to
make the speed dip. For this instant, both speed and pitch dip, to underscore
“the fall” and the possibility of “losing it,” perhaps also to ironically comment
on the previously-mentioned problem with pitch related to slowing down foot-
age. At this point in the video, the slowing down to freeze spreads throughout
the pub. In the dart game, a thrown dart is frozen in mid-air. At the pool table, a
prospective winner takes a shot at the -ball to pocket it in a corner, but miscal-
culates, so the ball is about to jump off the table when the image is slowed
down to a freeze.
The camera then tours the pub where all life is now frozen. Craig David and
Sting, however, can walk about the room, which is inhabited not merely by
frozen people like in a wax museum, but also frozen acts with objects defying
gravity – coins, a tray of drinks, pool ball and dart still frozen in mid-air. This is
reminiscent of the way Morpheus and Neo, in The Matrix (Wachowski and
Wachowski ), after the surrounding action is frozen, walk about the simu-
lacrum of a world that just a moment ago seemed real, discussing the matrix as
a system. When walking about his similarly frozen world, Craig David adjusts
the black pool ball to a position just above the corner pocket. One by one, the
petrified people and things start moving again as Craig David and Sting leave
the pub: the coins fall where they should, the dart hits its target, the adjusted
black ball hits the corner pocket to enthusiastic cheers, the fall of the drinks con-
tinues onto the floor.
Thus, like in Street Spirit and in Here Is Gone, hybrid temporality, as well
as slow motion and variable speed are at stake. However, the hybrid tempora-
lity in Street Spirit and Here is Gone, where bodies move at different speeds
in the same frame, is rather different from the execution in The Rise and Fall,
where action around the key characters is frozen. An aesthetic reminiscent of
the one in The Rise and Fall is found in Michel Gondry’s video for The Rolling
Stones’ version of Like a Rolling Stone (). In Gondry’s video, a combina-
tion of two simultaneously shot photographs is used as a basis for a D model
in which a virtual camera can move. Gondry did not go on to construct a model
for people to walk about in, but merely used a technique of sliding between the
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perspectives of the two cameras to produce its curious effect. The effect is actu-
ally prefiguring the bullet-time effect used two years later for The Matrix,
which used many more cameras to get  degrees around its subjects. The
two-camera effect employed by Gondry hardly operates with a range beyond
 degrees. The compelling visuals of the video are based on a combination of
this pre-bullet-time effect and an effect created by using “one picture out of five
from a film and … an image warping” between these, as Pierre Buffin, from the
visual-effects company that worked with Gondry, describes it. This warping
produces a “wobbly” effect reminiscent of a concave/convex distorted funhouse
mirror.
The unreal atmosphere effected – curiously situating the video between the
realms of still and moving images – is consistent with the point of view of the
video’s main character, the lost female “rolling stone” played convincingly by
Patricia Arquette. Yet another effect relating to the D model based on two
photographs used by Gondry is the one used in the video to David Bowie’s
song, New Killer Star (Brumby Boylston ), where a flickering back and
forth between two perspectives on the same object also involves a rudimentary
animation. The technique is much like in lenticular cards, but the flickering re-
petitions and animation effects also recall some of the works of the experimental
filmmaker and artist Ken Jacobs, who has done much to explore the realm be-
tween still and moving images.
Slow motion pervades music videos in general beyond those discussed here.
It has a compelling power to examine movement, a power that is also celebrated
in Benjamin’s essay on the artwork in the age of mechanical reproduction. Cit-
ing Rudolf Arnheim, Benjamin talks about how “slow motion not only presents
familiar qualities of movement but reveals in them entirely unknown ones
‘which, far from looking like retarded rapid movements give the effect of singu-
larly gliding, floating, supernatural motions’.” Expanding on this observation,
Benjamin adds that a “different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to
the naked eye…[The] camera intervenes with the resources of its lowerings and
liftings, its interruptions and isolations, its extensions and accelerations, its en-
largements and reductions.” Some of the fascination with slow motion in Ben-
jamin’s description points to instances of “gliding, floating,” and recalls notions
of weightlessness. Likewise, in The Rise and Fall, gravity is put on hold, and
various objects are in effect rendered weightless, hanging, as movement is slo-
wed down toward a standstill.
The intimate relationship between weightlessness and slow motion is probed,
as we have seen, in another way in Cunningham’s video to Only You, where
the weightless unreality of the body is not only produced through the mutable
temporality of post-production, but also induced by means of positioning the
actual profilmic bodies under water, a liquid carrying much the same weight as
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the human body, whereby it is rendered weightless. This produces a tempora-
lity of movement modulated by the under-water weightlessness, which again is
overwritten on a secondary level by the temporality created in post-production.
Still, the initial logic of movement of the weightless body in water continues to
be present in this palimpsest, though it is overwritten by the performative danc-
ing of the body to the music.
In ordinary slow motion, time is set aside and overruled, in favor of laying
out the spatiality of a movement, which in its normal tempo is hard to appreci-
ate in all its detail. This can be observed in the spatial dynamic of facial emotion,
as explored by Bill Viola in a number of art videos, or in exploding buildings in
blockbuster movies or in the music video to Fatboy Slim’s Gangsta Trippin
(Roman Coppola ), or in fight scenes in a film like The Matrix. Thus, if the
spatial tends to be privileged (over the temporal) as the original temporalities
are sacrificed in ordinary slow motion, in Only You, a new temporality per-
formed in post-production gets to trump and dominate the original temporal-
ities which are still perceived deeper in the palimpsest. Thus, the originary
temporal dynamics of the profilmic bodies in Only You are partly subdued,
not so much in order to bring forth spatial details, but predominantly in order
to bring forth an alternate temporal dynamics performed by a master puppeteer
who eloquently demonstrates how rhythm is the essence of emotional expres-
sion. This situation can, for example, make it difficult to assess how fast the
movement represented in the slowed-down format really would be were it not
slowed down. The location of the characters, floating in mid-air in a back alley,
furthermore operates to alienate the movements from its origins.
In The Rise and the Fall, mutable temporality is employed to produce par-
allel temporalities, as well – those of the frozen and of the moving characters. In
principle, this can also be regarded as a form of what I, with reference to Street
Spirit, have called hybrid temporality, allowing irreconcilable temporal worlds to
co-inhabit the same photographical picture frame as if it were showing a single
world. Of course, such a world could not exist to be filmed and its filmic image
may therefore be assigned to the category of the impossible image, not because of
the spatial breaches as to how the world appears (which initially inspired this
term), but because of its temporal breaches. If the spatially impossible image vio-
lates what is spatially possible, then the temporally impossible image violates what
is temporally possible. The sense of the impossible also looms more or less
strongly under vocal performances overwritten by the Auto Tune effect. In the
case of Craig David, the effect seems moderately used, but it still makes the
vocal output a palimpsest, and also a hybrid, where man and machine are both
featured, in a singing cyborg that merges Craig David and his machines.
On a more general level, these examples illustrate how post-production pro-
cesses now often endow photographical images, or recorded voices, with a ra-
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dically boosted mutability. Lev Manovich, in discussing the future of images,
notes a number of computer-facilitated techniques that define the new status of
what he calls the hybrid image:
The ability to composite many layers of imagery with varied transparency, to place
still and moving elements within a shared D virtual space and then move a virtual
camera through this space, to apply simulated motion blur and depth of field effect,
to change over time any visual parameter of a frame – all these can now be equally
applied to any images, regardless of whether they were captured via a lens-based
recording, drawn by hand, created with D software, etc.
The new situation offers a radical malleability to images, even if they appear to
be photographic, and therefore “forced to correspond point by point to nature,”
in the words of Charles S. Peirce. Therefore, as Manovich proposes, “while we
can say that today we live in a ‘photographic culture,’ we also need to start
reading the word ‘photographic’ in a new way. ‘Photographic’ today is really
photo-GRAPHIC, the photo providing only an initial layer for the overall gra-
phical mix.” Thus, the boosting of post-production capabilities has offered a
situation where the malleability redefines images both in terms of spatial and
temporal parameters, as well as where this malleability is intimately connected
to the palimpsest, and to hybridity. How, then, is the temporal palimpsest of
Only You construed?
In Cunningham’s video, the temporality of universal clock-time is not so
much sacrificed in favor of letting us appreciate the details in the spatial unfold-
ing of the movements, as is often the case in slow motion. Clock-time tempora-
lity, institutionalized through technologies of automated cinematic reproduc-
tion, is first of all sacrificed in order to allow a subjective intra-emotional
temporality to come forth, a temporality that embodies the music as much as it
articulates an inner pulse of life itself.
How, then, do we probe such a temporal dynamism that seems to intimately
link musical and a bodily movement? This question brings us right back again
to Richter and his effort to create a universal language of rhythm, where he saw
film as a uniquely fitting medium, and to the Russian painter Wassily Kandins-
ky’s related efforts to manifest movement and rhythm in abstract paintings.
This relates as well as to efforts at the margins of musicology and dance theory
to understand “correspondences” between musical and somatic structures.
Levi-Strauss has been concerned with these issues, as has the Hungarian musi-
cologist János Maróthy, who according to Richard Middleton, argues that
“rhythmic sensation” snatches us out of particularity, “switching the individual
into the circuit of universality”. In the perspective of Middleton, the key con-
cept that links the aural to the visual, the music to the embodied human life, is
gesture. We may well understand temporal dynamism in music and in the hu-
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man body as connected and mutually inspiring each other, as part of a circuit,
or an ecosystem, not necessarily always in balance. And we might see gesture as
providing crucial connections, between the aural and visual, as well as between
the artist and the public. But how are these relations configured?
Let us look at the connection between the body of the musical performer and
the music. Maróthy points out the importance of gesture in the following obser-
vation.
Successful synthetic simulations of musical sounds have led to realising that music is
made humanly important not by a “violin sound” or by a “piano sound” alone but by
their shaping through the gestures of a performing artist. Instead of pre-program-
ming these through sophisticated softwares, computer musicians have returned to
the human gestures themselves in order to control the sonic flow produced by inter-
active systems of live electronics.
Thus, the “shaping [of instrument sound] through the gestures of a performing
artist” is vital for achieving an adequate result. So what kind of gestures should
these be? As Maróthy further notes, “standard performance orders like largo,
allegro, let alone dolce, espressivo or even lusinghiero (in Beethoven’s Quartet C
Sharp Minor) hint at behavior patterns rather than at abstract musical quali-
ties”. The task of the performing artist, here articulated by the composer, is to
endow the performance with a particular “feeling” anchored in gestural embo-
died life. Just as that embodied life, in its turn, may provide inspiration for wri-
ters of songs. The body cultures relating to contemporary rap music, to the Bra-
zilian bossa nova of the early s, and to classic Argentinian tango music by
Carlos di Sarli, each of these are as widely apart as they are gesturally well-
integrated with their music. This integration of body culture and music means
that by the help of seeing the music, in terms of the musicians playing it and
dancers dancing it, we may understand the music better. Perhaps this is because
one dimension of understanding music is to understand the gestural world it
forms a part of: the postures, attitudes and moods of the musicians playing it,
as well as the fitting responses from dancers and the public enjoying it, not to
mention the clothing styles and life forms that nurture it and are nurtured by it.
Another term that may be productively linked up to gesture is attitude. Think
about how a musician playing, a dancer dancing, will take on a certain attitude.
This attitude again may provide an organizing principle for the more specific
gestures co-constituting the music and the dance. Attitudes may well be de-
scribed as ways of relating emotionally, as indicated by terms like care, seduc-
tion, aggression, threat, sadism, joy, love, melancholy and despair. Such single
words, of course, will never summarize complex attitudes and emotional condi-
tions, but they may indicate some relevant trajectories for explorations of the
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relations between music and motion, where the gestural level, in part, orga-
nized around attitudes, forms a bridge between these two spheres.
The British musicologist, Nicholas Cook, when discussing the relation be-
tween image and music, argues that “the coupling of image and sound contex-
tualizes, clarifies, and in a sense analyses the music.” Vernallis brings the clar-
ifying and analytical powers of images more directly to bear on music videos
when she notes that
Meyers … uses particular techniques to draw attention to the heterogeneity of a pop
song’s rhythm arrangement. The first half of a musical phrase might be ornate, and
the second half given over to a smoother flow of images: a bevy of kids on big-
wheeled bikes, or a slow-mo shot of water pouring from a pail. These two contrasting
types of visual articulation – busy or drawn out – offer different vantage points. We
might first listen more intently to a particular detail, and next we might hear the mu-
sic as a wash…. Meyers’s broadly drawn and well-projected visual material can
change the way we hear songs. The songs seem louder somehow. They gain a sense
of clarity and immediacy.
Thus, a crucial way the video might “analyze” the music is by its approach to
editing and the sense of temporal flow in the imagery. As an overall approach,
the music video can show attentiveness toward particular details, or it can pre-
sent a more general “wash.” Cunningham does not hold back on being particu-
lar. He intervenes on a musical level, as if providing new instruments to the
musical mix. But key to his visual analysis of the music, as it is in many music
videos, is the bodily gestures displayed. Maróthy talked about how music has
the power to switch “the individual into the circuit of universality.” We may
well conceive of the gestural as a key link whereby that can take place.
Such a switching of the individual into the circuit of universality, however,
may take place in radically different ways, relating also to fundamentally differ-
ent forms of life. This is evident when moving to the last example to be dis-
cussed here, Cunningham’s independent video project Rubber Johnny. This
moves us away from the post-industrial aesthetics of Portishead so well con-
veyed in the music video Only You, to the freakish retrograde, yet futuristic
post-human frenzy of a mutilated and morphing character, shape-shifting to
the frenzied beat of Aphex Twin, moving faster than any human can. Still, on a
fundamental level, Cunningham’s video may be regarded as a music video, in
the sense of a video attuned to music, where we in fact can see (as in the original
sense of the word video) music.
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The Posthuman Frenzy of R J
A grainy close-up of Johnny’s face, taken with an infrared camera, opens the
video. It seems he is being interviewed by an off-screen therapist asking, “Now,
how are you feeling? Are you feeling OK, you feel well?” Johnny merely mum-
bles as a response. He seems both physically and mentally beyond the norms of
the human. He is sitting in a wheel chair and sports an abnormal egg-shaped
head on top of a small face, and seems otherwise feeble and weak. Yet, the
therapist seems to sense that Johnny is capable of perceiving something he him-
self cannot, so he asks: “Are you seeing something…is there something you see
over there? What do you see there, Johnny?” The meeting ends by Johnny hy-
perventilating and the therapist offering him an injection to calm him down. A
transitory sequence starts as a neon light is lit, a rat walks over the logo ‘Warp
Film’, a condom is pulled over a dildo and punctured. On the condom is writ-
ten, ‘Rubber Johnny,’ which in Britain simply is slang for condom.
The punctured condom, with its world of rubber, does not sexualize the vi-
deo as much as its puncture produces a certain attitude. The sexual theme and
an atmosphere of rubber still provides a bizarre undertone in a new close-up of
Johnny’s face as he shows his tongue in a fast equilibrist motion parodying a
standard trope of the porn movie. The movement is spastic and grotesque. It is
produced at an inhuman speed and with a mechanical gestural logic that seems
as robot-like as human, and which thereby evokes an impression of Johnny as a
bizarre cyborg as much as simply deformed.
Johnny’s play with his tongue leads to a peculiar music and dance sequence
which – in contrast to the opening scene – positions him in full control of his
surroundings. The sequence creates a completely new world for him. This is a
world of ferocious speeds and a virtuoso bodily control in complete synch with
the music. In this world, Johnny has mutated to become strong and athletic,
catching and reflecting rays of light coming at him, as if from an attacking en-
emy’s laser weapons in a computer game. He comes across here almost like a
mechanized game character – as someone played as much as playing. The se-
quence is disrupted by someone in a doorway, outside the frame. A character
that could potentially be Johnny’s father addresses him in an aggressive and
demeaning manner. This instantly reverses the mutation to an athlete and re-
constitutes Johnny as a passive, deformed freak under control.
A new sequence radicalizes the video and its exploration of the limits of per-
ception. The sequence is initiated by Johnny sniffing a long stripe of white pow-
der. His body again moves with the music in a frenetic tempo. The at-times-
mechanical body now reveals its organic aspects as the body virtually explodes
into fragments, and is broken down to its constitutive parts: plasma, brain-mass
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and bones are thrown at the camera and hit a glass frame right before our eyes.
Johnny decomposes and is reduced to pure plasma and an occasional organ in
the form of an eye, an ear, a mouth. As if a still-life picture or a snapshot, such
tableaus are held on the glass plate before the frenetic beat starts again, with
visuals tightly in synch with the music. When the biological remains that is
Johnny tear themselves loose again to revamp the ferocious movement, the
plasma is stuck on the glass plate for a while until it pops back, like chewing
gum. This connects to another rubber element here, namely that rubber quality
inherent in the frenzy of the electronic music and in the dance the video articu-
lates. Cunningham comments on the rubber quality in the music in an inter-
view:
The bass line in the track sounded like an elastic band to me and so I got the idea of
someone shapeshifting like a piece of chewing gum, whilst raving. The title Rubber
Johnny just seemed to fit the character and shapeshifting idea really well. It has noth-
ing whatsoever to do with condoms, although it is a bonus that Rubber Johnny is a
term that we used in the playground.
On a more general level, “an elastic band,” situated around the waist, is also
key to the dynamism and elegance of dancers, vital for energetic rebounds.
Thus, Cunningham dramatizes a key element in dancing in his Rubber Johnny
character, who from a rubber-like music, in the words of Cunningham,”[is] sha-
peshifting like a piece of chewing gum.” However, this rubber quality, is in
Rubber Johnny orchestrated with a spastic energy reflecting both the mechan-
ization of his body as well as its abnormal deformities, in a register far away
from any form of harmonious human dance.
Perception and the Limits of the Human
What Cunningham comes to explore in the mutable temporality of Rubber John-
ny is not merely a shapeshifting body capable of moving beyond human speed,
or a music pushing the boundaries of our perception. The limits of human per-
ception are thematized more fundamentally. The issue is first raised though the
questions about what Johnny sees. Implicitly, an ordinary human like the thera-
pist cannot see what Johnny can. An inserted picture of a Chihuahua, with its
eyes much like Johnny’s, white in the infrared camera’s green imagery, ironically
comments on our lacking perceptive capabilities. We are reminded that we are
incapable of seeing what the dog, and probably also Johnny, sees. Issues of per-
ception are also articulated by the infrared photography itself and its expansion
beyond the visual field where we can only operate with technological aids that
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can adapt signals to our visual register. Yet another element focusing on percep-
tion and its manipulation are the drugs involved, the therapist’s injection as
much as the white stripe. One of the parameters through which drugs can be
assessed, is whether they are energizing or relaxing, whether they support high-
or low-speed activities. Another is whether they support presence or open alter-
nate worlds of fantasy through changing our perceptions, even offering halluci-
nations. In Rubber Johnny, drugs, at least the white stripe, may evoke a sense
of both the energizing and the hallucination-inducing, but first and foremost it
can be related to the speed of a certain kind of music, which through the aes-
thetic of post-production, has ventured beyond the realms within which a hu-
man musician can handle without special aids. The tempo is simply far beyond
what a human body can play.
The music for Rubber Johnny is therefore largely produced by means of a
computer operating the instruments (or sound samples). This allows program-
ming to take place at a human speed, where both the sense of rhythm and the
body of the player/programmer can keep up. The speed of the tracks can later
be played at a completely different speed, in this case much faster. Thus, the
limits of human performance and perception also become an arena for the mu-
sic here. The music pushes up against and partly beyond the limits, not only of
what the human body can play and dance, but also of what it can perceive.
Sound and image in the ordinary music video, according to Michel Chion, are
only occasionally synchronized. Vernallis also notes this in her discussion of
the music video director, Francis Lawrence’s work: “Editing is subtly articulated
off the beat and irregular. It makes the music the dominant voice – the image
serves as a coloration or counterpoint.” She also describes how Lawrence’s
“softly articulated editing falls off the beat, bringing the song’s rhythm to the
fore.” In Rubber Johnny and Only You, Cunningham articulates a diametri-
cally opposed vision. In Rubber Johnny, synchronization is taken to the ex-
treme, much further than in the already strongly synchronized Only You.
Thus, Rubber Johnny, by means of music and imagery, pushes us to the edge
of or beyond human perception. Cunningham comments on his exploration of
the limits of perception by saying:
I wanted to see how fast you can go before it becomes nonsensical, a mess. The edit-
ing style in Rubber Johnny is actually very old fashioned and simple. If you were to
watch it at half speed you would see that.
It was incredibly difficult to edit this video and find that line, where it seems break-
neck, but still flows and makes sense as a sequence. I would have to redo each shot
about twenty times in order to find something that worked. It involved a lot of ex-
perimentation. It was closer to animation than editing and I had to create the video
two frames at a time.
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At times, works in video, music or other arts may also push beyond the edge
Cunningham is balancing. They may radically transcend the limits of human
perception. Rather than challenging the capabilities of our perception and bal-
ancing on the edge of the possible, they may, in a sense, leave their anchoring in
human-embodied perception and instead make themselves available on a con-
ceptual level. But, in this case, James and Cunningham do not wish to leave
the human scale, but rather push it to its limits. Therefore, they operate at, and
slightly beyond, the threshold of human perception, but without leaving it alto-
gether.
The Forms Afforded by Temporal Mutability
Street Spirit and The Rise and Fall inaugurate, in their wildly different
ways, worlds of hybrid temporality where bodies are miraculously accelerated
and de-accelerated independently of each other while mysteriously sharing the
same space. Only You articulates an intimately controlled universe, where the
speed of the bodies is danced, as if from an immensely sensible and musical
master puppeteer, while Rubber Johnny displays a more action/reaction-or-
iented synchronicity where the controlling agency is more dispersed. The ecol-
ogy of the musical groove, together with the visuals, allows questions of origin-
ary agency to fade into the background in favor of a circulation of energies and
impulses that seem as much human as machinic, as emanating from the “shape-
shifting” plasma in play. This cyborg dimension, where the machinic and the
organic are fused in a new dynamism – albeit here ironically charged with the
abject deformities defining Johnny – can also be traced back to some of the in-
spirations behind Benjamin’s questioning of the relation between art and tech-
nology, in particular to Dziga Vertov. In one of his early manifestos, Vertov de-
scribes how the human is transformed and engulfed by technology, in this case,
the cinematographic apparatus:
I am kino-eye. I am mechanical eye. I, a machine.… Now and forever I free myself
from human immobility, I am in constant motion…. My path leads to the creation of
a fresh perception of the world. I decipher in a new way a world unknown to you.
In Vertov’s vision, as well as in Cunningham’s, an interrogation of and change
in perceptual forms are pivotal. The human becomes machine-like, liberated
from human mobility or lack thereof, finding new dynamism in a merging with
the machine, with technology. This merger yields a new and fresh perception of
the world.
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Within the nexus of the human body, technology and perception – where the
human and the machine are brought together in cyborg-inspired visions – we
can also find the Australia-based artist Sterlac’s explorations of body and tech-
nology. He also seems interested in puppeteering the human body, as if instal-
ling a sort of post-production procedure whereby his limbs can be controlled.
His most interesting project in this regard may be hisMovatar (), which he
describes as an “inverse motion capture system”. Motion capture is based on
capturing the movements of one object, often a human body, and mapping that
motion onto a virtual object, for example a D graphical model of a human
being. Now, what Stelarc’sMovatar does is to reverse the traffic of data. Rather
than having movement data mapped from the real to the virtual body, he pro-
poses to get data from a virtual body equipped with the artificial intelligence
necessary to generate movement, and map that data onto one or more human
bodies. In a presentation of the project Stelarc writes:
Consider, though, a virtual body or an avatar that can access a physical body, actuat-
ing its performance in the real world. If the avatar is imbued with an artificial intelli-
gence, becoming increasingly autonomous and unpredictable, then it would become
more an AL (Artificial Life) entity performing with a human body in physical space.
With an appropriate visual software interface and muscle stimulation system, this
would be possible. The avatar would become a Movatar. Its repertoire of behaviors
could be modulated continuously…and might evolve using genetic algorithms. With
appropriate feedback loops from the real world it would be able to respond and per-
form in more complex and compelling ways. The Movatar would be able not only to
act, but also to express its emotions by appropriating the facial muscles of its physical
body.
Starlac’s project appears at a time when the mapping of movement data from
one object to another has become an important device in the field of cultural
production. Motion capture technologies have long been used in the produc-
tion of films and games, and the art world is rife with more playful mappings of
data. Recent developments in image production seem to render motion capture
techniques even more central, and thereby bolster the realm of post-production.
With reference to The Matrix Reloaded (), Silberman, explains this shift in
the following way:
The standard way of simulating the world in CG [Computer Graphics] is to build it
from the inside out, by assembling forms out of polygons and applying computer-
simulated textures and lighting. The ESC team [ESC Entertainment is a special effects
company] took a radically different path, loading as much of the real world as possi-
ble into the computer first, building from the outside in. This approach, known as
image-based rendering, is transforming the effects industry.
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A similar evolution has already occurred in music. The first electronic keyboards
sought to re-create a piano’s acoustic properties by amassing sets of rules about the
physics of keys, hammers, and strings. The end result sounded like a synthesizer.
Now DJs and musicians sample and morph the recorded sounds of actual instru-
ments.
Instead of synthesizing the world, Gaeta cloned it.
Manovich makes a similar point about the shift from simulation to sampling-
based technologies, drawing heavily on the visual effects designer of The Ma-
trix trilogy, John Gaeta, who is also discussed in Silberman’s article (above).
Later cases like The Curious Case of Benjamin Button (David Fincher, )
and Avatar (James Cameron ), as well as ongoing aspirations towards
photographic realism in computer games by means of capture and synthesizing
technologies, only reinforce this development. Silberman’s parallel to music
production, where “DJs and musicians sample and morph the recorded sounds
of actual instruments,” also captures well the generalized post-production
mode that permeates cultural production at present, where the interest in muta-
ble temporalities is merely one element.
Valery was right in expecting innovations to transform the techniques of the
arts, and thereby affect artistic invention even to the brink of changing our very
notion of art. These changes are still being discussed, perhaps now most inten-
sely in relation to the new status of photography in the art world and the term
post-medium condition. Likewise, it seems increasingly necessary to reflect on
the ways in which current technological changes affect cultural production and
perhaps also come to alter our notion of art. Today’s technological changes are
related to the computer with its procedural receipts offered by ever more finely
tuned algorithms, along with increasingly developed storage, mixing and mod-
ification technologies. Thus, efforts to conceptualize current changes to cultural
production often revolve around notions like archive, algorithm and post-pro-
duction.
This chapter has explored a particular aspect of the aesthetics of post-produc-
tion, the mutable temporality, which seems to become increasingly prevalent in
contemporary music video, but is in no way limited to this format. When the
music video in particular has been an arena where various forms of mutable
temporality has been probed, it has at least two explanations. Music itself being
our most important temporal art form, is therefore also an arena for the explora-
tions of various forms of emotional temporalities. Such temporal experiences
are not merely articulated in the music itself, but also in the image streams and
pulses accompanying them in music videos. Another explanation may be found
closer to the relationship between technology itself and the audiovisual lan-
guage it supports. Music video has long been a playground for new technolo-
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gies, for new algorithms and ideas. For the film director David Fincher, it was
“the most terrific sandbox, where I could try anything.” Special effects compa-
nies are aware of this perception and have offered some of their new toys for
music video directors to try out, as was the case when Gondry made the video
for Like a Rolling Stone. Although the attraction of new technologies, ef-
fects and algorithms will stay with us, there are also reasons to expect that the
technologies supporting mutable temporalities may become less foregrounded
as they increasingly become standard equipment in editing suits. With these
medial resources firmly embedded in the algorithms of applicable software, as
well as in visions about what the medium is capable of and what visual lan-
guages can convey, we can expect new works in this field to become less tech-
nologically driven and more free to explore artistic visions without becoming a
vehicle of display for the new technological device. Thus, the artistic vision may
stand out stronger, and not risk being reduced to a mere consequence of a new
special effects tool. This means that the urgent charge of exploring new algo-
rithms and technological solutions, offering works that carry their technological
fingerprints – like Street Spirit, Like a Rolling Stone and The Rise and Fall
–may give way to works that take the human predicament of subjective tempo-
ral experience even more seriously, as a field that warrants interrogation.
With contemporary life being increasingly networked and mediated, where
we can conduct exchanges across various time zones with several friends simul-
taneously – one caught in a hurried morning, another enjoying the relaxation of
a night approaching bed-time, where virtual and real presence increasingly
comes to feel really real no matter whether we can physically touch each other
or not – there are contemporary temporal and existential experiences to be inter-
rogated and articulated. The prevalent practice of walking about with our own
soundscapes in our headsets, cut off from the sounds of our immediate sur-
roundings, can also bring alternate temporalities into our lives, and disconnect
us from the temporalities of the world physically surrounding us.
Music videos have been important as sites for interrogating hybrid temporal
experiences and forms of mutable temporalities – supported by the music itself
as a temporal art. But may such issues also become increasingly interrogated in
other formats and genre? Could we not expect various forms of mutable tempo-
rality to make a greater impact in cinema too? The realism of storytelling, as
well as the pervasiveness of dialogue between characters we see speaking, can
be counted among the factors holding back such a development. However, in-
terestingly, a film like Christopher Nolan’s Inception () has a plot that
lends itself to the relativization of time, and may be considered a major effort,
after The Matrix, to warp time and to articulate not only a spatially impossible
image, but also a temporally impossible image, where hybrid temporalities seem to
inhabit the same space. The modernism of Alain Resnais certainly provided
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compelling hybrid spatio-temporal experiences in the doubling of Nevers and
Hiroshima in Hiroshima Mon Amour (). A film like Wong Kar Wai’s
Fallen Angels () also provides strong subjective temporalities in which
voice-over, in combination with slow motion, effects a divide from the physical
here and now. These few examples of wildly different films from different times
and styles offer merely an indication of what cinema has achieved in terms of
temporal hybridity. But in spite of the achievements, cinema, it seems, have
come a longer way in exploring space. With the growing interest in subjective
storytelling and the inner working of the mind, combined with the growing op-
tions for mutable temporalities, cinema may now be on its way to conquering
the vicissitudes of time more forcefully. Still, there are crucial differences be-
tween music videos and movies, even if both exemplify audiovisual discourses.
In traditional cinema, sound is fitted to the image; whereas in music videos, it is
the other way around, the images are fitted to the music. Naturally, with the
temporal art form of music at its center, as its raison d’être, music video absorbs
the mutable temporality with faint resistance. Cinema, on the contrary, may
partly have to leave the common representational strategy of lip-synch in order
to gain the freedom to involve mutable temporalities. It is telling that Wong Kar
Wai’s style has been compared to a music video, and the effectiveness of the
music video as a “sand box” for film directors coming of age now may also be
telling for coming developments.
The growing importance of the aesthetics of post-production may more gen-
erally be anchored in a series of developments. Bourriaud’s diagnosis of the
form that cultural production now takes – especially in the world of art – as
based on post-production, provides both a general diagnosis of cultural produc-
tion and an analysis of the logic of production in the art world. Music produc-
tion since the Beatles has largely been an art of the mixing table as much as an
art of the instruments played. This situation is further radicalized by the singing
cyborg afforded by technologies like Auto Tune. Manovich argues for the neces-
sity of inserting a hyphen into the word photography to truly represent the
photographic practices of current filmmaking, not merely in Hollywood science
fiction, but increasingly across genres. John Belton adds to this picture by noting
how “filmmakers used to say they would ‘fix it in post[-production].’ Now…
they tend to say they’ll ‘make it in post’.” In accordance with this, Belton
further observes how “Pleasantville combines color and black and white in
the same frame, violating the integrity of the image. The image is revealed as
not whole, but made up of parts.” All of this speaks to the growing mutability
of our forms of cultural production, in which the index – which helped boost the
credibility of images and sounds inscribed through mechanical reproduction to
a higher status, above the merely iconic forms of representation – is becoming a
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less restrictive force in the formation of contemporary sound and image produc-
tion. Post-production is the stage where this mutability is executed and realized.
The aesthetics of post-production, and more specifically, the aspect involving
mutable temporality, is likely to stay with us and may also move more power-
fully into the language of cinema, where the temporal may offer unexplored
fields in an art form that has often been more spatial in its concerns. But the
urgent charge toward investigating something new, as mutable temporality has
been explored in music videos, will not endure, as the fronts of urgency keep
moving. Counter-reactions like Dogme  – which shunned the “fix-it-in-post”
mentality – and interest in more or less abandoned media, as well as an interest
in traditional production methods, are also likely to remain. However, the new
mutability in audiovisual culture, whereby it has, in a sense, become more algo-
rithmic, is likely to see further blossoming, supported by the step-by-step mi-
gration of audiovisual production to digital platforms.
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, )
. A case in point is John Cage’s work Organ²/ASLSP now being performed in the St.
Burchardi church in Halberstadt, Germany. The performance started at midnight on
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the th of September  – with a silence lasting until the th of February,  –
and is scheduled to finish in the year . Thus, Cage has made a piece that re-
quires a  year performance. At that speed, it is not perceivable as a combination
of sounds that constitute a rhythm and a melody of any sort. No single person can
hear the whole piece, nor even its beginning and its end. Thus, it is to be experi-
enced first of all on a conceptual level.
. Dziga Vertov, The Writings of Dziga Vertov, Annette Michelson (ed.), transl. Kevin
O’Brien (Berkeley: University of California Press, ) .
. http://www.stelarc.va.com.au/projects.html# (last accessed May , ).
. Ibid.
. Such efforts also take place within medicine directed towards appeasing disability
and revealing functions of the human brain and body. Among the challenges is to
have the brain control artificial limbs like it controls its natural ones.
. Silberman.
. Both The Curious Case of Benjamin Button and Avatar perfected capturing
technologies, enabling actors to be able to control their digital characters more pre-
cisely, and avoid a “botox effect” stemming from a loss of data that might render the
virtual actor somewhat muted. According to Silberman, this may be easier than we
may initially think: “While the topography of the human face is the hardest to simu-
late digitally, it turns out to be one of the easiest to map photogrammetrically. It has
fewer shadows and occlusions than, say, the city of Paris. The language of the face
communicates maximum information through the subtlest inflections. The inter-
faces of our souls are designed to be read in a heartbeat.” Ibid.
. Rosalind Krauss, “Reinventing the medium”, Critical Inquiry, :  (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, ) –; Arild Fetveit, “Convergence by means of glob-
alized remediation”, Northern Lights Volume  () -; Michael Fried, Why
Photography Matters as Art as Never Before. (New Haven: Yale University Press, ).
. Carol Vernallis “‘The Most Terrific Sandbox’: Music Video Directors, Style, and the
Question of the Auteur.” Quarterly Review of Film and Video, volume , issue  (Oc-
tober ) .
. Pierre Buffin, co-founder of BUF Compagnie introduces the co-operation on Like a
Rolling Stone in this way: “We had already worked on different projects with
Michel Gondry, such as video-clips like Björk, Lenny Kravitz or Terence Trent D’Ar-
by. During his visits to BUF, we showed him the new tools we were developing and
the new effects they could provide. One day we showed him our tool for modeling
objects from two pictures, based on stereophotogrammetry.” The situation invoked
here – in which the expert maker and the expert user of groundbreaking tools meet
up before the execution of an important task – seems strangely reminiscent of the
congenial meetings between James Bond and Q early in every Bond film. http://
www.director-file.com/gondry/stones.html (last accessed August , ).
. John Belton, “Painting by the Numbers: The Digital Intermediate”, Film Quarterly,
Vol. , No.  (Spring ) .
. Ibid., .
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Algorithmic Culture:
Beyond the Photo/Film Divide
Eivind Røssaak
In recent film and media studies, there has been a growing uneasiness among
scholars with regard to the destiny of the moving image in the digital age. This
article will argue that an investigation into the altered relationship between still
and moving images can tell us a lot about the new condition of the moving
image culture. Traditionally, the relationship between still and moving images
has been governed by a discourse on the dialectical or antitethical relationship
between film and photography. Historically speaking, the art of photography
predates the invention of cinematography, but projectionists and filmmakers
have always utilized this relationship dramatically and aesthetically as a transi-
tional relationship between forms of mobility and immobility. Tom Gunning
has shown how the Lumière brothers would astonish their audiences with a
special technique of exhibition where they transform a projected still image into
a moving image by cranking the projector. Since then, the ambiguity between
stillness and motion has always been a resource for resonance and wonder in
cinema and, in particular, in experimental film from the constructivists and sur-
realists all the way up to contemporary filmmakers like Jean-Luc Godard and
Chris Marker in Europe and Ken Jacobs and Ernie Gehr in the United States. In
more recent digital cinema (especially science fiction films), and in moving im-
age installations in art galleries and on the Internet, a new kind of exploration of
this resource is emerging. It may be connected to the transition from analog to
digital.
Within the analog world of film stock and celluloid, the relationship between
the still and the moving image was often looked upon as a way of foreground-
ing the material basis of the filmstrip, the relationship between the tacit frames
and the act of projection. Accordingly, within the digital world of bits and bytes,
the relationship between the still and the moving image has changed. But is this
focus on stillness and motion outdated? On the contrary, it seems as if the rela-
tionship between stillness and motion has returned within a new and perhaps
more complex matrix of problems. Several studies among acclaimed film scho-
lars such as Laura Mulvey, Mary Ann Doane, Bernard Stiegler, Timothy Mur-
ray, Geoffrey Batchen, Thomas Elsaesser and W.J.T. Mitchell, have in recent
years tried to diagnose the situation by reflecting on and doing close readings
of certain works. Significantly, their studies are not simply close readings in the
formalist sense of the term; rather, they are investigations of a new situation.
What has happened to the image? Scholars talk about a “naming crisis” in the
realm of the digital image. Is it still an image? Both scholars and artists seem to
be urgently engaged in trying to assess this crisis – or new potential – of the
image. A growing number of scholars such as Friedrich Kittler, Lev Manovich,
D.N. Rodowick and Mark B.N. Hansen have also started to address these issues
via the technical term “algorithm”, which was a term only used by computer
specialists and mathematicians just a few years ago. This chapter will specifi-
cally address the relationship between new media, algorithms and the construc-
tion of the image. While many scholars trained in the world of analog and
photochemical photography lament the introduction of digital image produc-
tion because they think it impoverishes the experience of time and history, this
paper will explore some of the new affordances of the digital in relation to aes-
thetic experience and sensation.
Even film scholars not interested in this aspect of the digital image see many
advantages of digital technologies. Today, it is hard to imagine that before the
advent of the laser disk and the videotape, most film scholars were writing their
analyses from the memory of the film they had seen in a movie theatre. For
instance, Stanley Cavell writes in the foreword to his seminal work, The World
Viewed (), that, “I wrote primarily out of the memory of film”. Laura Mul-
vey talks about a similar situation in the “Preface” to her Death x a Second:
Stillness and the Moving Image (). These researchers and critics from the
s were confined to watching films in darkened rooms, projected at  (or
thereabouts) frames per second. But new media changed this situation. “By the
end of the twentieth century, ways of consuming cinema had multiplied and the
regulation of its speed had been widely extended,” Mulvey writes. With the
VCR, films could be stopped at any point, and with the DVD-player perfect
freeze-frames were easily created. The pause button and the menu button have
introduced new modes of analyzing film, thus opening up old films in new
ways. In the essay, “Delaying cinema”, Mulvey contends:
The process of repetition and return involves stretching out the cinematic image to
allow space and time for associative thought, reflection of resonance and connotation,
the identification of visual clues, the interpretation of cinematic form and style, and,
ultimately, personal reverie. Furthermore, by slowing down, freezing or repeating
images, key moments and meanings become visible that could not have been per-
ceived when hidden under the narrative flow and the movement of film. Although
the alert spectator of melodrama may well have had the ability to read the cinematic
language of displacement, consciously or subliminally, at  frames a second, today’s
electronic or digital spectator can find these deferred meanings that have been wait-
ing through the decades to be seen.
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Mulvey’s narrative almost exhibits a teleology at play. She discusses the transi-
tion from the constrictions of the movie theatre spectator to the new revelatory
potential of the “digital spectator” as critic. Through a series of brilliant read-
ings, she shows how new technology can alter cinematic hermeneutics. Never-
theless, Mulvey’s newly liberated observer addresses the “same” object, namely
classical cinema. Her interests lie in the way new media can enhance and deep-
en the encounter with the unique singularity of the classic feature film. She is
not interested in the potential of the new; she is interested in the potential of the
old – finally revealed. She uses new media to study the potential of old media,
without paying attention to how new media have changed the conditions of
visual culture. Indeed, these two aspects of new media are interconnected. New
media do not simply deal with or offer “the new”. They address and, some
would even say, strengthen the distribution and hegemony of the old. Many
have already done encyclopedic assessments of what is new and what has re-
mained the same since the digital revolution with regards to narrative cinema.
What interests me here, is the changing vocation of the image after it became a
technological object of a different kind, that is, a programmable object.
Programmable Objects
According to media philosopher Lev Manovich, a new media object is defined
by its programmability. All programmable objects are composed of digital
codes and are subject to algorithmic manipulation. The algorithm is the neces-
sary conversion point in the transformation of the analog image into a digital
image. Algorithms are abstract, symbolized, step-by-step instructions normally
written in pseudo-code or drawn in flow-chart diagrams. Alan Turing, one of
the inventors of the computer, described algorithms as any set of instructions
fed into a machine to solve a problem. Put simply, algorithms describe how a
computer can carry out the task you want it to do. They are expressed in a form
called a program or software. They accept an input and produce an output. A
text or an image that undergoes this kind of treatment, becomes a programma-
ble object, or “softwareized”. Within the visual field, the question of represen-
tation and indexicality is threatened. Now, is the new image “real” or not? Some
hardcore celluloid fetishists, like D.N. Rodowick, would even venture to say
that “digital depictions are not ‘images’, at least in the ordinary sense of the
term”. Even if digital imagining strives in most cases to be perceptually indis-
tinguishable from the previous medium, namely, the photographic or photo-
graphic realism, the difference in the medium is crucial, and Rodowick’s expla-
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nation is worth listening to even if I disagree with some of his more pessimistic
and nostalgic conclusions.
In The Virtual Life of Film, Rodowick discusses the differences between the
analog and the digital as two distinct ontologies. While the analog photochemi-
cal process is based on a principle of continuity between input and output, the
information processing of the digital image is, ontologically speaking, based on
a separation or discontinuity between input and output. Without this funda-
mental discontinuity, computer algorithms wouldn’t work. “The ontology of in-
formation processing…is agnostic with respect to its output,” as Rodowick
phrases it. It is the discontinuity between the input and the output that pro-
duces a new space for creativity and imagination – and chance and control. This
space is addressed, not by light and shadow as in the photochemical process,
but by computer algorithms, which carry out manipulations and alterations.
Algorithms is a key term here. Indeed, William Uricchio talks about today’s
“algorithmic turn” due to the new affordances of software such as photosynth.
The “modern” static perspective, perfected by artists like Canaletto, isn’t really
challenged before the arrival of the “postmodern” dynamic and processual per-
spectives made possible by photosynth software, according to Uricchio. But
the algorithmic turn should also imply several elements of the less spectacular
and the less visible. Alexander Galloway describes more generally and more
specifically contemporary culture as an “algorithmic culture”. He uses the
term to describe the culture of computer gaming as paradigmatic for under-
standing our new digital age. Video games are “informatic software” and be-
long to what he calls “algorithmic cultural objects”. Gaming is “oriented
around understanding and executing specific algorithms”. In computer gam-
ing, it is all about action and change. Each gesture, each action the player per-
forms is connected to an algorithm. To Galloway, computer gaming becomes a
metacritical reflection that reaches into the heart of computerized society.
Both Uricchio and Galloway make “processuality” and processing, that is,
editing and otherwise manipulating existing digital images, central. Computer
gaming, as an active intervention in the processual aspect of the technological
image, becomes exemplary for the way more and more people interact, via al-
gorithms, with available objects from our visual culture. Most of us do not write
algorithms, we access them through application software. As I see it, playing
around with digital editing software also is a “game” which is all about finding
the best algorithm. Among the many well-known software packages are Adobe
Photoshop and Final Cut Pro, which, in reality, consist of thousands of ready-
made algorithms, and the user can activate these algorithms simply by import-
ing an image and adding different layers or techniques using a variety of easily
available tools to transform the image. The software industry even describes
how their programs offer unique and robust graphics editing experiences. Some
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of the most advanced effects deal with manipulating the quality of the “me-
dium” itself. Indeed, what we see on the screen – whether it is a digital image
that looks like a painting (after the “fresco” effect is applied), a sculpture, a
mosaic, a still photograph or an image which is somehow moving or is a combi-
nation of still and moving elements (easy with the programming language
called Processing) – is now just an option inscribed by the algorithms. In other
words, the photo/film divide, which was closely associated within the analog
culture with certain stable substances or medium-specific qualities such as cel-
luloid, paper or chemistry, has become radically problematized. Indeed, the
same digital information can be instantiated visually, acoustically, or kinestheti-
cally with the help of adequate programming algorithms; the information can
be warped, streamed, or sampled, accelerated or slowed down, supersaturated
or attenuated. Programmable objects can simulate any previous media object.
We can, in other words, call the algorithmic culture a transversal culture, be-
cause it so easily creates lines of flight between or across different “old” media.
Certain medium-specific qualities have become preliminary appearances easily
available for alterations.
Algorithmic cultures address a new materialism that is not based in medium-
specific divisions between photo and film or still and moving images, for exam-
ple, but rather in mutable information codes. Within a coded environment,
forms of appearance are optional and governed by the new machinic agency of
the viewer/user. This is the new situation established by the computer and rein-
forced further by the Web’s . culture, smarter software and more bandwidth.
Film and photography are no longer medium-specific qualities, but are rather
two of the ways that algorithms hide themselves. Significantly, we interact with
the algorithms, but usually through an interface where the actual algorithmic
instructions are hidden. As Galloway reminds us, now more than ever, the
question is: is what you see what you get? The answer to this fundamental ques-
tion is both yes and no. The coexistence of both of these phenomenologically
incommensurable positions addresses both the problem and the potential of the
new algorithmic culture.
The New Ground of the Image
The German artist Andreas Müller-Pohle has explored the relationship between
image and information in its many variants. A crucial narrative behind his lar-
gely conceptual image production is the transition from the analog to the digi-
tal. In one of his most famous series of works, Digital Scores (after Nicephore
Niepce) from , he has literally turned visual culture upside down by folding
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the computer language out of the black box (the machine) and into the white
cube, the art gallery. In this piece, he reprocesses the information from the oldest
existing photograph, Nicephore Niepce’s so-called heliograph View from the
Window at Le Gras from . Niepce’s heliography was made using a pewter
plate coated with a solution of Bitumen of Judea, which was exposed in a cam-
era for more than eight hours, then washed with oil of lavender and white pet-
roleum to remove those parts of the bitumen not hardened by the light. To the
left in the image, we see Niepce’s pigeon house and to the right, a wing of the
main building of his home. The light in this picture is magical. It is as if all of the
normal shadows caused by the sun have been somehow erased. This is due to
the fact that during the eight hours of exposure, the sun had crossed the sky and
lit every object evenly. There is indeed time in this photograph, a time which
encompasses a duration longer than most feature films.
In Andreas Müller-Pohle’s Digital Scores (after Nicephore Niepce), we no longer
see Niepce’s home or the pigeon house. The dots, the silver, the emulsion and
the light are also gone. The visual information in the image has been turned into
data, numerical representations. Müller-Pohle has taken the old image, the old
medium of the heliograph, on a journey literally into the darkest corners of the
digital machine. Niepce’s heliograph (or at least the watercolor reproduction of
it found in Helmut Gernsheim’s  Geschichte der Photographie) becomes a long
winding digital code. Müller-Pohle displays the code on eight panels as a messy
swarm of numbers and computational notations. Each panel represents one-
eighth of one byte of memory. Niepce’s eight hours of exposure has been trans-
formed into eight panels of information. The time of the image has been spatia-
lized into numeric code. In a gallery, the time of the image is “recaptured” as the
time it takes to walk from one panel to the next.
Crucially, Müller-Pohle has reversed the image-making process and chosen to
display the new matrix of the image. What kind of transformation are we wit-
nessing? “We see not a photograph, but the new numerical rhetoric of photo-
graphy”, Geoffrey Batchen writes in a comment to this work. However, this
numerical rhetoric should not be confused with the old relational geometry
used in the rhetoric of composition, which goes back to the time of Alberti. We
are instead dealing with an attempt to display the language of the computer as
the new language of the image. The visual aesthetic of the original photograph
has been decisively displaced in favor of the machine’s capacity to “remember”
the image as numbers to be manipulated. The result fiercely demonstrates the
fundamental anti-aesthetic hidden in the logic of the algorithmic culture. Con-
temporary image processing usually involves digital conversion and attune-
ment at some stage in its process. If this process is arrested to reveal the codes
conditioning these operations, as in Müller-Pohle’s case, the impression will de-
nigrate the image as we know it. Some would even say that an algorithmic cul-
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ture involves a fundamental critique of the visual layer of our culture. If visual
culture is reborn as programmable codes, it is, at the same time, non-visual. In a
questionnaire on the future of visual culture studies, Laura U. Marks asserted,
“I personally think that the period of visual culture is over. Thus it’s ironic that
all these programs in visual studies are starting up, just at a point when infor-
mation culture, which is invisible, is becoming the dominant form of our cul-
ture.” Batchen thinks that information processing pushes us primarily into a
kind of immaterialization:
At least since  and the introduction of Adobe Photoshop into the marketplace,
photography has been in the words of the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard,
an immatériel (“the principle on which the operational structure is based is not that of
a stable ‘substance’, but that of an unstable ensemble of interactions … the model of
language”). Certainly, the identity of the photographic image no longer has to do
with its support or its chemical composition, or with its authorship, place of origin,
or pictorial appearance. It instead comprises, as Müller-Pohle suggests, a pliable se-
quence of digital data and electronic impulses. It is their configuration that now de-
cides an image’s look and significance, even the possibility of its continued existence.
In other words, “photography” today is all about the reproduction and consumption,
flow and exchange, maintenance and disruption, of data.
I both agree and disagree with Batchen’s radical conclusion. Since the initial
stages of the digital revolution, we have learned that the immaterialization the-
sis of Lyotard and Batchen has its limitations. To a certain extent, it is due to a
notion of programmability understood as conditioned by immateriality. It
would be better to see the contemporary image as a technological object, which
is processual. Even if digital photography comprises “a pliable sequence of di-
gital data and electronic impulses”, it still relies on a variable system of sup-
ports (capturing apparatuses with specific algorithms built in, software and
hardware), which comprise the work process, or what Karl Marx would call
“the hidden abode of production” where access is restricted or governed by
what Friedrich Kittler has called “computeranalphabetismus”. Rather than
Batchen and Lyotard’s focus on the process of immaterialization with regard to
digital media, we need this focus on a new materialism. In the hidden abode of
contemporary production, the medium/matter distinction hasn’t disappeared,
but has simply been reorganized. We could use the distinction between the me-
dium of storage and the medium of display as an illustration. Within analog
culture, there is usually a causal relationship between storage and display, say
between negative and print, but in algorithmic culture, the relationship has be-
come not simply arbitrary, but dependent on the new interstice of software, or
what I would call an algorithmically enabled work process. By using the term
“algorithmic culture”, I want to direct attention to this new and fundamental
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difference. An algorithmic culture is not an immaterial culture, but a factory
where the work process abides in different layers of code and algorithms.
If we juxtapose the two images, the old Niepce heliograph and Müller-Pohle’s
Digital Scores, the question is, what controls the move or the transition between
these two images? By using information theory, we can say that we see two
types of information and two different types of media. They both direct atten-
tion toward a material substratum of production: dots in the case of Niepce and
numbers in the case of Müller-Pohle. We move from dots to digits. If we forma-
lize the impression we can put it this way: it is the same image, but represented
differently. The first we would call a photograph, the second is a numerical re-
presentation of the photograph. The identity of media itself has changed funda-
mentally. Put more simply, we could say that in the case of Niepce, there is a
causal relationship between storage and display, but in Müller-Pohle’s case, the
new storage medium of digital codes has itself become what is displayed. Mül-
ler-Pohle’s experiment addresses the new “non-visual” layer of visual culture by
arresting the technological nature of image processing at the stage “before” it
becomes an image in the ordinary sense. He implicitly criticizes Bolter and Gru-
sin’s idea that the digital image essentially remediates earlier media, for exam-
ple, realistic photography or analog film, but the heart of the matter is more
complex: the diffusion of informatics within the production and recirculation of
images actually – and essentially – negates and postpones the phenomenologi-
cal output “level” of the image. In a paradoxical maneuver, Müller-Pohle dis-
plays the non-visual machinery of the before-the-image as a multiple, as eight
potential images, as codes to be reprogrammed. The machinic ground of the
image (codes and algorithms) has become a reservoir for a plurality of expres-
sions. The digital image becomes a new (non)ground for unprecedented spa-
tio-temporal explorations.
The Image as Projectile
Ken Jacobs has used both analog and digital technologies in his found-footage
film experiments. His Tom, Tom, the Piper’s Son (/) rephotographed
Billy Bitzer’s ten-minute silent short from  into a -minute delayed ex-
ploration of the material. He uses what could be called an analog technique
(rephotographing off the screen) to create a vertical effect. A recurring stylistic
effect is namely the ways in which he digs deeply into each frame of the film to
excavate the hidden life of the grain of the image. Jacobs’ film is widely recog-
nized as a classic structural film and was added to the US National Film Regis-
try by the Library of Congress in . In , Jacobs reworked Bitzer’s old
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short with the aid of digital tools. He calls this version, Return to the Scene
of the Crime. This time he limits it to reworking the film’s short opening scene
where the pig is stolen. However, this version is  minutes long, but instead of
digging deeply into the frames in a vertical manner, he uses a technique that is
comparative and horizontal. It is not primarily the grain of the image that he
studies here; his comparative analysis of images and sequences often juxtaposes
images or a series of images in different technical (digital) attires. In a fabulous
sequence, the juggler’s balls are transformed into still images “captured” from
different fractions of the opening scene (fig. ). It is as if the whole opening
scene is folded into a spectacular explosion of past and present moments, creat-
ing an intensive time-space. The juggler scene suddenly comes to a halt, is then
run backwards and then forward again. The sequence intensifies time and space
in ways that eclipse the analog version of the same material.
Fig. . Still from Ken Jacobs’s Return to the Scene of the Crime ()
These intensities have been further explored by Jacobs’ student Gregg Bier-
mann, who also refashions found footage, often using Hitchcock classics. I call
his works “software cinema” because they so insistently explore a found se-
quence of film images according to a preprogrammed software feature or “spe-
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cial effect”. In Labyrinthine () Biermann works with  memorable and
iconographic shots in Hitchcock’s classic Vertigo (). The shots are super-
imposed on top of each other, creating a hypnotic labyrinth of repetitions and
transformations (fig. ). The different moments overlap in a kind of contra-
punctual proliferation lasting  minutes. This superimposition of images is un-
like how we remember it from the classical (analog) techniques, where the
images are partly transparent. The images are composite sequences of con-
centric rectangles. The rectangular screen no longer frames one shot at a time,
rather, the screen becomes a theatre for a multiplicity of images where each new
shot is born within the previous shot as a new rectangle, which gradually in-
crease in size and finally covers the last shot. As it grows, new shots are born
within the shot and this goes on according to a rhythmical scheme where each
shot is repeated four or five times. As the film develops, several series of shots
overlap. Cinematic motion as the movement of objects in space within the image
is here competing with the movement between blocks of floating images. The
blocks float like moving pictures through the screen like an approaching bullet
or projectile. Ultimately, a labyrinth of movements appears both within the im-
age (the image within the image) and between the images (the changing rela-
tionship between the images within the image). Continuity editing is replaced
by a discontinuous and labyrinthine editing process, and the screen no longer
displays one image at a time, but several.
In spite of the rhythmical slowness of the floating concentric rectangles, it is
sometimes confusing to distinguish between them as if this virtual multiplicity
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Fig. . Still from Gregg Biermann’s Labyrinthine ()
of time folding images indexes in intangible ways the constant confusion and
dizziness of the protagonist of the film, Scottie (James Stewart) – and the viewer
– who both are sometimes unable to distinguish between the different women
(the woman remembered and the woman seen) as played by Kim Novak. Bier-
mann’s hypnotic repetition and manipulation of the characteristic soundtrack
together with the “floating” iconography of the film highlights the entire reper-
toire of genres at play in Vertigo, which itself floats in between a detective
mystery thriller, a romantic melodrama and a horror movie. Most of the shots
are of Scottie as he is observing or thinking; he hardly moves during these se-
quences. The images have a stuttering and discontinuous logic that arrests and
focuses on perceptual phenomena, which slips away when we view the film.
Biermann opens these intervals of the imperceptible, enlarges them and turns
them into an art form of their own. It is as if he is using the technologically
enhanced quality of the images to explore the optical unconscious in a way
never envisioned by Walter Benjamin.
Fig. . Still from Gregg Biermann’s Spherical Coordinates ()
This feature of the unconscious is taken to a different vein in Spherical Coor-
dinates (), which remakes a short scene from Hitchcock’s Psycho. Here,
we concentrate on Janet Leigh who is driving. The image twists, bends, folds
and turns around (sometimes still, sometimes moving) as she steers the wheel
(fig. ). “The camera moves in a variety of ways, examining the inside of a D
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animated sphere on the inside of which a scene from Psycho is wrapped”, ex-
plains Biermann. It is as if a camera is analyzing the manipulation of the im-
age itself. Spherical Coordinates and Labyrinthine foreground the digital
imaging tools in ways that turn the films into sensitive systems. He manipulates
well-known found footage, that is, he intervenes in our memory, a collective
system where images have become “emoticons” of sorts, and alters the very
threads of this system. The exploration of abnormal movements between the
still and the moving image create a system of post-cinematic “emoticons” map-
ping and altering the coordinates of a sensitive system which is collective or
more than human.
The Time of Technology
These new spatio-temporal explorations seem to reveal a new potential for the
visual. We need to question the relationship between images and the body, be-
tween the inhuman and the human in new ways. I will show how Mark B.N.
Hansen does this with regards to the digital image, but first, Rodowick’s cri-
tique of the digital image. He laments the inability of the digital image to con-
vey an experience of time passing, and he continues:
It might be clarifying at this point to insist on the rather radical point that in the
digital universe there is no cinema, no photography, no images, and no sounds. The
cosmogony of computers only recognizes symbolic notation and algorithmic opera-
tions, and is totally agnostic as to outputs. We are used to thinking of images on the
model of painting or photography, as limited extensions of space present to us as a
whole, and we want to think of digital or electronic “images” in this familiar way. But
an electronic image is not “one” – it is never wholly present to us because screens are
being constantly refreshed and rewritten. And again, the code writing this output to
the screen can just as easily take the form of text, a sound, or an abstract symbolic
notation. This is why I say in The Virtual Life of Film that the reconstitution of an image
from digital information is something like making a very detailed painting from the
information given in a very precise description. Or, to refer to a wonderful early text
by Roland Barthes, digital “photography” cannot be considered as a “message with-
out a code” – it is only code and nothing else.
Rodowick poses a radical opposition between the analog and the digital image.
He asserts that the radical otherness of the digital image creates a “naming cri-
sis”. We need a new name for the image, or for the no-longer-an-image-as-we-
used-to-know-it. In The Virtual Life of Film, Rodowick argues that the specific
quality of the analog image resides in the fact that it conveys a unique impres-
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sion of time passing due to the fact that there is a causal relationship between
input (the time of shooting) and output (projection). The digital image essen-
tially lacks this causal relationship. Its multiplicity resides in its discontinuity
between input and output. Furthermore, Rodowick establishes a causal rela-
tionship between the technical quality of the image and a certain mode of ex-
perience. One image conveys a certain experience of time, another does not.
Significantly, Hansen establishes a similar causal relationship between technol-
ogy and experience, but he reaches the opposite conclusion.
As I see it, digitization requires us to reconceive the correlation between the user’s
body and the image in an even more profound manner. It is not simply that the image
provides a tool for the user to control the “infoscape” of contemporary material cul-
ture, as Manovich [and Rodowick] suggests, but rather that the “image” has itself
become a process, and, as such, has become irreducibly bound up with the body.
Hansen’s new embodied understanding of the digital image relies on a concept
of affectivity, which he describes as “the capacity of the body to experience itself
as ‘more than itself’ and thus to deploy its sensory-motor power to create the
unpredictable, the experimental, the new” (). Both Hansen and Rodowick use
a modern phenomenology to posit their argument, but their phenomenology
seems to be based on two different conceptions of technology and the self. To
Rodowick, the analog image becomes a time traveler negotiating between two
experiences of time, but the digital image is unable to capture this experience of
duration because it is never “wholly present to us”; it is merely a contingent
configuration of numerical values where an indexical basis is replaced by a con-
tinual scanning or updating, he would assert. Hansen, on the other hand, seeks
to implicate the process of image making itself as a certain time of technology
where information is “made perceivable through embodied experience” in new
ways.
Upon viewing Biermann’s Labyrinthine, both Hansen and Rodowick offer
significant insights into the analysis of the experience. On the one hand, Hitch-
cock’s Vertigo is replaced by a new “feel” of the image. The film no longer
carries the same kind of aura as we experienced in the original theatrical release.
However, the ground of this aura (its originary memory impact, so to speak) is
addressed as a malleable nervous system (both emotional and visual). Rather
than a photochemical “index”, the experience of computer-generated image
processing opens up the potential for a new experience of the film as a way of
indexing the changing vocation of the life of the new media image itself. This
new opening relates less (or not at all, as Rodowick would perhaps contend) to
the kind of time or duration at play in an analog image, but it foregrounds a
new technicity of the image which exposes time as a non-human nervous sys-
tem or a becoming. In other words, the loss of a certain “feeling” of “human”
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time (Rodowick) may be the necessary condition for the new image to produce
the mode of affective experience addressed by Hansen.
Kaleidoscope
The multiplicity of the digital image can be studied even more dramatically in
the work by new media artists such as Mario “Quasimodo” Klingemann. He
experiments with new algorithms and software on his website, which can be
downloaded or simply interacted with. Some, like his piece Kaleidoscope, are
pieces of software that can accept a painting or a still photograph as an input
and a moving or an interactive image as an output. As soon as one engages
with Kaleidoscope, the website takes complete control of the user’s mouse and
keyboard. Each key instantiates an algorithm, which alters the image. The old
film/photo divide is deconstructed and integrated into a playful structure of
interactivity. The viewer becomes a player interacting or infecting the image
itself with movement. When the Web site is opened, Kaleidoscope presents a
stilled wheel with images of a woman. The image is based on J.H. Lynch’s
drawing “Autumn Leaves”. Once you click on the image, the keyboard is acti-
vated and “she” begins to move according to the following parameters:
[] – start/stop rotation 
[] – start/stop rotation 
[] – start/stop rotation 
[] – toggle flip tiles
[+]/[-] –more/less tiles
[q]/[w] – rotation  speed
[a]/[s] – rotation  speed
[y]/[x] – rotation  speed
[e] – reset rotation  speed
[d] – reset rotation  speed
[c] – reset rotation  speed
[UP]/[DOWN] – zoom in/out
[m]/[n] – spiral offset
[] – reset spiral offset
[]/[] – shearing 
[]/[] – shearing .
The process of interacting with the image is inseparable from what Hansen calls
affectivity. This is an experimental becoming where the body of the player de-
ploys “its sensory-motor power to create the unpredictable, the experimental,
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the new”. We don’t view the image, we play with it, and each action activates
an algorithm which instantiates a certain move and a certain speed of the im-
age, as well as simulated camera moves. However, the algorithms also reveal
themselves in the transitions between arrest and motion and in between differ-
ent motions, etc. This kind of interaction with what looks like a still image is a
feature of many of Klingemann’s web installations, such as several of his so-
called Incubator sketches, like Rubber Screen.
Klingemann’s generative art work Flickeur is a software-based “machine”
which intervenes or interacts with the database Flickr.com. Once the user/view-
er presses play, Flickeur will randomly begin to retrieve images from Flickr.com
and create an infinite “film” with a style that can vary between stream-of-con-
sciousness, documentary or video clip. All the blends, motions, zooms or time
leaps are completely random. Flickeur works, according to Klingemann, “like a
looped magnetic tape where incoming images from Flickr.com will merge with
older materials and be influenced by the older recordings’ magnetic memory.
The virtual tape will also play and record forward and backward to create an-
other layer of randomness.” Klingemann actually programs a series of ran-
dom errors and glitches to simulate the appearance of the wear and tear of a
filmstrip or a magnetic band being over-written. These marks and the nerve-
wracking soundtrack sometimes turn the material into a very suggestive horror
story. Here, www.flickr.com, which is one of the largest user-based digital photo
archives in the world, is transformed into a thriller.
One could argue that the examples in this article are not representative of what
we call the digital image. I think we need to go beyond many of the most popu-
lar theories about the digital image, such as Bolter’s and Grusin’s notion that
new media basically remediates older media. This is, as I have shown, insuffi-
cient. Rodowick, Hansen and Manovich’s approaches (despite their internal dis-
agreements) seem more promising. If we take into account that the characteris-
tics of the digital image essentially reside in its processual aspects rather than in
its product aspects, the examples in this chapter are exemplary. New media
tools can be used to analyze old media in the fashion preferred by Laura Mul-
vey, but ultimately the digital image as envisioned by Hansen and Rodowick,
and demonstrated by Müller-Pohle, Jacobs, Biermann and Klingemann, speak
of a different image. It is connected to a new technical matrix, an algorithmic
culture, which interrupts the image not to analyze it in its unique singularity,
but to give birth to a potential multiplicity which is always more than one –
and ready to change.
Thank you to Harald Østgaard Lund, Arthur Tennøe, Matthias Bruhn and James Elk-
ins for useful comments.
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“The Archives of the Planet” and Montage:
The Movement of the Crowd and “the
Rhythm of Life”
Trond Lundemo
The French-Jewish banker Albert Kahn (-) created his “les Archives de la
planète” in the period  to  using color photography, film and, to a lesser
extent, black-and-white photography and stereography. This means that this
archive, conceptually as well as its physical holdings, depends on connections
and divisions between still and moving images. The intersections between the
still and the moving depict a constituting heterogeneity in the archive after the
introduction of time-based media. These changes towards the storage of move-
ment in the media architecture of the archive accommodate and coincide with
the entrance of the anonymous and the everyday into the visible. The entrance
of the masses into the “archives of the planet” is conditioned by the very same
techniques as those that will eventually make the modes of everyday life stored
there disappear. In this text, I propose that these constellations of media could
lead to a different understanding of montage in an age of the archive; one based
on gaps and dissociations between images and media as well as their intersec-
tions. This can perhaps be seen as a “montage at a distance”, or a “soft mon-
tage”: one that is present as a possibility in the future and still to be concluded.
It offers the material conditions for montage without its execution, and is conse-
quently always a “montage to come”. The configuration of visual media in the
Albert Kahn archive is designed, as in any archive, with a future use in mind.
The archival image becomes the object of future connections between images,
instead of being restricted to playing a role in a single, fixed work. This, in turn,
has consequences for how one thinks about the position of the moving image in
archival constructions and its relation to history.
Albert Kahn was one of Europe’s richest men as a consequence of his invest-
ments in diamond mines in South Africa and in Japan’s emerging economy at
the turn of the th century. His philanthropic interests were formed by the
colonialism and pacifism of his time: he was part of the intellectual life of France
and a close friend of Henri Bergson. “Les Archives de la planète” was begun in
late  when Albert Kahn made a trip around the world. While visiting the
United States, Japan and China, he had his chauffeur take photographs and
films of the trip. This material is included in the archive, and, for this reason,
marks the inception of ‘les archives de la planète’ by shaping its conceptualization.
After this trip, Kahn decided to create an archive of the planet as an ”inventory
of the surface of the globe inhabited and developed by man as it presents itself
at the start of the th century in order to fix once and for all the practices, the
aspects and the modes of human activity, whose fatal disappearance is only a
question of time” (my emphasis). He appointed Jean Brunhes, an important
researcher in the developing discipline of cultural geography, as the director of
the archive, and between  and , Kahn financed cameramen who tra-
velled to more than  countries around the world to make this inventory.
When the collection process finally came to an end , due to Albert Kahn’s
bankruptcy in the wake of the stock market crash, it comprised , auto-
chromes (a new color photography process on glass plates invented by Louis
Lumière in ), , meters of film (over  hours of projection) and 
stereographs. There are also some  black-and-white photographs, but their
role in the archive appears to be secondary in comparison to the other technolo-
gies used. A small part of the film footage was acquired from newsreel compa-
nies, and was not shot by the Kahn cameramen. The archive was kept intact
after Kahn’s bankruptcy and even survived the occupation of France shortly
after Kahn’s death in , probably because it was considered to be of little or
no financial value. Almost all of the film material is stored as unedited shots, as
it was never exploited commercially, and only small parts of the material were
ever spliced together for use in Jean Brunhes’ courses at the Collège de France.
As to the question of who was the “director” of these films and photographs,
we have to think in terms other than the traditional hierarchies of director, pro-
ducer and cameraman in the film industry. Kahn was only present at the shoot-
ing during his trip around the world and on the shots that took place in his
mansion and his garden in Boulogne on the outskirts of Paris. He did, however,
appoint Jean Brunhes as director because he understood the project as con-
nected to the emerging discipline of cultural geography. Kahn maintained an
important role in the decision-making process regarding whom to hire as cam-
eramen and he had the final say in where to send them. Kahn’s role clearly
exceeded that of instigator and financial backer of the enterprise. The many dig-
nitaries invited to Kahn’s home were filmed and photographed, and it seems
that the decisions about which people and which geographical places should be
included in the archive were largely his. There is little evidence of what orders
were given to the cameramen and by whom, but it remains clear that the images
from different places look stylistically coherent and similar in framing, distance,
etc. These decisions were probably made in collaborations between Kahn,
Brunhes and the experienced cameramen they hired, and the stylistic unity of
the material makes it evident that there were directions given to the cameramen
to secure a certain homogeneity in the framing, camera movements and the dis-
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tance to people in the films as well as in the color photographs. Part of the ex-
plicit ideological background of the archive was to show the universality of
mankind within the disparate cultures documented by the new technologies.
Much of the research on this archive has been concerned with its role as a
source of history, and has been devoted to identifying the events, people and
places documented. Film scholars like Tom Gunning, Paula Amad, François de
la Breteque and Teresa Castro have analyzed its film archive and its position
within film history, particularly in relation to the documentary tradition. Tom
Gunning has identified the footage as largely belonging to a pre-documentary
“view” aesthetic, whereas Paula Amad refers to it as an anthology of film
styles. Teresa Castro has sought to save the material from ‘the primitive mode’
by inferring a mental montage already anticipated in the shots while de la Bre-
tèque relates it to various movements in non-fiction cinema, like the films of
Lumière as well as those of Vertov and the European avant-garde. Amad has
approached the archive from the perspective of its representation of transient,
everyday events, claiming it to be a “counter-archive” because of the privilege it
accords to the anonymous and the everyday. In her outstanding recent mono-
graph on the archive, she situates the “counter-archival” in a Bergsonist reading
of cinematic memory.
The tendency of the research on this archive has been to focus on single
events or on one medium, and few scholars, with the notable exception of Paula
Amad, have approached the theoretical questions emerging from the use of
multi-media. This discussion will focus on the configuration of the media in the
archive. Kahn’s project is interesting from an analytical point of view regarding
the “connections” between the moving image and other media in this physical
archive as well as in the “archive” as a theoretical concept. The role of the mov-
ing image within larger media environments can also be approached in a con-
temporary context through Kahn’s archive, as it is currently being digitized and
made available as a database called FAKIR (Fonds Albert-Kahn Informatisée
pour la Recherche).
There are three properties of the Archives of the Planet that makes it of particu-
lar interest to questions of media configurations in the archive:
– Firstly, it is not a collection of existing films and photographs, even if Kahn at
some points augmented his collection by acquiring existing newsreel footage
from Pathé or other newsreel companies. It differs, in this respect, from
many of the discussions of the day about archiving existing films as histori-
cal sources. Kahn’s archive is not a collection of existing films and photo-
graphs as a source of knowledge, but seeks to acquire knowledge through
the act of shooting. Film is a means to make ”an inventory of the surface of
the globe”, and not the object of collection itself. This idea of the recording of
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a culture poses stylistic questions about distance, angles, framing, movement
etc., but also about how the relations between the media are designed and
conceived.
– Secondly, the film material was (with few exceptions) never edited together.
This means that it was not given a narrative or a persuasive force through
editing, but remained as raw shots, ‘rushes’, with the whole of the shots
length intact. The montage of shots and intersections of media remained to
be decided, as possible connections, and consequently open to future re-ar-
rangements. This aspect of the Kahn films clearly sets them apart from the
newsreel tradition that emerged during that period (Pathé Journal in  and
Gaumont Actualités in ).
– Thirdly, Kahn’s archival impulse was formed by the anticipation of an ap-
proaching catastrophe, or at least of the disappearance of the cultures and
social life, the signs of which he was collecting. Kahn made an archive for
the time to come, after many of the cultures and modes of social life docu-
mented had ceased to exist. It was only then that this raw material could
receive a reading, a montage.
Throughout the  years the material was collected, Kahn remained with the
multiple media model of films and autochromes. In addition, about  stereo-
scopic plates were collected in the early years, and according to the Albert Kahn
Museum exhibition, a phonograph was brought along for Kahn’s first trip, but
was never replaced after it was broken during the first part of the journey. Why
did the archive keep with this media architecture? If these media were under-
stood as true slices of reality, wouldn’t the autochromes be sufficient? Or just the
films? The media used in the archive demonstrates that none of them could give
a full and accurate account of any one event. Kahn equipped his photographers
and cinematographers with both still and moving image cameras because they
complement each other. The visual modes of these techniques store different
things, and are consequently techniques for the selection of information: color
photography lacks movement, films lack not only color (except for the color
film footage shot in the late s) but also that frozen moment in time. Films
were an essential part of the archive, however. In the phrasing of Jean Brunhes,
the director of the archive, “the precious discovery of cinema adds to the form
the expression of movement itself, that is the rhythm of life”.
This points to an important factor in the discussion of cinema as well as of the
role of the image in the archive at the time. If Boleslas Matuszewski was already
in  arguing that films were ”a new source of history”, the post-Gutenberg
Galaxy archive, where sound is stored as sound and visual events as moving
images, produces an awareness that what is seen is different from what is said,
that texts tell other stories than images. The heterogeneity of the archive is a key
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feature of the Aufschreibesysteme of , as analyzed by Friedrich Kittler in
Grammophon, Film, Typewriter. It is an archive of gaps, cracks and contradic-
tions, where knowledge is produced by putting fragments together. In a very
valuable discussion of Kahn’s project from the perspective of the history of ar-
chive theory, Paula Amad asserts that the Kahn archive used film and photogra-
phy in a synthesizing approach, and she refers to Ricciotto Canudo’s view of
cinema as a synthesis of the other arts (“the Sixth Art” ()) as a theoretical
program for the collection. However, the role of film in Kahn’s project is a
different one. Various media were used because they have different qualities,
and consequently also different shortcomings. Film is not the synthesis of the
other arts in this collection of media, since the moving image would have suf-
ficed by itself.
It would be logical if film and photography were used for different purposes
in the archive, for different kinds of events. However, this doesn’t seem to be the
case. At least, what one would expect a division by media – for instance, that
photography would be for portraits, individuals, landscapes and things with
less movement, while film would be used for fast or steadily moving objects –
but this expectation was soon proven to be wrong. The Archives of the Planet
often used film to make portraits of people and it used autochromes to show
parades and moving objects, with the result being blurred images due to slow
exposure speeds in the color process. It is striking how often the two media
show the same things from a similar viewpoint. A city scene or a person in a
given setting are often “recorded” twice; once in color and once in movement.
The fact that the same events are photographed twice results in a division be-
tween film and photography, demonstrating that Kahn, Jean Brunhes and their
cameramen didn’t suffer from the illusion that cinema was the complete or “to-
tal medium”.
Crowds
Kahn wanted to make an “inventory of the surface of the globe inhabited and
developed by man…” This surface of the globe had only become visible with
the emergence of photography, with a new kind of description in the literature
of Flaubert and Balzac, and only came fully into view with the moving image.
The movement of the crowd into light is accompanied by cinema, since it cap-
tures ”the rhythm of life”, as Brunhes claimed. The introduction of the moving
image is closely linked to the entrance of the anonymous population into the
visible, as it became possible to include visual events in the archive. Of course,
Michel Foucault’s account of the penal and medical discourses describes this
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movement into the visible as occurring somewhere early in the th century.
However, with the moving image as an object of storage and repetition, this
“entrance of the population into light” takes on a new dimension, as is amply
demonstrated by the films in the Archives of the Planet. As I will shortly return
to, it may also simultaneously anticipate the reversal of this very movement,
towards a retreat from visibility.
When Siegfried Kracauer in his  Theory of Film discusses cinema as “the
Establishment of Physical Existence”, he interestingly devotes much attention to
“the big” among “things normally unseen”. The crowd, or in his phrasing,
‘The Masses’, is such a large phenomenon that it demands a new optic to prop-
erly capture it:
At the time of its emergence, the mass, this giant animal, was a new and upsetting
experience. As might be expected, the traditional arts proved unable to encompass
and render it. Where they failed, photography easily succeeded; it was technically
equipped to portray crowds as the accidental agglomerations they are. Yet only film,
the fulfillment of photography in a sense, was equal to the task of capturing them in
motion. In this case, the instrument of reproduction came into being almost simulta-
neously with one of its main subjects. Hence the attraction which masses exerted on
still and motion picture cameras from the outset.
Kracauer goes on to mention the films of Lumière, early Italian cinema, D.W.
Griffith and “the Russians”, and then turns to the question of montage. Kra-
cauer’s account of the history of media is worth further attention here: Firstly,
cinema supplies still photography with motion, with the “rhythm of life”, to use
Jean Brunhes’s words. The movement of the mass is portrayed as a supplement
to photography, a redemption of the movement of physical reality. This results
in an account of media constellations as fluent transitions from one level to the
next in a progression of technologies. If Kracauer places the emergence of
photography and film more or less at the same time – “they came into being
almost simultaneously with” the crowd – it is probably because early photogra-
phy didn’t have the capacity to “capture” the movement of the crowd. The
images would become blurred, just as in the autochrome process. Instantaneous
photography wasn’t technically available until later in the century. With the
higher levels of light sensitivity that allow for shorter exposure times, we are
already on the way towards chronophotography, so often portrayed as some-
thing that smoothly led to the movement of film in traditional cinema histories.
This is probably the background for Kracauer’s conflation between the time of
the “coming into being” of photography and film.
This account of matters, besides the obvious problems connected with teleo-
logical historical narratives, conflates what is so interesting in the composition
of media divisions in the Kahn archive: the differences between the still and the
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moving. Kracauer, towards the end of his book, continues: “Where photogra-
phy ends, film, much more inclusive, takes over”. Jean Brunhes’s view, “the
precious discovery of cinema adds to the form the expression of movement it-
self, that is the rhythm of life”, also portrays media differences as a simple addi-
tion, securing a seemingly fluent transition from the still to the moving in the
archive. Just as the accounts of the famous Lumière screening at Grand Café in
 tell us that it started with the projection of a still image that suddenly burst
into motion, redeeming the movement of the masses leaving the Lumière fac-
tory, it proposes a media genealogy that obliterates the coexistence and, hence,
the differences between the still and the time-based image in the archive. In
practice, however, the Kahn archive displays the gaps and tensions that exist
between still photography and the moving image in the archive.
Another property of Kracauer’s account is that it sees in cinema technology
the very condition for its subject – the masses. At least, the “instrument of re-
production came into being simultaneously with one of its main subjects”. If
Kracauer here makes a connection between social life and technology, he
doesn’t establish a causal relationship. However, as is made clear by Walter
Benjamin and other Frankfurt School theorists, the masses, as a part of the social
technologies of industrialization and urbanization, were constituted well before
the introduction of cinematography. This is exactly the reason why filmmakers
Jean-Luc Godard and Harun Farocki suggest that cinema “came too late” to
have any influence on the formation of the political life of high capitalism.
When cinema was introduced at the end of the th century, the political, social
and economic structures of Fordist capitalism was already established and im-
plemented.
Jacques Rancière gives another account of the genealogy of the visible crowd,
when he claims that it was literature, and not cinema, that shed light on the
masses. It was the attention to the infinitely small detail, the grain of dust, the
anonymous people and the everyday routine in the works of Flaubert, Balzac,
Dostoyevsky and Zola that made the masses visible. Rancière goes even further
to say that it was this turn in literature that made photography and especially
cinema accepted as an art form, and not only as a technique. Cinema only
gives a physical image to a visibility that has already been established through
literary description, and consequently he has no reason to lament cinema’s be-
lated arrival on the scene of the masses.
The consequences of Rancière’s assessment regarding the issue of technicity
are huge. It would, for instance, imply that the rupture in the archive from a
place that stores texts to one that also encompasses time-based media is dimin-
ished. The th-century novel and cinema describe different kinds of move-
ment, however. These differences could be investigated through various per-
spectives, as that of montage, of psychotechnics or intermedial configurations.
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Cinema is connected to other media in different ways than the literature that
came before it, or the digital that came after. Also on a very basic material level,
the movement of the crowd in literature is of a different kind than in cinema.
The intermittent movement of the film strip through the camera and the projec-
tor belongs to a different logic of time and space than literary description. Gior-
gio Agamben has observed how gestures are submitted to an intermittent, jerky
logic at the end of the th century, and that cinema offers a new gestural re-
gime. This is what makes cinema ethical and political besides its aesthetical
dimensions, according to Agamben. Rancière, instead, sees the movement of
the masses abstracted from technology. This indistinction between modes of
movement in different technical media is also a common shortcoming in today’s
analysis of the conversion from cinematic movement to digital video compres-
sion, where many consider digital technology only as a means of access to a
‘content’. We should instead speak of different ‘rhythms of life’ in these cases.
In order to examine the issue of media configuration further, it is interesting
to note how the Kahn archive was seen as an undertaking that depended on the
new technologies of color photography and cinema in order to fix the modes of
human activity. The dispositifs are clearly seen as the condition for the subjects of
the archive, the crowd and everyday life, but they are also the agents of this
“disappearance, which is only a matter of time”. The technologies that make
the crowd and everyday life visible are also the tools of globalization. It is well
known how the Lumière brothers, in particular but also their various competi-
tors, sent cameramen to many countries around the world in the months follow-
ing the introduction of the Cinematograph to shoot material in these places.
They also organized screenings of material from other places while they were
there. Cinema and sound recordings are part of a powerful globalization move-
ment at the turn of the th century.
Kahn’s archive does not only use the technologies that make the crowd visi-
ble, but also the ones that homogenize it. Cinema and photography are part of a
larger network of world-encompassing techniques of control that regulated the
local as part of a global system. Kahn’s inventory of the cultures of the world
cooperates with the standardization of time, telephone networks, world fairs
and new means of travel to allow the local modes of life to adapt to a world-
wide system of representation. The tools for capturing the modes of human ac-
tivity are simultaneously the tools that make them disappear through economic,
technological and social change. This is the disappearance that Kahn himself is
stating as the reason for creating the archive. There is clearly a sense of loss in
Kahn’s archival impulse, as the disappearance of the modes of life are only a
question of time, but there are no real signs of nostalgia on Kahn’s part. His
various philanthropic projects strove to create a better world of universal under-
standing and cooperation.
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By fixing the existing modes of human life for the future, one also brings them
to an end; such is the paradoxical logic of the archive. This is consistent with the
archival function of selecting what to include as the past: This selection inevita-
bly turns the present into the past. The double temporality of Kahn’s, and prob-
ably any, archive, is that by collecting and storing material, it prepares for the
end of what it stores. Its end is the only reason for archiving it. To fix an image
of an event or a place is, ultimately, to make it disappear. These properties of the
archive become especially acute and interesting in the multiple media model of
Kahn’s project, since it is constructed on the separation between movement and
stillness. The time-based image continually supplements, contradicts and refers
to the still image, thus accenting the heterogeneity of the post-Gutenberg ar-
chive. The ephemeral moment of film is contrasted with the immobile, and “the
rhythm of life” is stilled in the encapsulated moment of the autochromes. Both
modes of inscription fix a time lost, but based on different temporalities.
The end of the various modes of life in the face of globalizing modernity is
not identical to the decline of the masses, however. In the process of industria-
lization of non-Western societies, life has become increasingly regulated accord-
ing to new structures of working time and leisure, housing principles are recon-
structed, etc., while the crowd remains the dominant figure of social life. The
masses become described, measured and visualized in photography, sound re-
cordings and cinema. The masses survive this first wave of globalization, as
documented and thereby accelerated in the creation of the Archives of the Pla-
net. As I will note later, a gradual process of dispersal of the masses began after
the Second World War. In the move away from the enclosing institutions of
what Foucault described as a disciplinary society, represented by the agglom-
eration of people in schools, hospitals, factories and prisons, towards a ‘society
of control’, processes of individuation are transformed at a range of levels. In
short, globalization in  propelled the masses into the visible, whereas the
 version disperses these same masses into individual reception and repre-
sentation, as epitomized by television, the personal computer and the Internet.
Modernity makes the end of the existing modes of life only a matter of time.
The global transformation of the local is the driving force of the archive, as it
anticipates the end of these life forms. Kahn’s archival impulse lies with the
approaching end, an invisible and unspoken element that nonetheless condi-
tions what is stored. This is an invisible element of the archive that is appre-
hended and anticipated through the phantom of the crowd in the autochromes.
The long exposure time of the color process blurs the masses in motion, render-
ing the fleeting presence of people as transparent spots in the image. This en-
capsulates the “media theory” of the Archives of the Planet. Film and photogra-
phy are not a full record of any event or any form of life, but rather a temporal
lack, producing specters of what once was. This is an archive for a future still to
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come, where these cultures and modes of social life would have been irretrieva-
bly lost. This apprehension of an unknown future invests the archive with a
complex temporality.
The Image and History
The temporal figures of the Archives of the Planet lead us to the issue of the
philosophy of history at work in this archival theory. The survival of these
images into a time when these modes of human life have disappeared depends
on their montage being open to future connections. These images are not – or
not solely – images with a stable signification of pastness within a secure histori-
cal continuum because their temporality is split between the media of the ar-
chive – the still and the moving – and the fixation of a time lost. Since the film
shots and stills were not edited together or organized for exhibition, the materi-
al establishes virtual connecting points between the images. This is a potential
for a montage still to be executed. Film editing and photographic displays are
archival work in that it entails the selection of the material to be included, and
the discarding of things not considered part of the work or the exhibition. The
Archives of the Planet is a special case, since this selection process never hap-
pened. All of the material has been kept independent of these selections, and
without being edited into any defined context. These images surprise us with
an unfamiliar look and freshness due to their unusual color and the primacy
they give everyday life. However, just as striking is their unfinished character
due to the fact that they were never edited. They were, and remain to this day,
images for an unknown future.
Walter Benjamin, in his Theses on History understood the historical articula-
tion of the past as “to take control of a memory, as it flashes in a moment of
danger”. This image is an alluring one for the description of the relation of
the past to the present in the Archives of the Planet. It would be tempting to see
the ghost-like appearances of the autochromes of parades and passing people
on the streets as the memory “as it flashes in a moment of danger”. It is an
emblematic image of the masses slowly becoming visible. The crowd also leaves
the regime of the visible, as they have passed only as a flash at a certain moment
that is shorter than the time of exposure of the image. It presents the entrance of
the anonymous crowd into the visible followed by their subsequent dispersal
into individual users and customers in the media sphere of the post-Fordist so-
ciety. The ghostly figures of the image are “a monstrous abbreviation” (”einer
ungeheueren Abbreviatur”), of these two historical regimes of visibility.
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By introducing such a split temporality in the image itself, the ghostly shad-
ows shatter the continuum of history. The image is no longer a preserved mo-
ment of past time. Technology instead inscribes itself to demonstrate how it
conditions the representation of the past and the writing of history. These auto-
chromes are images of the ephemerality of history itself. The stability of the im-
print is broken as it introduces movement into the still image, resulting in an
unidentifiable presence of invisible people in the image. This ephemerality is at
the core of Benjamin’s materialist approach to the concept of history. The auto-
chromes provide the evanescence of the flash of lightning, as the people they
depict have already passed. Their passage is abbreviated in a ghostly moment.
They have, literally, left the picture. These images are haunting pictures of war.
The parading soldiers have passed and gone, impossible to discern as indivi-
duals in the image. They are the ghostly shadows of the sort that Maxim Gorky
had already identified in the moving image upon his visit to the Cinematograph
in , thus eluding a fixed historical signification or an indexical presence in
the image alone.
However, Benjamin’s famous expression of “memory, as it flashes in a mo-
ment of danger” cannot be reduced to the stable, moving images of Kahn’s films
alone. Neither is this dimension to be found in the still photography in the ar-
chive, since these images remain before us at any time, and not only at a mo-
ment of danger. The flash of memory is a matter of montage. As the images of
the Archives of the Planet were not edited together for screening, the archive is
the site of future connections and virtual montage. However, it would, in this
case, be insufficient to understand montage only as the editing of film shots or
the arrangements of still photos. Instead, the historical articulation of the past
depends on the configurations and intersections of media. The role of photogra-
phy and the moving image in Kahn’s archival project is to establish connecting
points with other technologies, media, visibilities and utterances. The centrality
of the media interconnections and gaps is commented upon by Samuel Weber
in relation to Benjamin’s concepts of allegory and aura:
What this meteoric event [of the allegorical that exceeds or eludes signification] leaves
behind in its wake is what I would be tempted to call – if a neologism can be allowed
– the mediauric: auratic flashes and shadows that are not just produced and repro-
duced by the media but which are themselves the media, since they come to pass in
places that are literally inter-mediary, in the interstices of a process of reproduction
and of recording – Aufnahme – that is above all a mass movement of collection and
dispersion, of banding together and of disbanding.
The rupture of the continuum of historical time and the presence of the past in
monstrous abbreviation in the present makes these autochromes of ghostly pro-
cessions in Kahn’s archive into seductive images indeed. The historical articula-
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tion of the past depends not on the single image, however, but on virtual mon-
tage and future connections: these flashes occur in ‘inter-mediary’ places. They
occur in the spaces between the media. It is too simple to assign to these images
a Benjaminian materialist historicity in their own right. The image as a flash is
what one cannot see in one image alone. Even if these images are invested with
a split temporality, and they could be said to display movement at the same
time as they are still, the flashes that are the media exist in the virtual connec-
tions between the still image and the moving.
This virtual montage is already suggested in the heterogeneity of the tempo-
ral modes of the images of the archive: the phantoms of the still color photo-
graphs relate to the film shots of the same subjects and places at the same time.
These images establish distant points of connection to each other, as well as to
other images of this and other archives. Instead of illustrating Benjamin’s flash
of memory in a moment of danger, the autochromes demonstrate how any ar-
chival medium remains incomplete and fragmented. It produces distant con-
nections, intermedial spaces, gaps and ruptures. The connecting points between
the stills and the editing of one image after another are absent in this archive.
This is a “soft montage”, as the connections are only fleeting and temporary. It
is a montage at a distance, in the sense that its elements are physically separated
and only associated in thought. If we see these virtual connections in the Kahn
archive as a form of montage, it could be one that oscillates between the still and
the moving in similar ways as Benjamin’s theses on history, between an image to
be retained and the evanescence of a flash. It is a montage made of the memory
of images, suddenly and momentarily associated and disconnected at the same
moment. The montage, consequently, always remains in the future, in new si-
tuations and intermediary configurations.
“Memory, as it flashes in a moment of danger” is for Benjamin an Erlösung of
the past: This redemption of physical reality is what Kracauer found in cin-
ema. The redemption is, however, not in the single image itself but in mon-
tage. French art theorist Georges Didi-Huberman discussed the relevance of
montage in an attempt to understand the role of the image in the archive. The
issue is whether the archive image tells us anything about the horrors of war.
Didi-Huberman argues that even if the image doesn’t tell us everything, even if
it is not all of an event, it is still an essential part in the process where one con-
structs a knowledge about an event. Didi-Huberman evokes Godard’s claim in
Histoire(s) du cinéma that there are no images of the Nazi extermination camps in
cinema, and that this is where cinema failed to fulfill its mission: To make the
Third Reich extermination camps known and understood. This is the field
where the questions raised in relation to the Kahn archive become essential.
Of course, there are many documentary images of the camps, of the mass
graves and of the horrors of the genocides. What Godard is implying with his
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claim is that the montage of images that could produce a way of thinking about
these events were missing at the time. An image is never one in Godard’s theory
of cinema, it is always a juxtaposition. The image of the Shoah is not the image
that captures the gas chambers, but on the contrary one that shows what one
cannot see. The montage, as “a form that thinks” according to Godard in part
a: La monnaie de l’absolue of Histoire(s) du cinéma, relies on putting images,
sounds and texts of various sorts together, and its exemplary experimental field
is in many ways Histoire(s) du cinéma. The work in the archive is exactly this; to
juxtapose media and fragments of different sorts to construct a dimension that
is not in the archival document alone. These gaps and fissures between the ar-
chival parts take on a new dimension with the introduction of the time-based
media in the archive. As its images largely remained unedited, it is clear that the
Archives of the Planet is not this type of montage construction. But exactly be-
cause it was not edited for exploitation, because it was kept as raw footage al-
most as a time capsule, it still maintained a virtual dimension for eventual con-
nections and juxtapositions. Because these images were made for a time to
come, after the end of the existence of the modes of social life portrayed in the
images, the connecting points between the events and places depicted were still
not resolved. The miraculous survival of the images of the Kahn archive even
during the Vichy regime – one would expect that an archive established by an
international Jewish banker would have been seen as politically suspect and
economically valuable – constitute a rare case where the images of the th cen-
tury have not yet received a reading through established connecting points.
The Digital Return
We are moving from the analog to the digital. The conversion of “les Archives de
la planète into the FAKIR (Fonds Albert-Kahn Informatisée pour la Recherche)
database is part of a development that often – maybe far too often – leads to
discussions of the role of the indexical and the loss of the link to physical reality.
This version of digitization is grossly simplified. Digitization doesn’t mean that
film preservation becomes obsolete, and the unedited films of les Archives de la
planète remain intact. Despite many of the programmatic statements typical of
our current period of transition, the conversion to digital files doesn’t mean the
end of the film base, which remains unchallenged as the superior storage me-
dium for moving images. FAKIR does not eliminate all of the material links
with the events and cultures in the archive. What we are moving into is an age
of “compound” archives, where film-base and digital files of the same material
co-exist and are connected in specific ways. The task of contemporary archive
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theory is to think about the various ways that these connections are constructed,
and how the relations between film and bits are coded.
In the age of the digitization of analog materials, there is a demand that ar-
chives make their holdings “accessible” online, or at least on the computers at
the archive itself. The access imperative is a prerequisite for public funding, and
implies an economy of the “content”. The question how the “content” of an
archive, a museum or a collection can be made “accessible” varies according to
the media of their holdings. Nobody supposes that the digital representations of
the ancient objects of a historical museum is access to the actual “content” of the
museum, but this confusion is quite often the case involving film and photo-
graphic archives. This relationship between the analog and the digital makes
the Archives of the Planet a very important case in the discussion of montage in
an age of online access. This entails the reconsideration of many key concepts of
film theory, from the notion of “the work” to the idea of montage itself. My
argument has, perhaps paradoxically, exalted the montage dimension of the Ar-
chives of the Planet because its films are not edited together. This leaves space
for temporary intersections and provisional montage, for future juxtapositions
and virtual connections. According to the general idea of what was once called
“new media”, the interactivity and navigation supplied by computer interfaces
in an age of online access seem to promise exactly these properties of the ar-
chive. In a database structure, momentary connections between images and
“soft montage” seem to be the governing principles. There are, however, at least
two reasons why this is not the case.
On a general level, any database is designed, programmed and indexed ac-
cording to certain structures. The algorithms of the database may hide them-
selves, but they are the regulating force of the use of the material. The montage
made by the user of the database may often be the most conventional known, as
it tends to retrace the habitual paths of navigation of our culture. In the FAKIR
database, which became accessible in the spring of  online at <www.albert-
kahn.fr>, the unedited shots of the films are suddenly linked in various but spe-
cific ways. If they are not edited together, they are linked by new cues; geogra-
phical, topical, thematic and material. The database architecture is designed for
navigation according to a world map, where one narrows in by choosing con-
tinents, countries and sometimes cities. The links of the database already pro-
grams the paths of navigation and there is nothing that implies that the unex-
pected, sudden connection is facilitated by the new interface. The pathways of
navigation in the database are, at present at least, as established and disciplin-
ing as those in the adjoining gardens from different parts of the world outside
the Albert Kahn museum in Boulogne on the outskirts of Paris.
The only access to the Archives of the Planet for the ordinary user is in the
edited mode. The films in the FAKIR database are edited together to represent a
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place or an event, either produced for earlier TV productions or special screen-
ings. Sometimes, the shots by the Kahn cameramen are intercut with other
kinds of archival and stock footage. The autochromes are linked in succession,
almost in PowerPoint mode, according to place or event. The user is also pre-
sented with a narrative in the Kahn Museum in Boulogne, where geographical
unity of the stills and the occasional film montage is the structuring principle
(recent topics being the Maghreb, “Infinitely India” and Japan). The BBC series
Edwardians in Colour: The Wonderful World of Albert Kahn makes use of parts of
the material intercut with new shots and other archival materials as well as with
explanatory interviews to tell the stories of events and places. This is the only
access to the archive made possible for the public. The raw shot quality of the
archive, which makes it stand out from all other film collections and archives,
where the beginning and end of each shot is still intact, is only accessible to the
researcher of the analog material. The image alone, without a commentary, the
shot without an adjoining shot, is a horror for archive culture. It is seen as de-
void of public interest by archives, meaningless by the public and a disturbance
of database design. The image always seems to come supplied with a nametag,
a place and date of birth, to make it possible to embed in a historical narrative
and in an educational and political project.
The computer media environments provide a setting determined by another
logic than the globalization movement of the film and the photographs of the
archive. The digital database provides a mode of media connectivity “after” the
heterogeneity of the  paradigm of the archive, where the gaps and conflicts
resulting from the juxtaposition of the temporal image and the still are no long-
er present. In the digital database, the local and communal modes of human
activity of which Kahn set out to make an inventory have disappeared. The
globalized image of the mass in film and photography has dispersed into indi-
vidual units with a user name, a password and a customer profile. Addressing
the forms of globalization pertaining to the digital code of the control society
depends on understanding how media form our life environments. The media
ecology of “universal machines” condition other kinds of media interrelations
than those of the age where the crowd remained visible. While the masses en-
tered into the visible through the medium of the moving image, as discussed in
different ways by Kahn and Kracauer, the media environments of the computer
age are accompanied by a dispersal of the masses. Post-Fordist production no
longer requires workers in a factory, but relies on individualized work patterns
in front of screens and computers.
This is an age of the archive where the analog exists with a digital “alias”,
where everything returns twice. The photographic and filmic are superimposed
with the digital files of the same events. The communities and people at the
center of Kahn’s archival project were on the brink of disappearance. The fleet-
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ing moments inscribed in the archive’s films and autochromes were inhabited
by ghosts and specters of a lost time. When these images return in digital code,
it is not the return of the same temporality and social technologies as the one
designed by Kahn for his archive. When this haunted archive returns in digital
mode, it is a return of ghosts of ghosts. As a result of this conversion from a
media set-up of the first wave of globalization to the current second globaliza-
tion, the “rhythm of life” has been altered and the montage between the images
is a different one. In this change of pace and mobility, in this reconfigured tem-
porality, intermediary spaces open up. These spaces are the field for an analysis
of image connectivity and modes of montage in the digital age.
Notes
. The Armenian filmmaker Artavazd Peleshian has developed the concept of “Dis-
tance Montage” in a different sense, as it still depends on the material cuts of the
film: Peleshian, “Distance Montage, or The Theory of Distance”, in Documentary
Films of the Armenian Soviet Republic; A Retrospective, Moritz de Hadeln, Hans-Joa-
chim Schlegel (eds.), (Berlin ), -. Harun Farocki develops the concept of
“soft montage” as the comparison of images through multi-channel moving image
installations in: Harun Farocki, “Cross Influence/Soft Montage”, in Harun Farocki.
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